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This dissertation had a complicated genesis in the 
realms of mind before it ever acquired a physical habitation 
and a name on paper, and in writing it I have accumulated a 
special set of debts. The idea for this project occurred to 
me in a seminar with Lewis P. Simpson as an extension of an 
earlier study of Emerson's conception of the Logos. My 
greatest scholarly debt in life is to Professor Simpson, who 
first acquainted me with the problems of consciousness, 
modernity, and language that I have begun to address here 
merely as a footnote to his own monumental achievements as a 
latter-day humanist and man of letters.
Other debts to my teachers at Louisiana State 
University are of scarcely less weight. James Olney helped 
me frame my ideas about the evolution— or perhaps 
dissolution— of the idea of the autonomous self in terms of 
the traditional canon of life-writing, and has lent both 
useful admonitions and support to me during the composition 
of this piece in an infinite variety of ways. His 
investments, particularly of time and energy as I shaped and 
edited this project, have ranged far beyond what any student 
could ask of any teacher. I first tackled the issue of 
medieval nominalism and the flowering (or blight) that it 
engendered as it became internalized in the intellectual 
life of the Reformation, and in Restoration and eighteenth- 
century English literature with John Fischer, and later
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explored these questions with Aubrey Williams, Professor 
Emeritus of English at the University of Florida. I am 
immensely grateful to both for their insight and for their 
endless willingness to explore ideas on these and other 
topics in conversation. Such exchanges are the breath of 
academic life, and without them we find ourselves lapsing 
into the silences of the solipsism that terrified Henry 
Adams. John R. May first introduced me to the work of Walter 
Ong, and with Professor May I explored the relationship 
between the technology of print culture and book-making, and 
the emergence of modern self-consciousness that is the focus 
of Adams's view of western intellectual history. Professor 
May has also been of immense value as a tireless liaison 
with the Graduate School and the Department of English at 
LSU since, as Henry Adams tended to be, I am frequently 
absent instead of present at designated points in physical 
space and time. Joseph V. Ricapito offered me insights on 
the picaresque which have informed my own discussion of 
Adams's mode of narrative in The Education of Henry Adams.
Other professors from outside the community at LSU have 
also been generous with their time and advice. James M. Cox, 
Avalon Professor of English Emeritus of Dartmouth College, 
listened as I talked my way toward a shape for my argument 
at a succession of MLA meetings, and was a continuing source 
of enthusiasm and inspiration, as well as an example of 
courage and intellectual integrity. His view of Henry Adams
v
has colored my own thinking and writing as certainly as his 
view of teaching and learning has altered my understanding 
of the life of the scholar. Thanks are also due to 
Professor Kenneth Surin of the Program in Literature at Duke 
University for his unfailing generosity with his time, and 
for his persistent and probing questions which, while 
daunting, made it easier for me to grapple with the problems 
of modernity, postmodernism, and the idea of a trans­
personal concept of identity. Professor Ronald G. Witt of 
the Department of History at Duke helped me chart a path 
through the complexities of the diffusion of the nominalist 
view of language in medieval and Renaissance Europe in an 
NEH summer seminar in 1993. His assistance was invaluable 
as I picked my way through the tangled history of the view 
of language that Henry Adams believed to be at the heart of 
modernity. While we do not always read the Renaissance in 
identical ways, Professor Witt's rigor and his insistence on 
precision have helped me clarify my views on any number of 
issues in early modern intellectual history.
Differing from these debts to my teachers, but no less, 
is my debt to Gregory Boyce Lyon, my former student, who is 
now a graduate student himself in early modern history at 
Princeton University. I first read Gilles Deleuze's The 
Logic of Sense in his company, as he first read Ficino's 
commentary on Plato's Symposium in mine, and I have found
vi
that the greatest reward of teaching is that our students 
become our teachers.
Finally, I would like to thank those who supplied help 
in more material ways. Virginia S. Wilson and William 
Youngblood, of The North Carolina School of Science and 
Mathematics, were a unified source of unfailing 
encouragement and of release time for trips back to LSU in 
the early days of my writing and research. Marcelline 
Barron, Dean of Academic Programs and Research at the 
Illinois Mathematics and Science Academy, awarded curriculum 
development grants and travel money which facilitated my 
research and allowed me to explore my ideas by teaching them 
in non-traditional courses. The staff at the Massachusetts 
Historical Society allowed me remarkable freedom of access 
to Henry Adams's personal library and papers in the summer 
of 1984. Many of the volumes in his library are extensively 
annotated, and some are mentioned here. Adams's copies of 
William James and Henry Maudsley and Karl Marx, as well as 
his readings on the emerging science of entropy were of 
crucial importance as he formulated the views of self and 
history that are the subject of my own study. Reading his 
annotations in the actual bodily artifacts of his books 
rather than on microfilm invested my time at the Historical 
Society with his (appropriately) ghostly presence.
Perhaps greater than all of these debts which have to 
do with the public world and public life are those private
vii
and nameless ones that I owe to my parents, whose kindness 
and integrity, and whose generous support have made this 
rather extended project possible.
While living in exile on his farm, Machiaveili once 
wrote that his greatest pleasure in life came at the moment 
when he could strip off the muddy clothes of laborer and 
exchange them for metaphorical robes of state. In this 
'•graver dress," he wrote, he could enter his study, and 
visit the "antique courts of the ancients" where he could 
taste at will the food of mind that seemed to him, as he 
roamed the historicized and secularized versions of 
Augustine's courts and palaces of memory, to be his alone.
My own greatest pleasure has been less that of the isolated 
consciousness in communion with the simulacra of thinkers 
conjured in the private spaces of mind than it has been the 
experience of communing with the extraordinary group of men 
and women whom I have mentioned here. Their gifts of mind 
and spirit and their wisdom have made my writing— indeed, my 




This dissertation was produced over a very long period 
of time. It began as a fairly straightforward exercise in 
the history of life-writing. I intended to place Henry Adams 
in the usual line of thinkers— Augustine, Montaigne, and 
Rousseau-— and I planned to show how he anticipated the 
autobiographical experiments of Gertrude Stein and Samuel 
Beckett. That route would have been an easier one and, had I 
followed it, this project would have been completed long 
ago, but as I worked with Adams, and discovered his links 
with the Pre-Raphaelites and with Swinburne and William 
Story as a young man, and his subsequent patronage of 
Auguste Rodin, Augustus Saint-Gaudens, and Henri Bergson in 
later life, I became aware of how passionately involved he 
was with the articulation of a modernist aesthetic of self­
representation. I also came to realize that, in his 
autobiography and his essays, Adams was in search of a world 
founded in something other than historical reason and 
represented through something other the agency of the 
personal self. My way was, at first, fraught with paradox, 
if not outright confusion. I could not, for example, decide 
exactly why Adams had found it necessary to destroy his 
personal diaries, and, symbolically, his youth as he 
finished his painstaking history of the United States. And 
then there were the religious dilemmas of the pseudonymous 
novel } -her, which was written at about the same time as
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the History of the United States. The works that most people 
know— Mt. St. Michel and The Education of Henry Adams— were 
equally confusing, especially since Adams had claimed that 
they were the first two installments of an autobiographical 
enterprise that he equated with suicide, just as he equated 
biography with murder. I was thus fairly sure, that when 
Adams wrote of a "scientific" history he meant something 
other than what most people had assumed he had meant, or at 
least, that his ideas about it changed between the 1880s and 
the first decade of the twentieth century.
Adams became something like the hound of heaven for me, 
except that I pursued him rather than his pursuing me, most
notably through the mazes of streets that lead through
Washington to Rock Creek Church Cemetery, which because 
Adams habitually referred to it simply as "Rock Creek 
Cemetery," I had some difficulty in locating. When I finally 
did get to the cemetery, the day after Christmas, just
before the annual meeting of MLA in 1984, I found that the
landscaping that Adams had commissioned made locating the 
gravesite with its famous statue by St. Gaudens impossible 
without a map. I also learned that Adams had insisted that 
no "verbal markers" identify the grave, and that the statue 
remain nameless. One of the most famous statues in late 
nineteenth-century American sculpture is thus hidden from 
any but the most tenacious seeker by tall evergreens. One 
could pass the monument on all but its northern side and
x
believe that it was a clump of trees. Having obtained my 
map, I found myself standing before the statue that Adams 
claimed had said everything he had to say. Like everything 
else about Adams, however, the statue was only another 
unfolding of a Chinese box of self-representations. That 
late December afternoon, in a blaze of sunlight, I found 
myself face-to-face with the most enigmatic statue I had 
ever encountered. It was both male and female, both powerful 
and vulnerable, both anguished and at peace, as Adams had 
intended it to be. The statue was the wordless metaphor— the 
perfect silence— which in its stillness communicated all 
that Adams had meant by "education” and all the ways of 
seeing and being that lay outside the realm of rational 
discourse. The statue did indeed have the power to tell me 
everything I was to learn about Henry Adams's personal 
odyssey, but at the time I felt more like Browning's Childe 
Roland, and the statue looked more like a ruined and gutted 
chapel than any legitimate source of revelation. I was like 
the tourists that Adams himself liked to watch from the 
vantage point of the Egyptian marble benches that surround 
the statue. He enjoyed his role as unnoticed observer then, 
and I suppose he would have enjoyed watching me as I, like 
the pilgrims of two generations before me, read the 
hieroglyph of my own condition in the impassive face before 
me without knowing that I was beholding a simulacrum of my 
own dilemmas.
What I gradually realized, after a summer among Adams's 
books and papers at the Massachusetts Historical Society, 
was that the statue, like the Education, which Adams claimed 
shielded a core of meaning hidden from all but the most 
determined readers, was a sort of Augustinian emblem of 
reading. The idle passerby would simply pass by— and be 
rewarded with a husk of meaning. Adams's real audience would 
persist, and be rewarded with a kernel of meaning that was 
nevertheless and necessarily indecipherable. The unmarked 
statue haunted me, especially since Adams had also demanded 
that no illustrations accompany the Education.
Suddenly one day, as I was thinking about Adams's 
fondness for Pope, I realized that Adams had centered his 
ideas about the possibility of meaning in history in the 
problem of language for some of the same reasons that Pope 
had written the Dunciad. Pope had feared the linguistic 
legacy of the philosophic via moderna. and Adams's work was 
a sort of self-consciously final exemplum of it. I thus 
began another journey, and this one led me through mazes of 
mind that made the streets of Washington seem like models of 
clarity as I retraced Adams's personal intellectual history. 
Adams may have begun with Gibbon and Hegel, but his own 
path, as my own did, carried me to the Reformation— which 
Adams saw as the crack between the medieval and modern 
worlds— and to the nominalism of Scotus and Ockham that 
Adams believed had been its place of origin. After a year of
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such endeavor I understood that Adams had indeed extended 
the modernizing project of Scotus and Ockham, but had done 
so not by embracing its logical outgrowth in enlightenment 
thinking, but by rejecting it. Most specifically, Adams 
sought, with Nietzsche, to reject the doctrine that mind and 
consciousness are the world. He became fascinated with 
philosophic vitalism late in life, and saw it as a 
counterpart to the explosive new work in theoretical physics 
that preoccupied him in the first years of the twentieth 
century. Seen in this light, Adams's claim in some of his 
letters that the Education had represented an exploration of 
Bergsonian doctrines about identity made more sense. I saw 
that Adams, who was born in 1838, but, as he insisted, had 
also been born in the twelfth century with Abelard, and 
reborn in new form every time he finished writing a new 
book, was most properly seen, as he himself claimed, as a 
theorist and historian of historiography. His proper 
company in the history of ideas was indeed provided by 
Augustine and Montaigne, and Rousseau, but also by Petrarch, 
Ockham, Althusser, and Deleuze. My own study has thus taken 
unexpected turns, and as it has turned, I have turned; in 
the process, the boundaries between Henry Adams and me, and 
the text about Henry Adams that I have written into being 
have become progressively more blurred.
This is not a traditional dissertation. I have not 
included the usual overview of scholarly texts about Adams,
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and there are few citations from them because most scholars 
have read Adams from either a more literary or more 
historical point of view than I have. There are works like 
Robert Vitzhum's The American Compromise or Lois Hughson's 
From Biography to History, in which Adams is primarily an 
historian and biographer. Then there are more literary 
treatments— like William Decker's The Literary Vocation of 
Henrv Adams, or John Carlos Rowe's Henry Adams and Henry 
James, or Carolyn Porter's brilliant discussion of Adams in 
her Seeing and Being; The Plight of the Participant Observer 
in Emerson. James. Adams and Faulkner. These, and others 
like them, are excellent and useful studies, but I felt that 
if Adams saw his letters and essays, biographies and 
autobiographies as pieces of fractured whole that was both 
representative of himself and of a modern consciousness of 
history, then he needed to be represented in those terms. I 
have thus chosen to consider Adams as he himself considered 
himself— as a social theorist and historiographer. Thus 
Foucault and Hans Blumenberg, Gilles Deleuze and Georges 
Bataille have replaced the more expected names from the 
realm of American Studies.
My work is intended as a series of views of Adams, a 
kaleidoscope of perspectives. It is not intended as a final 
reading of his work, but rather as what Harold Bloom once 
called a "map of misreading"— the kind of reading that 
necessarily leads us to a renewed and more vital response.
xiv
As a student of Adams, I have sought to emulate the role he 
assumes as guide in his Mt. St. Michel and Chartres. I 
cannot claim to point the reader toward the truth of the 
texts we will encounter, but I can promise to give him a 
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This study traces Henry Adams's evolution from an 
enlightenment historian to a prescient postmodern theorist, 
and explores how he came to regard his own intellectual 
history as paradigmatic of the arc of subjectivity in the 
West from the Middle Ages to Nietzsche and Bergson. Adams 
was a self-conscious philosophical nominalist, and he 
believed that his radical doubts about the capacity of 
language for embodying meaning had their origin in medieval 
nominalism. Adams found the seeds of modernity and the 
problem of subjectivity which were the focus of his own 
musings on the nature of the self and history in Abelard and 
Ockham. Nominalism was, in Adams's view, the only tenable 
position for the self-imprisoned subject of modernity. 
Adams's view of language and its powers also anticipates the 
view of the relationship between self and identity, and self 
and world in later thinkers like Louis Althusser and Gilles 
Deleuze. Partly because of his conception of the de-centered 
Word, the act of writing enjoys a special status in Adams's 
work. Adams's eloquent and rapacious "I" consumes all of 
universal history. His "I" is a self-creating and fluid 
entity constituted within a verbal matrix. Adams is thus not 
only Adam^, but all of his models from Augustine to Petrarch 
to Bergson. Adams believed that the model of world grounded 
in consciousness was one that condemned the perceiving 
subject to a terrible isolation; his final efforts at self-
xvii
representation in Mt.St. Michel and Chartres and The 
Education of Henry Adams, and in the historical essays that 
he claimed were addenda to his autobiography are efforts to 
murder the personal self in order to escape it. Adams's 
infamous claims that biography was murder and autobiography 
suicide become explicable in this context. Adams's many 
versions of self in textual form— whether his personae 
appear as biographical or historical characters or as 
figures in his parodic version of autobiography— are all 
founded in written texts which become the ground of his 
communication with the world.
xviii
CHAPTER 1
SUBJECTIVITY, WORLD PICTURES, AND THE PROBLEM
OF LANGUAGE
Toward the end of his life, Henry Adams came to speak 
of his long and varied writing career as a quest for "form" 
that had found its fruition in "failure." In trying to 
define what he meant, we may think of Adams's "failure" as 
embodied in the works for which he is best remembered— Mt. 
St. Michel and Chartres and The Education of Henry Adams—  
which Adams regarded as a single effort that had been 
extended and completed in his essay "The Rule of Phase 
Applied to History." He wrote John Franklin Jameson that 
the "Rule of Phase" was merely a "supplementary chapter" for 
the Education. Adams implied that, taken together, these 
three works constituted his autobiography. Adams's avowed 
purpose in all three writings had been to "suggest a reform 
of the whole University system, grouping all knowledge as an 
historical stream to be treated by historical methods." He 
wrote that he had invented a new form for the three works, 
and that his innovation would enable him to construct an 
autobiographical survey of the "stream of knowledge" from 
the twelfth century to the twentieth that was "literary and 
not technical."
Adams's claim that a work on architecture and stained 
glass and an essay on the processes of history were part of 
his own life story is startling. Although we know that he
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had predicted that in the future all history would have to 
be autobiographical, difficulties arise when we attempt to 
press Adams's use of the word ’’form." Adams was a man who 
adopted many masks, and his quest for aesthetic form was 
itself but another of Adams's many personae, one which was 
synonymous with his quest for the shape of personal 
identity. Both quests seem at some point to have merged in 
his mind with the "historical stream [of knowledge] from the 
12th century till today."
Explicitly, Adams believed that his identity was 
inseparable from, and perhaps synonymous with the patterns 
of intellectual history from the late Middle Ages to the 
twentieth century. He chose to engage in a species of life- 
writing that allowed him to use himself and his own 
intellectual evolution as a paradigm for western 
intellectual history. This enterprise was both enigmatic 
and paradoxical. As his niece Mabel LaFarge explained,
Adams "loved to hide himself and invented every possible 
means for doing so." At the same time, he lived as though 
he were continually on stage in the theater of history. The 
persona he adopts is not unlike that of the picaro, and his 
mode of autobiography is closer to the first person— and 
presumably fictional— narrative of a picaresque novel than 
it is to that of John Stuart Mill. Whether he was 
destroying his diaries and announcing that he had destroyed 
six years of his life in the process, or writing
pseudonymous novels, or merging his own identity with the 
Queen of Tahiti's in a joint memoir, he was always engaged 
both in self-creation and in the analysis and ironic 
exposure of the fictions and myths of the idea of personal 
identity which he recognized as having informed the primary 
notions of order in western society. This was equally true 
in the case of his histories and biographies. Like his 
other experiments in narrative, these more conventional 
works tended to deal explicitly with the failed promises of 
republics and individuals, while at the same time providing 
Adams with yet more surrogate selves.
In all of his literary experiments Adams was in search 
of an appropriate monument for his existence. Believing with 
Hegel that he inhabited an "age of prose,"1 Adams wrote 
primarily in the narrative mode. He described narrative as 
a "ruling mode of perception," a "style of comprehension" in 
the modern world. However, Adams's novels, histories, 
biographies, and autobiographies are all somewhat oblique 
explorations of the boundaries of the personal self. Like 
many thinkers of his day, Adams was profoundly aware that 
the self is the creature of its perceptions. The route of 
his quest for a model of self-representation that would 
reflect the chaos of modern life rather than an organic 
notion of order led him to adopt and abandon the generic 
forms of novel, narrative history, and biography. In fact, 
his narrative quest is a kind of charnel house, littered
with exhausted forms and selves, and unified and mediated by 
the extraordinary body of his letters, which run to six 
volumes. Adams's autobiography, the presumed formal apex of 
his career, is an exercise in which he legitimizes his 
radical rejection of the concept of identity as a viable 
organizing principle for the definition of his being. In 
order to reveal the great hoax inherent in the notion of the 
personal self, Adams had to deconstruct even the 
conventional forms of autobiography, and our experience of 
reading his own efforts at self-representation is the 
experience of stripping off the layers of autobiographical 
texts that precede and determine the shape of Adams's 
narrative. Indeed, if it can be said that his writing as a 
whole involves a quest for form, it must also be said that 
it also and equally involves a quest for simultaneous self­
definition and annihilation. Adams's autobiography echoes 
and underscores Rilke's anguished recognition that, for the 
subject of modernity, "nowhere will world exist but 
within."2 In "The Rule of Phase," Adams wrote that "the 
mind has always figured its motives as reflections of 
itself...and this is as true in its conception of 
electricity as in its instinctive imitation of a god." 
"Always and everywhere," he continues, "the mind creates its 
own universe and pursues its own phantoms."3 Adams was not 
Emerson, exulting in the possibility that "mind creates the 
world...and that at last all matter is dead mind." Rather,
5
he envisions the self and the subjectivity which governs its
perceptions as a permanent prison-house. In the Preface to
the Education he says that the work, like the Henry Adams of
the title, is the product of a "shrunken Ego."
Appropriately, the Education is written in the third person.
Alienated even from himself, Adams cannot be sure that the
self that pens its own life story has any existence.
...I am trying to persuade myself that 
there is any such thing as me. More and 
more I am forced to admit that the whole 
show is a piece of idiocy...but I wrote 
all that ten years ago as education...4
Annotating his copies of the works of William James some
twenty years earlier, Adams was already thinking of the self
in terms that were beyond modern.
Is thought a stream? Has it a starting 
point or an end? Why not call it an 
ocean with streams in it? Or the inter­
reflections of mirrors?...Or a magnet, 
with lines of force? Or a condition, 
like time and space? Does thought think, 
or do I think, or does the earth-worm 
think?5
Throughout his copies of the James volumes, Adams's
annotations reflect his obsession with the problem of
consciousness and its engulfment of world.
The soul in philosophy is the ego. The 
phenomenon is not ego, but the 
consciousness of the ego. 'Cogito ergo 
sum,' the old, old formula! But what am 
I? All this is to return to the old 
dispute without answering the old 
question.6
Elsewhere, in another annotated volume in his library,
Henry Maudsley's Body and Will. Adams marked a number of
passages that suggest that the supposition that there is any
world external to our own consciousnesses is no more than a
useful working hypothesis. In his extensive annotations to
Maudsley, Adams wrote that it is "futile ingenuity" to
"think anything outside of human consciousness."7 If Adams
was uncertain about the nature of consciousness and the
existence of the world outside the self, he also despaired
of attaining to any sort of knowledge through introspection.
Of all studies the one he would rather 
have avoided was that of his own mind.
He knew of no tragedy so heart-rending
as introspection...Nearly all the 
highest intelligence known to history 
had drowned itself in the reflection of 
its own thought and the bovine survivors 
had rudely told the truth about it 
without affecting the intelligent.
Adams's fascination with the problem of consciousness led
him back to metaphysics and to the reconfiguration of the
history of philosophy as a history of subjectivity which
would end in a science of chaos.
He got out his Descartes again; dipped 
into his Hume and Berkeley, wrestled 
anew with his Kant, pondered solemnly 
over his Hegel and Schopenhauer and 
Hartmann; strayed gaily away with his 
Greeks-— all ...to ask what Unity meant, 
and what happened when one denied it.8
His studies led him to conclude that as "bottomless" as 
nihilism and pessimism seemed, the western philosophic 
tradition had been content to collapse the "universe of
contradictions" into "the human thought as one Will" and 
"treat it as representation." Adams was not satisfied with 
the idea of treating the universe as a "motion of mind." At 
the same time, he feared that one could know the universe 
only "as oneself; it was psychology."
Because Adams framed his philosophic difficulties in 
the way that he did, any study of Henry Adams is necesse-rlly 
concerned with Adams's oddly prescient articulation of the 
twin problems of modernity and subjectivity. Long before 
the time of postmodern theorists, and even before the time 
of Heidegger, Adams was addressing the problem of what it 
means to be a splintered subject who both constructs and 
inhabits the mental landscape that we know as modernity. 
Adams claimed that the Chicago Exhibition of 1893 had 
shattered his sense of historical continuity, but as early 
as 1882 he had begun to ask what it means to be a subject 
thinking in a privately constituted world that it 
conceptualizes in representational terms. All of his late 
work is about what it means to be an isolated self 
conceiving of the world in terms of a construct as 
artificial as that of modernity on the one hand, and about 
the ages that came before it in terms of what Heidegger 
called their alternative "world pictures" on the other. 
Though he began by assuming with most Victorians that 
history was a mirror which could provide both the individual 
and his age with meaning and a map of the future he ends by
questioning the very possibility of producing even 
subjectively grounded meanings in history. He may have 
claimed to have found a ground for his being in the twelfth 
century and the sense of unity that he found there, but he 
also came to believe that this was both a curiously 
artificial and a curiously modern way of reconstructing the 
past as a simulacrum of self.
Adams was one of the first self-conscious students of 
modernism, and he found a focus for his fascination with the 
alien entity that was modern man in the phenomenon of 
machines and the universe of force which they seemed to 
emblematize. The theory of history which he developed in 
the first decade of the twentieth century uses the machine 
as a symbol of the triumph of a conceptual and impersonal 
series of forces which he saw as having replaced the 
principle of identity and order with a vision of mappable 
chaos. Implicitly, then, Adams's late work is not only 
about modernity and subjectively constituted worlds. It is 
also about the advent of the formless formulae and the anti- 
selves that mark the embrace of difference and exteriority 
in post-modern thought. Adams's critique of identity in fact 
helps explain his recognition that the concept of personal 
identity with its dependence on the existence of substantive 
constructs like "god" and "self" and "world" is not the only 
one for organizing experience.9 Adams recognized in the 
first decade of the twentieth century that what was at stake
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in modernity was the emergence of a subject which would 
arbitrarily "picture" both history and the self as 
constructions of mind. Adams also knew, however, that the 
Cartesian model of consciousness was not the only one for 
the perceiving subject, and that the modern self was not a 
single entity at all, but rather the product of 
"multiplicity," a term that Adams uses idiosyncratically as 
a sort of shorthand for his sense of the fragmentation of 
modern intellectual life. Subjectivity itself is a 
condition which determines the self-conscious fascination 
with the power to conceive a world picture, but the subject 
is multiple, an entity simultaneously beset and determined 
by what Anthony Cascardi calls "a field of conflicting 
discourses"— the often contradictory modes of self­
conception and expression that characterize the discourses 
of philosophy, literature, religion and psychology in the 
modern world.10 In this view, the self is a compilation of 
multiple voices, a production founded in language. Thus, 
Adams can legitimately claim that he is equally present in 
his Education, his biography of John Randolph, and in his 
history of the Madison and Jefferson administrations through 
his articulation of these entities through words.
As I have suggested, Adams couched his own meditation 
on modernity and a prophecy of post-modernity in his letters 
and in the series of texts he called his autobiography— Mt. 
St. Michel and Chartres, The Education of Henry Adams, and
"The Rule of Phase Applied to History." His resulting forays
into the history of consciousness and self-consciousness and
the problem of subjectivity required him to center his
discussion in a consideration of modern man's dependence on
language and its adequacy as an instrument for connecting
him to the uncertain world that lies beyond the perceiving
self. Adams revisits the ancient question of realism and
nominalism in language, a question that was apparently much
on his mind in the first years of the twentieth century as
he finished Mt. St. Michel and Chartres and began writing
the Education. In his annotated copy of Alfred R. Wallace's
Man's Place in the Universe. Adams articulated his perennial
fascination with the "multiplicity of the modern world" in
terms of nominalism and realism.
'Unity' means to be one in regard to 
mechanical, physical, and chemical laws.
This one-ness constitutes a unit.
Therefore fishes constitute a unit.
Water is a unit. Space and time are 
units. The old question of Realism and 
Nominalism alive as ever.11
Gilles Deleuze locates the origins of nominalism in the
thought of the Stoics,12 and Adams claimed to be fascinated
by Zeno, at least, but his questions about the limits of
language are more reflective of Plato's Cratvlus. and the
self-erasing impulse of the Parmenides than they are of the
works of Zeno. Moreover, Adams focuses on medieval
nominalism rather than its classical antecedents as a
manifestation of western man's fascination with the power of
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will and the phenomenon of force. Adams believed that the 
nominalists and their via moderna had begotten a universe of 
subjectivity in which language was specially privileged.
For Adams, modernity and subjectivity were monstrous doubles 
of one another, the twin fruits of the displacement of God 
and the Locos by man and the fragile and tentative words 
that he employs as vehicles for transmitting meaning.
Adams's fear of words and his fascination with their power 
seem to have crystallized along with his doubts about the 
possibility of producing an objective, scientifically 
determined version of history. He saw in nominalism the 
roots not only of the fragmented sensibility of the modern 
world, but also of its faith in science and in the 
possibility of naming a new heaven, new earth into being 
through the right use of reason.
Adams's fascination with language was hardly unique; 
other late nineteenth-century writers were aware that at 
least from the time of Descartes, the power of language had 
been determined by the "I" which uses it. Adams's innovation 
was his replication of Pope's location of the origins of the 
fragmentation of an ideal of community founded and 
reinforced through a universal language in medieval 
nominalism. The "I" of the Cartesian coqito both 
constitutes and determines its world because of philosophic 
innovations that preceded the Discourse on Method by 
centuries. Adams realized that Descartes was not interested
in the nature of the hats and cloaks that passed for people 
in the streets beneath his windows. Rather, both Descartes 
and Adams after him, helplessly following in the paths of 
the via moderna. were concerned with how their own "personal 
'I'" was manifested in the hats and cloaks or any other 
objects that came before their field of vision.
Subjectivity is triumphant in Descartes' Meditations. and 
becomes the primary term of existence in the modern world at 
the same time that personal identity, with language as its 
mouthpiece, is necessarily explicitly privileged and 
empowered. In such a world, the words that we use to 
connect ourselves to the world outside the self assume 
deific capacities. For the subject of modernity, words are 
the primary indicators of being.
Adams's view of language is best understood in the 
context of Ockham's fourteenth-century versions of 
nominalism and the resurgent, but sometimes unconscious, 
nominalism of the late nineteenth century. Adams's ability 
to create and abolish selves through narrative, and his 
belief that his biographies were really about himself echoes 
Nietzsche's claim that "every name in history is 'I.'" 
Deleuze sees Lewis Carroll as a central figure in 
nineteenth-century nominalism.13 The pseudonymous Carroll, 
himself a double and renaming of Ernest Dodgson, can have 
his heroine, Alice, go on a quest where she has a revelation 
that causes her to misplace her sense of personal identity.
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Afterwards, Alice experiences life as it is defined by an 
alien sense of the order of things, a world in which Humpty 
Dumpty says that when he uses a word it means exactly what 
he decides it will mean. Alice as a subject of modernity 
thus reverses the experience of epic heroes, whose quests 
were crowned by a revelation of meaning. Meanings confirmed 
from outside the universe of subjectivity are lost in the 
seas of modernity.
There is a little of Dodgson, of Lewis Carroll, and of 
Alice in Henry Adams. Adams embarks from the vantage point 
provided by the enlightenment sensibility on a quest for 
education, one which he thought would have predictable ends. 
His quest is memorialized in acts of life-writing that are 
also a succession of literary funerals. He projects his own 
linguistic anti-self into a textual entombment through a 
self-proclaimed "suicide in print." Adams thus represents 
the triumph of a view of language that both empowers and 
buries the personal self of the writer.
There are two tendencies implicit in the view of 
language that accompanies the emergence of the modern world. 
On the one hand, the Ockhamist, and, later, the Cartesian 
vision suggests that the world beyond the hats and cloaks is 
still available. It is the locus of reality that has 
shifted, not its final composition. God is dependent on the 
perceiving self's consciousness of God. World is contingent 
on the perceiving self's constitution of it as world. God
and Self and World remain intact in this vision, and 
language retains its capacity to embody meanings that 
reasonable individuals can not only agree upon, but which 
they can use as a route of access to the realm of the 
transcendent. The other vision, that of Ockham; of Swift's 
"Modern Author" in A Tale of a Tub; of Lewis Carroll in 
Alice in Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass; and of 
Henry Adams in his late work, suggests that words are 
arbitrary designations which, like the self that articulates 
them, create a chasm as much as a bridge between self and 
world. In Mt. St. Michel and Chartres Adams writes that 
linguistic realism was the Roman arch that presupposed unity 
between this world and another more permanent one. As he 
wrote again and again, the "attempt to bridge the chasm 
between multiplicity and unity" was "the oldest problem of 
philosophy, religion, and science." Adams demonstrates in 
Mt. St. Michel that nominalism is the necessary stance for a 
modernist, but he also says that it offers "no cover at 
all." There is thus a profound tension in Adams between the 
longing for unity and the embrace of multiplicity. For 
Adams, medieval nominalism began with Abelard's notion of 
concepts. This doctrine, Adams writes, was like a "false 
wooden roof" concealing a flawed construction. Despite his 
skepticism, Adams nevertheless retains a faith in "an energy 
not individual" that is "hidden" somewhere. His faith 
allowed him continue to question the possibility of the
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availability of some universal fountain of meaning, while 
balancing his linguistic doubles on the edge of the abyss of 
meaninglessness. Thus, his "Prayer to the Virgin of 
Chartres" co-exists with the ever-multiplying levels of 
narrative voice and self in the Education.
Adams seems to have actively sought release from the 
"sea of introspection" in an arena beyond the realm of 
personal identity which was available to him through 
writing. His Education records his embrace of a dimension 
of being excluded by the whole concept of identity.
Deleuze, who places himself, much as Henry Adams did, in the 
company first of the Stoics and then of Ockham and his 
nominalist followers, calls this arena the "realm of sense." 
Deleuze defines the realm of sense as a region of pure 
event, and sees it has having been recaptured in Nietzsche's 
desire to reverse Platonism as well as in the linguistic 
studies of late nineteenth-century linguists like Meinong.14 
It was this region, in radical rejection of his past and 
what he regarded as the discontinuity of being that it 
engendered, that Adams sought to figure for his readers in 
his autobiography and later essays.
As it is represented in his tri-partite autobiography, 
and as he had planned, Adams's thought recapitulates and 
mirrors the intellectual history of the modern world. He 
begins his account of himself in the last three chapters of 
Mt. St. Michel and Chartres. There, Adams discusses the
problem of medieval nominalism in language that anticipates 
Deleuze's description of the world of sense, that realm that 
freed the Stoics from the necessity of reflection and the 
prisonhouse of what would later be called historical self- 
consciousness. For Adams, the roots of his own identity 
were implicit in the linguistic dilemmas of the thirteenth 
century. Adams's language in Mt. St. Michel anticipates 
the cadence of the self-erasing sentences of the Education. 
As he explained repeatedly, the first part of his 
autobiography, Mt. St. Michel and Chartres, was an attempt 
to "realise the Unity of Thought in the Thirteenth Century." 
The Education. he claimed, was an attempt to "Realise the 
Multiplicity of Thought in the Twentieth" (Letters. VI,
117). Adams claims that he chose the thirteenth century as 
a point of unity, but, in fact, he believed that "unity," at 
least as he understood it, had been lost in the twelfth 
century. And, as Hans Blumenberg has suggested half a 
century later, and Adams already knew in 1903, the roots of 
modernity actually lie in late medieval nominalism's 
conception of a deus absconditus who was far removed from 
man, but who had given man language and will to allow him to 
construct a shared sense of a world peopled by individuals 
who exist only as discrete entities. Our concepts of world 
in Ockham's view are acts of mind, and it is only through 
them that we attain to any knowledge of self or world.
Adams saw in the nominalists' focus on the relationship
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between language, logic, and reality, and their emphasis on 
man's power for interpreting texts the seeds of the 
subjectively generated universe that would flower in the 
historical consciousness of a Petrarch, and begin to self- 
destruct in the Reformation's efforts at radical 
enlightenment for the faithful through the reading of 
individual texts. For Adams, the project of religious 
enlightenment which would reach its secularized apotheosis 
in the invention of America as a scientific project was 
conceived in the academy of the late Middle Ages.
The works which make up Adams's autobiography are a 
sort of twentieth-century version of a Jonathan Swift's Tale 
of a Tub, and, as in their great original, false prefaces 
and self-deconstructing assertions contrive to entrap and 
confront the reader with all of his preconceptions about the 
capacity of narrative to contain meaning. Because Adams 
chose to frame his narrative of his existence in this way, 
any study of him, in a perverse sense, can only incidentally 
be a dissertation about Henry Adams. Seen as an infinite 
and echoing hall of mirrors, the entire corpus of Adams's 
work is nevertheless finally empty of whatever it was that 
was Henry Adams. As he had promised in letters that 
antedate his "autobiography" by twenty years, he erases 
himself in print. To study Henry Adams's work is to study 
not the man himself but the context which created his vision 
of the world he inhabited and his vision of the world that
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would come after him. Adams would have approved the idea of 
his being only incidental to a study whose title features 
his name prominently. His way of conjuring a self by 
representing its absence allowed Adams to effectively 
realize his own erasure and the suicide of at least his 
literary selves in print.
Adams doubted the adequacy of the perceiving self as an 
sufficient narrating principle for his own autobiography, 
much less as a source of order in a narrative about an 
individually experienced but nevertheless collective 
cultural past that we still call history. By the early 
years of the twentieth century he was writing that he 
doubted that there was any such thing as Henry Adams at all. 
At the same time, and perhaps more than any other single 
figure in western intellectual history, Henry Adams is an 
appropriate focus for a study of the fabrication and 
simultaneous fragmentation of the subject amid its various 
avenues of expression in discourse. In his three-part 
autobiography— Mt. St. Michel and Chartres. The Education of 
Henry Adams, and "The Rule of Phase Applied to History"—  
Henry Adams self-consciously writes a coda to the centuries 
of self-referential discourse that followed Montaigne's 
location of the self in the processes of narrating his 
perceptions, and Descartes' definition half a century later 
of man as a "thing which thinks." Adams is also an 
appropriate focus for a study of the fate of the
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enlightenment project, which I, following Jurgen Habermas, 
have called the "project of modernity."15 Adams saw his 
intellectual odyssey as not only a focal point for such a 
discussion, but as its embodiment. In dispassionate fact, 
Adams's career does epitomize in small the progress of 
western intellectual history and the idea of self- 
consciousness from, as he says, at least the eighteenth 
century to the present, and perhaps, as he believed, from 
the twelfth century to the present.
The enlightenment project as it is usually understood 
originated in the eighteenth century, and accounts for 
Adams's otherwise peculiar and always misunderstood claim 
that his was initially an eighteenth-century sensibility.
The "project of modernity" encompasses the primary aim of 
the Enlightenment, with its faith in Condorcet's belief that 
there was one universal law and one universal language. 
Implicit in this claim was the corollary notion that history 
was single and universal, and that it chronicled man's 
progress toward the sacralization and demystification of 
nature and man's knowledge of nature alike.16 The adherents 
of the project of modernity recognized that change and 
transitoriness were apt to intrude in the gradual 
realization of enlightenment, but they believed that these 
were temporary states which would be overcome as science 
replaced mystery in all areas of human endeavor, and the 
modes of discourse which accompanied them were examined,
20
honed, and perfected. The power of the enlightenment's 
vision of man derived from its faith in the value of the 
individual, or more exactly, of the personal self.
Adams began with this faith, but like a single thread, 
unifying the myriad modes of discourse which comprise the 
body of Adams's work is the single theme of the crisis and 
eventual failure of the enlightenment project as it was 
manifested in the ideas about the individual's capacity to 
know himself and his world. The Ockhamist project, which 
Adams saw as the ancestor of the enlightenment project, had 
sought to derive an ahistorical truth available to all men 
based on reason and experience and articulated in the shared 
signs of a common language. Ockham's hopes explode in 
Adams's autobiography. Ockham had insisted that meaning 
would emerge as man analyzed the phenomena of his world. 
Adams finds not meaning, but only an infinity of 
disconnected signs. He ends not as a modernist at all, but 
as a postmodernist whose suspicion of the enlightenment 
project rival that first of Nietzsche and Weber, and later 
that of figures as diverse as Adorno and Althusser, Habermas 
and Deleuze. Adams may have called himself everything from a 
eighteenth-century man to a "conservative Christian 
anarchist" to a Hegelian and, by implication in his letters, 
a Marxist, but whatever name he assigned himself, he 
believed that his intellectual experience was the type or 
figure of the progress of western consciousness and self-
consciousness from the "seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries" (Education, 723) and "tastes founded on Pope and
Dr. Johnson" (Education. 752) to a new world picture whose
lineaments were determined by Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud.
Turn the dilemma as he pleased, he still 
came back on the eighteenth century and 
the law of Resistance, of Truth; of 
Duty, and of Freedom. He could under no 
circumstances have guessed what the next 
fifty years would teach him, but 
sometimes, in his old age he wondered—  
and could never decide— whether the most 
clear and certain knowledge would have 
helped him...would he have quitted his 
eighteenth-century...his abstract 
ideals...to perform an expiatory 
pilgrimage to State Street and ask for 
the fatted calf of his grandfather 
Brooks...
(Education. 740)
Nowhere is Adams's transformation into a postmodernist 
more apparent than in his shifting attitudes toward the 
problem of language. If the unifying thread in Adams's 
personal project is that of the gradual erosion of faith in 
the enlightenment project and its replacement by a new 
vision that was essentially postmodernist in design, the 
unifying thread in my own meditation is Adams's fascination 
with the power of language. Implicit in the enlightenment 
project is the notion that there are single answers to 
multiple difficulties. If we could represent the world 
accurately— picture it accurately and objectively— and, by 
extension, assign it accurate names through language, we 
could control and order it. Adams and others of his
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generation still felt this to be as true of the writing of 
history as it was of the projects of the natural sciences. 
And, as David Harvey points out, this was a way of thinking 
about language and about the world that it represents that 
united thinkers who were otherwise quite different from one 
another. Voltaire and Diderot, Condorcet and Hume, Adam 
Smith and Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill and Matthew 
Arnold shared a sense that a "single, correct mode of 
representation"17 was possible. Among these, however, at 
least Matthew Arnold, and, more profoundly, Henry Adams, 
came to feel quite differently about language.18 As the 
previously cited annotations to William James suggest, Adams 
wrote that all the new philosophy did was to revisit the 
endless debate between nominalism and realism.
Adams's most explicit discussion of the problem of 
language is couched in the imaginary journeys that make up 
Mt. St. Michel and Chartres; A Study in Twelfth-Centurv 
Unity. As readers, we accompany him in search of a vision 
of unity, but, with Adams as a unreliable guide, we founder 
on the rock of the uncertainties implicit in nominalism at 
the same time that we see in them the reflection of our 
doubts about the nature of language.19 Adams believed that 
he was part of what later thinkers have called a paradigm 
shift, and that he had found the roots of modernity and the 
roots of his own epistemological difficulties in the late 
Middle Ages and the growing denial of the capacity of man to
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attain to a knowledge of universals. Adams thus dramatizes 
the ancient conflict between linguistic nominalism and 
realism, and writes his own version of the phenomenon of 
resurgent nominalism which characterizes the philosophical 
discourse of modernity.
From the time in the 1860s when he discovered John 
Smith's falsification of autobiographical episodes in 
history of the Virginia colony, Henry Adams seems to have 
feared the power of the word at the same time that he 
celebrates it with a sensibility akin to that of Derrida. 
Like everything else about Adams— who described himself at 
the age of twenty as hopelessly dualistic— his attitude 
toward language remains paradoxical. In the years between 
1903 and 1915, when he adopted what I am calling his stance 
as a postmodernist, Adams makes himself the god of his 
narrative universe and experiments with the randomness of 
linguistic descriptions at the same time that the very 
existence of his autobiography reveals his old terror of the 
usurping power of words. Far from reflecting a sense of 
linguistic plenitude, Adams's work reflects his ever- 
intensifying belief that words had no referent outside 
themselves, that they were echoes and shadows of the 
perceiving subject which articulates them. Thus, Adams 
invents an audience for his imaginative journey through the 
Middle Ages in Mt. St. Michel and Chartres, but he must also 
destroy his diaries lest they be left to "gibbet" him.
Adams seems to have believed that, once articulated, verbal 
constructs had the capacity to incarnate linguistic doubles 
whose reality was as certain as that of their maker. Adams's 
ideas about language reflect the enlightenment project's 
obsession with articulating the power of words. In the 
early years of the century Coleridge and even Emerson seemed 
to cling to a belief that there was an essential 
correspondence between mind and nature and between words and 
the things they named.20 Coleridge, for example, had longed 
to write a volume on "Logos, or the communicative 
intelligence in nature and Man."21 As David Riede has 
shown, the Romantic certainty of a correspondence between 
self and mind and world and the words that mediate between 
them gives way to another view— that espoused by the 
emerging scientific agnosticism of thinkers like Thomas 
Huxley or Robert Chambers. Chambers, in fact, suggested as 
early as 1844 that language was not of divine origin at all, 
but rather a set of signs and gestures which represented 
man's somewhat limited improvement over animals.22 An 
intense conflict raged in Adams's day between proponents of 
the emerging sciences of man and the physical world alike, 
who believed that there might be no God, and the advocates 
for religion, who believed that God had created the world 
and given man speech as a means of bridging the endless 
distances between the visible and intelligible universes.23 
Adams reflects the tendencies of both sides. When he
destroyed his own diaries while he was reading the 
publishers' proofsheets for his monumental "scientific 
history" of the Jefferson and Madison Administrations, he 
claimed to be destroying himself. A decade later, Adams 
refused to assist his brother Brooks in a preparation of a 
biography of their father in fear that if he failed to call 
his father and his grandfather, or John Randolph or himself 
by the right names they would vanish.
Adams's longing for a belief in a time when words still 
had meanings of their own places him among the Romantics.
His certainty that meaning was constructed and artificial 
places him in a different line of thinkers from Coleridge 
and Wordsworth, and even from Chambers and Arnold. His 
radical doubt about that plenitude of language which made it 
possible for Wordsworth and Coleridge to traverse a sea of 
imagination into a more unified vision of being moves him 
backward toward Abelard and Ockham, and forward toward 
Deleuze. Adams thus should be considered as the intellectual 
companion of Nietzsche, not as a descendent of Gibbon and 
the other eighteenth-century icons of order he had admired 
in his youth. At the same time, Adams demands that his 
readers embark on the same journey through seas of 
imagination that his romantic predecessors made. All the 
while warning us that such a journey is not possible, Adams 
borrows the informing symbol of the opening section of the 
Mt. St. Michel and Chartres from Section IX of Wordsworth's
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"Intimations” Ode. As we discover, the journey miscarries 
even in the conception.
Adams's obsession with language and with the subject 
that represents world in speech is also reflective of his 
sense as an historian that the essentially fictional device 
of narrative is the historian's only means of recovering and 
translating meaning within the matrix of an historical 
continuum.24 After his history of the Madison and Jefferson 
Administrations is completed Adams no longer believed that 
the past can be recovered. Paradoxically, he retains his 
old belief, derived from George Bancroft, that 
quintessential Enlightenment historian, that the province of 
the self is duplicated and can be represented through the 
processes of history. What interests Adams is the act of 
creation that enables him to assimilate the past by 
narrating it. Through radical acts of naming Adams thus 
invents not only an audience for Mt.St. Michel and Chartres 
but the whole of the medieval past as a form of 
autobiography. Through even more radical acts of 
nomination, he creates a double for himself in The Education 
of Henry Adams and merges with the forces of a Marxist 
vision of history in his "Letter to American Teachers of 
History" and "The Rule of Phase Applied to History." By 
extension, his own audience is asked to engage in similar 
kinds of nomination, and Adams is deeply aware that in
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reading his works we are reading him, recreating both his 
texts and the pasts they conjure in a multitude of ways.
Adams's self-conscious awareness of the subject's self- 
enclosure was also an awareness of his own entrapment in the 
prison-house of language. Adams wrote late in life that his 
letters were "really to [himself]." We might say that Adams 
and the post-modern theorists whose work he anticipates are 
failed nominalists whose rightful antecedents are Abelard 
and Ockham and Duns Scotus. Adams exemplifies a belief 
which he shares with his medieval predecessors and his post­
modern children of mind in a sort of linguistic plenitude 
that nevertheless permits the radical doubts of a thinker 
like Robert Chambers. Adams believed that language could 
lend coherence to either one's own experience or that of 
other individuals or nations, but he also believed that the 
account of one's self in autobiography or of others in 
biography or of entire cultures in history was necessarily a 
subjective one. He believed that in naming things we 
redefine them and transform them into extensions of our 
consciousness, destroying their essential identity in the 
process and producing linguistic doubles. These doubles not 
only rival their maker, as I indicated earlier, but they 
take on a life of their own in the minds of the reading 
audience as well as in the mind of the narrating subject 
himself.
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In attempting to restore Adams to the historical 
framework whose existence he denied and yet saw affirmed in 
the canon of his own work, we may find a map for reading the 
later works of Henry Adams— which are creations fraught with 
the disease of historical self-consciousness— as well as a 
model for reading the earlier histories, essays and 
biographies which, with his two novels, make up a 
significant body of material. The later Adams, as I have 
suggested, was primarily interested in the residual power of 
language in a subjectively conceived world made up of 
nameless, faceless forces. In his belief that he was living 
in an age which would chronicle the dissolution of the 
autonomous self as an adequate narrating principle, Adams 
prefigures Theodor Adorno. Adorno believed that the rise of 
the bourgeois individual in the Renaissance is also the 
moment that marks its gradual erosion and prefigures its 
eventual annihilation. As Adorno points out in Minima 
Moralia. "the self, its guiding idea, and its a priori 
object has always, under its own scrutiny, been 
rendered. . .nonexistent.1,25 At the point where the principle 
of human domination becomes absolute, the self as a knowable 
entity begins to disintegrate. As we have seen, Adams 
himself expressed similar sentiments more poetically in his 
annotations to William James and Henry Maudsley, as well as 
in his letters.
Our study, however, begins at a point in Adams's career 
long before Adams's reading of James and Maudsley. Adams 
began to muse on the possibility of writing history in the 
Berlin of the 1850s. We will begin with Adams's early essays 
and his attempts to rectify the chronicle of history. Adams 
seems to have shared in the Enlightenment vision of a 
unified language and in the faith in scientific history as 
it was understood by Gibbon. In this light, we will examine 
the biographies of John Randolph and Albert Gallatin which, 
in a Montaignesque stance, Adams later regarded as 
experiments with his own being. Adams's primary attempt to 
write scientific history, however, is his History of the 
Madison and Jefferson Administrations, and we will examine 
the assumptions about the recuperable capacities of language 
in these volumes, while at the same time noting that it is 
during the production of this multi-volume study which is so 
much an expression of the aims of the Enlightenment project 
that Adams's theories of biography as murder and 
autobiography as suicide and his lingering sense of "nausea" 
at the panorama of history seem to have emerged.
When Adams first began to think about writing history 
in the late 1850s, self and destiny seemed solid, if dual, 
and the imitation of Gibbon and filial piety seemed 
sufficient to determine his own choice of life. He went on 
to write essays which justified John Quincy Adams's choices 
and which seemed to rectify the chronicle of history so that
it reflected the complexity of the earlier Adams's choices 
more accurately. His sense of the mission of the historian 
may already have been ironic, but he still believed in the 
possibility of conjuring meaning from and for the past 
through language. The chronicle of history seems to have 
been as rock-like in those early days as the certainty of a 
self that seemed substantive. All the promises of 
Enlightenment conceptions of historiography seemed to lie 
before him, if not in the realm conjured by the five senses, 
then in some realm conjured by the world picture replicated 
by scientific historians.
The chronicle of history was not enough for Henry Adams 
by the time he finished his biography of John Randolph in 
the 1870s. It was at that time that he seems to have begun 
to think of the writing of history and biography as 
necessarily autobiographical and solipsistic. Adams's doubts 
about the possibilities of language and the fragmentation of 
the perceiving subject are first apparent in his account of 
the history of the life of the Queen of Tahiti, who, in 
fact, gave him a Tahitian name and whose identity he shares 
in the volume that bears her name and his own. The new 
vision of language emerges full-blown, however, only in the 
self-deconstructing sentences of Mt. St. Michel and Chartres 
and in the two prefaces to The Education of Henrv Adams. As 
I have noted earlier, Adams's vision of a subjectively 
generated "order running through chaos" came to him as a
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vision of history. In Chicago for the Exposition of 1893, 
Adams claimed that he had been forced into an awareness that 
the old vision of a scientifically created history was an 
illusion.
Here was a breach of continuity a
rupture in historical sequence. Was it 
real, or only apparent? One's personal 
universe hung on the answer, for if the 
rupture was real and the new American 
world could take this sharp and 
conscious twist toward ideals, one's 
personal friends could come in at last 
as winners in the great American 
Chariot race for fame.
(Education. 1032)
Like so many sentences in Mt. St. Michel and Chartres and 
The Education the faulty logic of the sequence suggests a 
profoundly ironic stance which reflects Adams's belief that 
historical sequence was an illusion. While it is true that 
a breach in historical continuity has profound implications 
for one's personal universe, such a breach does not 
necessarily lead to the conclusion that one's friends will 
become winners in the race for fame. Fame is a value 
associated with the old world, where sequence mattered, and 
where one's identity was rock-hard and substantive like the 
concepts of God and world which coexist with the idea of 
identity. And that vision is precisely what Adams had seen 
in symbolic splinters on the shores of Lake Michigan. The 
kingdom of force and sense confronted the old kingdom of 
myth, and Adams found that his education had not prepared 
him to confront what for him was chaos. He writes that he
had never encountered anything like this at Harvard. He 
hardly means that Harvard in particular was inadequate, but 
that the western intellectual tradition and the pedagogical 
methods that had reinforced it were inadequate for dealing 
with that vast and alien mystery that was and is the world 
of sense. The world of sense for Adams confronted the world 
engineered by what Deleuze calls "state philosophy"— that 
mode of representational thinking which depends on the power 
of reason and the analogies that reason constructs between 
the corresponding realms of the subject, the concepts it 
creates, and the objects in the world to which the concepts 
are applied.26
Of the Education's two prefaces, one was attributed to 
Henry Cabot Lodge and one to Adams himself. The preface 
which he chose to attribute to Henry Cabot Lodge, describes 
the volume as a sequel to Adams's attempt to "measure" "man 
as a force" from 1150-1250. The movement, he has Lodge say, 
was to be studied as a problem in philosophy and mechanics. 
Lodge explains that Adams intended to "complete St. 
Augustine's Confessions.11 and at the same time explore his 
"favorite theory of history." The exploration of theory 
continued in his "Letter to American Teachers of History" 
(1910) and in his essay "The Rule of Phase Applied to 
History." And, in a manner of speaking, Adams did fulfill 
his ambition of completing Augustine's Confessions. The 
Education, as "Lodge" notes moves toward dissolution and
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fragmentation— the hallmarks of modernity. The Confessions 
move toward the stillness of the unity Adams sought but 
disbelieved.
In the preface to the Education that he claimed as his 
own, Adams proposes to provide a guide to replace the last 
valuable one he knew— Rousseau's Confessions. which he 
called a "monument against ego." Since Rousseau, and partly 
thanks to Rousseau,that "very great educator in the manner 
of the eighteenth century," Adams says, the ego has 
"steadily tended to efface itself," so that it is in Adams's 
own time a "manikin" upon which the "the toilet of education 
is to be draped to show the fit or misfit of the clothes." 
The garments are the object of study, he says, and the 
tailor must adapt the manikin to his patron's wants. His aim 
as tailor, Adams says, is to "fit young men in Universities 
or elsewhere to be men of the world, equipped for any 
emergency." At the same time, he seeks to reveal "the faults 
of the patchwork fitted on their fathers."
The young man is not an "ego" at all in the last 
paragraphs of this Preface. He is rather a "form of 
energy," and then a nameless construction, a "geometrical 
figure of three or more dimensions" which can be used as a 
"measure of motion, of proportion, of human condition."
While it must have an "air of reality" and be "taken for 
real," it is nevertheless an artificial construct. While it 
must be "treated as though it had life," and while it
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"perhaps” had life, it is nevertheless only an arbitrary 
creation, a designated point in space.
Adams makes his point about the artificiality of his 
creation by giving the manikin in question— -Henry Adams— a 
new birthday, February 16, 1907. Adams's own birthday was 
February 16, 1838. The date of the preface coincides with 
the private distribution of the Education. and suggests a 
new birth— this time for the linguistic double that is an 
embattled Adornian self under scrutiny, receding and 
diminishing with every word. Ironically, everyone, 
including his brother Brooks, called the book a species of 
memoir or autobiography. A new Adams is born in the 
narration of the fate of the point of force otherwise 
identified only as a nameless manikin. That the name Adams 
gives it is "Henry Adams" is an arbitrary choice, and, from 
his point of view, Henry Cabot Lodge was as accurate a name 
for the writer of the first preface as Henry Adams. After 
all, after reading Henry James's biography of William Story, 
Adams wrote James that his was not the life of Story at all, 
but "your own and mine— pure autobiography." Adams's 
straightforwardly held idea that the Bostonians of his day, 
including Henry James, were "but one mind and Nature" and 
that "the individual was a facet" of Boston anticipate his 
adoption of the view of experience and language that mark 
him as a Marxist, and paradoxically as a post-modernist, for 
Adams like the Marxist accepts the concept of alienation.
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Adams transcends it, however, in his total acceptance of the 
fragmentary nature of experience and the necessity of 
escaping the ideological construct of identity. In this he 
is closest to Louis Althusser and his notion of the 
interpellated subject which is created by its ideology at 
the same time that it substantiates ideology. Adams realized 
in the 1890's that he was essentially a Marxist, and his 
late work is postmodern in both its rejection of the idea of 
the subject as a naturally occurring entity and in his 
desire to embrace what we now call a philosophy of 
difference. The final chapter of this meditation will thus 
be an exploration and definition of postmodernism and 
Adams's place with a line of thinkers from Nietzsche to 
Adorno, Althusser, and Deleuze.
Sometime during the 188 0s Adams came to believe that 
the history of the future would be autobiographical because 
we are prisoners of our perceptions. He also believed that 
he could trace the intellectual progress of modernity from 
the eighteenth century to the twentieth by writing his own 
history and charting his own motion. Beginning with Adams's 
early essays and proceeding through a study of his 
biographies of John Randolph and Albert Gallatin and his 
history of the Jefferson and Madison Administrations we will 
examine Adams's justifiable claim that he had begun as the 
quintessential historiographer of the Enlightenment. 
Proceeding to a study of Adams's letters from the mid-1880s,
we will chart his growing sense that he was to embody not 
the success but the failure of the Enlightenment project.
The latter part of our study will deal with Adams's quest 
for an historical theory that could act as an adequate 
descriptor for the new world that was being represented 
through new theories in physics and mathematics. Adams 
believed that he had found such a theory in Marxism, but, 
like the post-modern theorists of our time, he also believed 
that Marx's theories must continually be rethought and 
rewritten. Thus the end of our study points, as Adams 
believed his life had, to a time seventy years after Adams's 
death, just as its beginning is situated a century or two 
centuries or even six centuries before his birth.
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CHAPTER 2
ADAMS AND THE PROJECT OP MODERNITY
Say it to Father will you I will am my 
fathers Progenitive I invented him 
created I him. Say it to him it will not 
be for he will say I was not and then 
you and I since philoprogenitive1...
Faulkner, The Sound and the 
Fury
...his very body was an empty hall 
echoing with sonorous, defeated names; 
he was not a being, an entity, he was a 
commonwealth. He was a barracks filled 
with stubborn back-looking ghosts still 
recovering...from the fever which had 
cured the disease... looking with 
stubborn recalcitrance backward beyond 
the fever and into the disease with 
actual regret, weak from the fever yet 
free of the disease and not even aware 
that the freedom was that of impotence.2
Faulkner, Absalom. Absalom!
While Henry Adams may have ended his life sharing and 
echoing Marx's sense that in the age of modernity 
"everything solid melts into air," and believing that all 
subjects are entities constituted within ideological 
matrices, he began his study of history by embracing many of 
the aims of other Enlightenment historians.3 Even the most 
radical theories that he developed after 1894 reflect a 
continuing desire to perfect a science of history which 
would, with the other emerging sciences of man, form a 
modern summa theoloqica— albeit in an ironic mode. Adams 
saw history as a form of narrative that was intimately
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related to the art of biography. The lives of the powerful 
individuals who had shaped history could be used as icons of 
the past and help to reveal history's essential, organic 
coherence. The order thus revealed in history confirmed the 
essential order in the mind of God, an order that for 
Adams's self-proclaimed model, Augustine, had been available 
to man through the agency of the Logos. For Augustine, the 
articulation of words places us in direct communion with the 
divine.4 For later thinkers, less certain than Augustine 
that words offered a sort of expressway to the mind of God, 
the scripture of nature offered more tangible images of 
order. In Adams's own time, in an age that found itself 
increasingly alienated from the world of natural process and 
language alike, man could sense the immanence of a 
transcendent order in human experience only through the 
mediation of the text produced by historians, who had 
replaced the idea of the poet as vates. or mythic seer, in 
the iconography of modernity. Thomas Carlyle, a primary 
exponent of the idea of history as the sum of lives of great 
individuals once described history as a sort of revered and 
ubiquitous presence which was, like God, available to man in 
all times and places. The historian was a sort of 
secularized priest, who afforded man access to this modern- 
day divinity. Adams initially admired Carlyle's work, but by 
1882, in the midst of the five-year period during which he 
produced three biographies of his own, he wrote William
James that he had little patience with "hero worship like
Carlyle's" (Letters. II, 466). Adams's reasoning was that
heroes "neutralysed" each other in history. While thought—
and hence the good of society— was advanced by only a very
few thinkers, their sole contribution was to "drag us up the
cork-screw stair of thought" to no avail.
...you could doubtless at any time stop 
the entire progress of human thought by 
killing a few score of men...What then?
They drag us up the cork-screw stair of 
thought, but they can no more get their 
brains to run out of their especial 
convolutions than a railway train (with 
a free will of half an inch on three 
thousand miles) can run free up Mount 
Shasta. Not one of them has ever got so 
far as to tell us a single vital fact 
worth knowing. We can't prove even that 
we are.
(Letters, II, 466)
The process of writing biography seems to have 
suggested the idea that Adams was to articulate twenty years 
later in The Education— that all great thinkers were doomed 
to be devoured by subjectivity in a "sea of introspection." 
When Adams set out to rewrite Sartor Resartus in his 
Education. he intended to demonstrate that perhaps the 
point of education was not the revelation of self and its 
possibilities at all. The cloak of education, which for 
Adams came to mean something like the cloak of ideology, is 
the only self there is in The Education.5 Nevertheless, in 
1911, when he was acknowledging that his "sense of a crushed 
humanity" had dominated everything he had written, Adams
still yearned toward the achievements of "Herakles, who was
quite another person." Adams was referring to the literary
"Herakles" created by George Cabot Lodge. Adams's last
work, written on the heels of his most depersonalized
theories of history was a biography intended to memorialize
Lodge, whose early death had profoundly saddened him.
Significantly, The Life of George Cabot Lodge(1911) was not
a biography of a statesman at all, but a portrait of the
artist. Thus, while Adams never entirely lost the sense he
shared with Carlyle of the power that accompanies the
historian's involvement in the creation of an authorized
version of the collective human past in history, and the
individual past in biography he did shift his focus from
history to art. He also never ceased to see himself as both
product of and participant in the enlightenment project,
though he believed he was presiding over its endpoint and
transfiguration. In December, 1884, in the middle of his
production of "two heavy volumes" of his History. Adams
wrote Francis Parkman that the more he wrote the more
certain he was that the old models of history needed to be
exchanged for newer ones.
The more I write, the more confident I 
feel that before long a new school of 
history will rise which will leave us 
antiquated. Democracy is the only 
subject for scientific history. I am 
satisfied that the purely mechanical 
development of the human mind in society 
must appear in a great democracy so 
clearly, for want of disturbing 
elements, that in another generation
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psychology, physiology, and history, 
will join in proving man to have as 
fixed and necessary development as that 
of a tree; and almost as unconscious.
(Letters. II, 563)
Only Adams's faith in the principle of identity and its 
reflection in the idea of biography and history had been 
shaken; he continued to embrace the aims of the Enlighteners 
and to believe that a mechanical science of man was 
possible. Though he continued to see himself as an 
Enlightenment historian, he was self-conscious very early 
about the limits of history and biography in ways that 
Carlyle and other nineteenth-century historians were not.
For Adams, history was not merely the record of either 
a cyclic or a developmental process. Neither was it simply 
an icon of progress. For Adams history was an emblem of 
continuity in which the historian assumed a kind of 
impersonal power over the chaos of the past and transformed 
it through narrative into history. Adams believed that the 
historian could construct patterns from the fragments of the 
human past, and thus provide his readers and himself with an 
anchor in history. History in this view is entirely 
subjectified. For Adams, as for Nietzsche and others, the 
subjectification of history involved what Lewis Simpson 
calls "the climactic stage of mind's willful transference of 
nature, man, and society— and eventually of God, and finally 
of mind itself— into itself."6 Adams was one of the first
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historians to realize that modern historiography had usurped 
the god-like role of universal storyteller and mythmaker, 
and that this revolution founded on words and textual study 
had been implicit in nominalism and its stepchild, the 
Reformation. Underlying and informing Adams's quest for an 
appropriate mode of historiography in the age of modernity 
was his complicated response to his family's history and the 
intricacies of their relationship to the American past and 
their demands that their descendants continue and complete 
their projects. The convoluted and often paradoxical 
process by which he came to understand that his own work 
was not and could not be either "objective" or scientific 
history as prescribed by the purer versions of the 
Enlightenment formula but was more nearly biography shading 
off into autobiography— and therefore, of necessity 
subjective and fictional— is the subject of this chapter.
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The historian's capacity for endowing history with a 
shape and a meaning that had previously been the province of 
God was especially apparent for Adams in biography. 
Biography, that peculiar genre in which the biographical 
subject and biographer merge in a fictional— and, for Adams, 
an increasingly troubling— union affords a transformed 
meaning and an altered shape for both the biographer and the 
biographical subject. Biography in the Enlightenment
formula served as a replacement for the frayed idea that God
had given man a substantive self and a place in the
providential order that his destiny on earth would reveal.
Adams increasingly came to feel that in biography he was
shaping the eguivalent of Dr. Frankenstein's creature from
the lifeless artifacts of his subjects' lives. He believed
that his subjects took on an unnatural existence as
distorted doubles of himself and themselves. Even in his
first effort at biography, where he had vowed to let his
subject Albert Gallatin speak for himself, Adams realized
that a kind of alchemy was taking place as he wrote. When
Gallatin's daughter, Frances Stevens, was killed in an
accident just as Adams was completing the biography of her
father. Adams sent her brother, who had commissioned the
project, several chapters, remarking that he was as shocked
at Mrs. Stevens's death as "though I had known her from
birth." He had given a public existence in print to a much
older woman whom he had never known.
The biographer is curiously situated, 
for being immersed in the interests of a 
past generation, he sees people born, is 
a confidant in all the affairs of their 
childhood, youth, and middle life, and 
gets to entertain a personal regard for 
them apart from personal acguaintance.
To me your sister was still the child 
whom I am watching with your father and 
mother here in Washington nearly eighty 
years ago.
(Letters. II, 330)
Adams's present tense— "I am watching"— is characteristic of
his attitude toward his biographical subjects. The reverse
was also true; Adams felt that his identity was altered by
the act of writing biography. He felt that a sort of
unnatural coupling took place between him and his subjects,
leaving both forever altered. Adams's writing of the
Randolph and Burr biographies seems to have crystallized
his feelings that in biography he was at the very least a
midwife in the process that lent his characters a new life.
Mr. John Randolph is just coming into 
the world. Do you know, a book to me 
always seems a part of myself, a kind of 
intellectual brat or segment, and I 
never bring one into the world without a 
sense of shame. They are naked, 
helpless, and beggarly, yet the poor 
wretches must live forever and curse 
their father from their silent tomb.
This particular brat is the only one I 
ever detested...I know he will live to 
dance, in the obituaries, over my cold 
grave.
(Letters. II, 475)
The motif of biography and its incarnation of lives in print 
as murder and entombment anticipates the radical statement 
of 1909, that "in biography we are taking life" (Letters.
VI, p. 227). Adams was beginning to feel that the 
biographer's art figured among the black arts of linguistic 
sorcery. Letters from the period attest to his combined 
revulsion and fascination with the creatures he conjured in 
biography. While he is completing his history of Jefferson's 
administration, for example, Adams writes that he has "just
finished with T. Jefferson! He has gone off to Monticello 
forever, carrying eight years of my life with him."
(Letters, II, 549). As Adams continued to work with 
biography, and as he began the history of Madison and 
Jefferson in the mid-1880's, he came to see that biography 
involves what Deleuze calls an "individuation without a 
subject."7 To borrow Deleuze's language, Adams came to 
regard individuals as "pockets of consciousness and 
sensation" that "run over the heath like a line of flight or 
a line of deterritorialization.1,8 In biography the author, a 
pocket of isolated consciousness, runs over the "line of 
deterritorialization" that is the alternative self produced 
through the writing of the biographical narrative. Adams 
wrote John Hay in 1882, only half-jokingly, that he had 
"invented Jefferson, Gallatin, and Burr" (Letters. II, 455). 
Later that year, after Hay had expressed an interest in 
Adams's biography of Burr, Adams wrote him that his "ideal 
of authorship would be to have a famous double rAdams's 
italics] with another name, to wear what honors I could win" 
(Letters. II, 463). He also remarked that it would be 
amusing to publish a "low and shameless essay," complete 
with "smutty woodcuts," and attribute both to his double. 
When he wrote again and again that his intellectual quest 
was a quest for form, Adams meant that he was forever 
seeking a temporary shape for his increasingly unbounded 
sense of self. "Form" for Adams means a vehicle in which
mind and consciousness can be expanded. Biography was a 
necessary vessel for such endeavor, but Adams discovered 
that it had to be transformed before it could reflect a 
conception of identity and a vision of history appropriate 
to a world characterized by multiple and dissonant voices 
and a sense of imminent chaos rather than the single voices 
of individuation and order that we see in biography and in 
the enlightenment models of history. Adams wrote Sir John 
Clark in late 1884 that "history and biography end with 
1815" (Letters. II, 560). Adams's sense of the exhaustion 
of the idea of biography came to him while he was writing a 
history that he regarded as an extension of the "feelers" 
provided by his own major biographical works. Echoing the 
reflections that accompanied his completion of the 
biographies of Gallatin, Randolph, and Burr, Adams begins to 
doubt the efficacy of writing history even before he began 
the massive undertaking that resulted in The History of the 
Madison and Jefferson Administrations. As early as 1883, 
Adams wrote Samuel Tilden that he was sorry he had decided 
to write the history of Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe, "for 
they appear like mere grasshoppers kicking and gesticulating 
on the middle of the Mississippi River...They were carried 
along on a stream which floated them, after a fashion, 
without much regard to themselves."9 Adams's view of the 
individual caught in the forces of history reflects more 
than his disgust with Jefferson's political machinations.
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He decided that his view of Jefferson was and is the
necessary conclusion that any modern historian must draw
about the role of any individual in history.
This I take to be the result that 
students of history generally reach in 
regard to modern times. The element of 
individuality is the free-will dogma of 
the science, if it is a science. My own 
conclusion is that history is simply 
social development along the lines of 
weakest resistance, and that in most 
cases the line of weakest resistance is 
found as unconsciously by society as by 
water.10
Biography and history can only exist in a world picture 
generated by the concept of identity. As the individual's 
overburdened consciousness explodes into the world it 
perceives, a new model for both the self and history must be 
constructed. History in this sense becomes, paradoxically, 
both the climactic point of the triumph of subjectivity and 
an emblem of a willed flight from subjectivity. In an 
historical reality conceived and rendered in history as 
subjectivity, the text of written history becomes the 
meeting ground for a community of being which is posited not 
on a base of lived experience but on a written document 
which is shared by both writer and reader— a Dickinsonian 
"letter to the world" writ large. Adams recognized that the 
real task of historians is that of designing the subjective 
reconciliations between past, present, and future that 
produce the text of history. Autobiography— the linguistic 
sphere of the deterritorialized subject— and biography— the
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sphere of the self as other— blended to produce the form he 
finally settled on in the Education. which is a sort of 
antithesis of both genres. After 1894 in his essays and 
letters on historiography he also felt that part of the 
historian's purpose was to analyze the text of the history 
of historiography as an alternative version of self.
Adams's word for continuity was "Unity.” If 
"multiplicity" was the descriptor of life in the world of 
the modern historian, unity was embodied in the lifeworlds 
and the historical narratives of the Augustinian vision of 
history. In Mt. St. Michel and Chartres. Adams makes it 
plain that St. Thomas Aquinas's systematic vision with its 
insistence that the world was susceptible to human 
understanding had paved the way as early as the thirteenth 
century for the individualistic readings of world and self 
provided by humanist text criticism. Indeed, he suggests 
that St. Thomas had outlined the path that would lead toward 
the Reformation and the emergence of modern science. The 
Enlightenment notion of biography, like St. Thomas's vision 
of the natural world, was appropriate to a history that 
could be represented in a unified way. It assumed that 
societies and individuals had their origin in the providence 
provided by a non-contingent Being, and that their record 
would be the organic one of evolution and demise provided by 
the predictable patterns of nature and individual existence. 
The task of the modern historian for Adams lay not only in
producing a scientific, "objective" history that reflected 
the altered vision of existence provided by science and 
technology, but also in finding a new shape for existence— a 
replacement vision of the lost Unity provided by the God of 
the Christian Middle Ages. An ancillary role of the 
historian in a historiography described in this way is thus 
interpreting the changing definitions of what constitutes 
the individual and its world. If Adams seems to have found 
part of his solution for narrating a new vision of unity—  
and a replacement for God— in the idea of biography, he 
deconstructed the idea of the possibility of both 
autobiography and biography in his Education. The rest he 
adapted through a fusion of his vision of the shape of the 
American past with Gibbon's aesthetics of history, and the 
methods of Bancroft and Parkman.
Adams's quest for an appropriate form for 
historiography was in some ways not only determined but 
compromised by his family's place in American history. Adams 
felt the presence of the family past, with its generations 
of diarists and statesmen as a great weight. Like a New 
England version of Quentin Compson, Adams seems to have felt 
that he was not a being at all, but, in the language of 
Absalom. Absalom!.a commonwealth, ringing with sonorous 
defeated names. If it were true, as Adams said, that family 
pride and politics were in his blood, then it was also true 
that the Adamses had sacrificed at the alter of the
Enlightenment Project and honored the god of Science, and he 
felt that he must continue the tradition that they had 
begun. In "The Heritage of Henry Adams," a curious and 
lengthy essay that accompanies the posthumous publication of 
Henry's last historical essays, his brother Brooks says that 
John Quincy Adams was a "scientist of the first force," who 
had been "vexed" by the same problems that troubled Henry 
and Brooks himself. In Brooks's opinion, "science and 
education were passions and amounted to a religion" for his 
grandfather. The Enlightenment habit of mind that makes 
Jefferson allow the Declaration of Independence to consume 
the linguistic spaces of his personal memoirs informs "The 
Heritage of Henry Adams." Brooks's introduction to his 
brother's life begins not with his and Henry's parents or 
grandparents, but with the idea of America as an embodiment 
of Enlightenment thinking. George Washington's desire to 
devise a "consolidated community" on a scientific model is 
the focus of the introductory section of Brooks's essay. 
Brooks eulogizes Washington's vision of a scientifically 
engineered, urban society focused on a central city which 
was to be the point of convergence for a network of highways 
and canals. His plans for the national capital included a 
national university "which was to serve as the brain of the 
corporeal system developed by the highways." The purpose of 
the university was to "fix a standard of collective thought" 
and "spread systematic ideas through all parts of the rising
empire.” The "Heritage of Henry Adams" is a genealogy of
thought, and in it Adams's first ancestor is thus not the
seventeenth-century Henry Adams who left Somersetshire for
the Bay Colony in the 163 0s, but an ancestor in mind— a
fellow traveler in a project which involved the exploration
of the possibilities of mind. In Brooks's view, and perhaps
in his brother's view, Henry Adams's work is a continuation
of the Enlightenment project that his forbears of mind had
begun a century earlier and educated their children to
complete. The second figure in this genealogy of mind is a
natural ancestor— John Quincy Adams— who, according to
Brooks, expanded upon Washington's plan for a "constructive
centralization," with "the expansion due to the operation
on the problem of a profound scientific mind." Brooks
believed that even the most radical of Henry's historical
theories had their origin in the work of their grandfather
and even their great-grandfather, both of whom had believed
that there was a "volume of energy ...stored within the
Union." John Quincy Adams believed that it was his function
to help liberate the energy of the "corporeal body" of the
Union through a continuation of the acts of mind that had
contributed to the invention of America in the first place.
The public lands are the richest 
inheritance ever bestowed by a bountiful 
Creator upon any national community. All 
the mines of gold and silver and 
precious stones on the face or in the 
bowels of the globe, are in value
compared to them but the dust of the
balance. Ages upon ages of continual
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progressive improvement... were stored 
up in the possession and disposal of 
these lands...I had long entertained and 
cherished the hope...of improving the
condition of man, by establishing the
practical, self-evident truth of the 
natural equality and brotherhood of all 
mankind as the foundation of all human 
government, and by banishing slavery and 
war from the earth...
(Degradation. 27-28)
J.Q. Adams saw his plans for an enlightened society wither 
under the blight of slavery and through "the total 
abandonment by President Jackson, of all internal 
improvement by the authority of Congress." The tragedy of 
the Adamses entwined with the failure of the Enlightenment. 
If the Enlightenment wrecked on the extreme idealism of its
belief in education, the Adamses' political fortunes wrecked
on the rock of the property interest of slaveholders and 
Jackson's "land-j obbers."
The enlightenment project for the Adamses was not 
merely the eighteenth-century's enlightenment. For them, as 
Brooks and Henry Adams were aware, it began with the 
Reformation, and continued the reformers' faith in the 
possibility of making what Steven Ozment calls "radical 
intellectual enlightenment" available to all.11 According 
to Brooks Adams, Henry had planned a large project in the 
intellectual history of the Reformation which would have 
afforded him an historical anchor akin to the one provided 
by Mt. St. Michel and Chartres.12 The source of the 
fascination with the Reformation is obvious; part of its aim
was to enable the individual believer to participate in a 
transformed world through education. Erasmus, in whom the 
educational and the religious aims of the Reformation are 
most clearly fused, realized, as Lisa Jardine has recently 
shown, that the technology of mass print culture would 
enable all believers to come to his own recognition that 
Christ was available to us through speech. Texts and the 
reading of texts in this view becomes the means through 
which Christ penetrates to the hearts and minds of 
believers.13 However, while the Adamses failed for some of 
the same reasons that Erasmus and Luther and Calvin did, 
they did not lose their faith in the divine origins of their 
mission until Henry Adams examined them from the vantage 
point of the twentieth century. For John and John Quincy 
Adams, the "ultimate extinguishment of slavery" was the 
"great transcendent earthly object of the mission of the 
Redeemer." More startlingly, for John Quincy Adams, "the 
Declaration of Independence was a leading event in the 
progress of gospel dispensation. Because he failed to 
persuade his fellow countrymen that the way of the future 
lay beyond private interest, he was possessed of a profound 
sense that his life had been a sort of passion play, 
complete with a crucifixion and the hope of a resurrection 
in history.
John Quincy Adams's martyrdom took place on yet another 
level, one that is inextricable from his political
martyrdom. He was devoted to the cause of science, and
produced a report of weights and measures for the Senate in
1821 that made John Adams write him that the report was
such a "mass of historical, philosophical, chemical,
metaphysical and political knowledge" that "no industry in
this country but yours could have collected [it] in so
little time." His real passion, however was astronomy.
To me, the observation of the sun, moon, 
and stars has been for a great portion 
of my life a pleasure of gratified 
curiosity, of ever returning wonder, and 
of reverence for the Creator and mover 
of these unnumbered worlds. There is 
something of awful enjoyment in 
observing the rising and setting of the 
sun. That flashing beam of his first 
appearance upon the horizon; that 
sinking of his last ray beneath it; that 
perpetual revolution of the Great and 
Little Bear round the pole...There is, 
indeed, intermingled with all this a 
painful desire to know more of this 
stupendous system; of sorrow in 
reflecting how little we can ever know; 
and of almost desponding hope that we 
may know more of it hereafter...
(Degradation. 60)
Adams was mortified that there was no observatory in America
and that American sailors were still dependent on
observations taken at Greenwich. For him, this was the
eguivalent of a lingering intellectual subservience to
England. When Cincinnati decided to build an observatory and
asked him to offer an oration at the laying of the
cornerstone, he risked his life to attend in 1843.
My task is to turn this transient gust 
of enthusiasm for the science of
instrumental in elevating the character 
and improving the condition of man...
(Degradation. 66-67)
The trip was a disaster, complete with snow, trains frozen 
to the rails, and Adams's own worsening sore throat and 
fever. He delivered his address long after the appointed 
time, and, as Brooks notes, "frankly admitted to himself 
that, in substance, he had committed suicide for the sake of 
science." His wife wrote that he had "returned in a state 
of debility and exhaustion beyond description." He did not 
die in 1843, but three years later having noted in his diary 
that "some discouragement of soul" accompanied his belief 
that his desire to "live in the memory of after-ages as a 
benefactor of my country and of mankind" had not, in his 
opinion, "received the sanction of my maker."
The elder Adams's project lay unfinished. He had
"labored all his life to bring the democratic principle of
equality into such a relation with science and education"
that it would become an "efficient instrument" for
governance. His projects were continued and immortalized in
the efforts of his grandson Henry with some irony.
Mr. Adams always adored order and 
loathed chaos. Yet he died for 
astronomy, the science of chaos. Such is 
human effort and prescience.
(Degradation. 122)
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His grandson's work, in his own and in his brother Brooks's 
view, would focus not on envisioning a world order, but on 
the emerging science of chaos.
In his biography of Albert Gallatin, Jefferson's 
Secretary of the Treasury, which was written in the late 
1870s, Henry Adams first displays his tendency to allegorize 
the history of his own nation and his own family through 
narrating the history of other nations and other families 
and individuals. Anyone who knows the history of the 
American Adamses is struck by the similarity between Henry 
Adams's representation of the Gallatins and the 
representation of his own family that develops in his 
letters, essays, and other projects— his New England 
Federalism, for example-— from 1858 until about 1890. Adams's 
sense of the entwined destinies of the Adamses and America 
had its origins in family mythology, but is mirrored in 
virtually every narrative history of the U.S. To read the 
history of the United States from at least the 1770s to the 
1820s is to realize that the history of the Adamses was in 
miniature a history of the ideological bedrock that 
sustained the formation and molding of the American 
experiment in republican government. The Adamses were rich 
in the virtues that Adams ascribes to Geneva aristocracy in 
the biography of Gallatin, and they, like the Gallatins, 
were steeped in something akin to Calvinistic doctrine. 
Self-designated as the "Gibbon of his generation," Adams set
out to write the tragedy of the inevitable decline of the 
United States after it failed to adhere to the policies of 
the Federalist Adamses and failed to choose Adamses for 
leaders. Brooks Adams thus writes accurately that the 
history of the Adams family was a sort of typology of the 
history of America for his brother. By extension, the 
history of America was also a landscape of the self. Adams 
believed that America's quest for national identity could 
best be studied through the fortunes of the Adamses, and the 
first forty years of his career as an historian were spent 
in carefully studying and correcting the chronicle of his 
family's history. Though there is filial piety in his 
experiments with his family's history, there is also the 
origin of the pattern of Adam's quest for a 
deterritorialized self, an unfettered sense of identity, 
that emerges fully formed in the Education and "Rule of 
Phase" essay.
Beginning with his early essays for The North American 
Review. Adams traces what he believes to have been America's 
tragic destiny, foretold by the drama enacted by his 
Federalist forebears and their foes. For Adams, the dramatis 
personae were particularized in the personalities of John 
and John Quincy Adams, on the one hand, and anti-Federalist 
figures from the American South whom Adams chose to 
represent in the shape of John Randolph on the other. Thus, 
long before he formally undertook the writing of
biographies, much less of an actual history, Adams was 
covertly writing a genetically altered species of biography 
and autobiography in his early historical essays and more 
limited efforts at historiography such as the editing of the 
documents that make up the volume he called New England 
Federalism. At the time, however, he was committed to the 
idea that he was using the scientific and objective forms 
appropriate to Enlightenment historians.
Adams was quite serious about the matter of family and 
rather Calvinistic himself about determining his vocation. 
Possessed of what he called a mens conscia recti (Letters,
I, 18), Adams was determined to take his place in the 
family gallery, but at the same time he felt the weight of 
his family and the demands of life in Boston, where, as he 
notes in the opening chapters of his Education— which was 
written a half century later— he felt himself surrounded by 
the visible monuments to the Adamses and their history in a 
thoroughly ominous way. Letters written to his older 
brother Charles from Europe beginning in November, 1858, 
when Adams was only twenty, suggest both his subtle sense 
of conflict between private ambition and his yearning to 
make himself worthy of the legacy of earlier Adamses that 
dominates Brooks's "The Heritage of Henry Adams" which was 
written in 1919. There is a typology of place apparent in 
the letters that recurs later in both the Randolph biography 
and, much later, in the Education. Italy, like the American
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South, is for him the realm of art and nature. Adams's 
letters from his trip to Italy focus on events like his 
visits to William Story's studio and his intoxication with 
the art world and the artifacts that were all around him. 
Germany, like New England, was school and duty. The life of 
the passions, which must be subjugated to the life of mind, 
confronts the realm of public obligation. In the geography 
of Adams's childhood, Quincy confronted State Street. In the 
geography of his histories and biographies, New England 
winter confronted the Maryland spring.
Adams's first collected letters date from his stay in 
Berlin, where he had gone after graduation from Harvard to 
read law and study German, French, and Latin. Having 
persuaded his father to allow him to take the rather daring 
step of studying in Berlin, and finding himself in a city 
where he was "surrounded by Art" (Letters. I, 3), Adams
seems to have become aware for the first time that being an
Adams was something of a burden. He wrote his brother 
Charles that Charles's letter of Thanksgiving Day, 1858, had 
left him feeling a profound sense of relief at being out of 
Boston.
Your letter dated Thanksgiving day 
arrived yesterday and I give you my word
that though I have been having a 
delightful time here ...still I have 
never felt quite so glad at being out of 
Boston as I felt after reading that 
epistle. There was in it a sort of 
contented despair, an unfathomable depth 
of quiet misery that gave me a placid
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feeling of thankfulness at being where I
am.
(Letters. I, 6)
Nevertheless, and this is yet another of the paradoxes that 
mark Adams's personal history, he was already engaged in 
self-consciously defining himself through a mannered 
imitation of the actions of the models provided by his 
antecedents. In particular, he imitated John Quincy Adams, 
whom he was alternately to vilify and idealize over the next 
sixty years. Temporarily free of what he seems already to 
have viewed as the suffocating atmosphere of Boston and the 
political enterprises of his omnipresent ancestors and the 
sense of his duty to them, Adams gleefully orders a 
"quantity of clothes," including a "miracle" of a greatcoat 
of "peculiar beaver-cloth," with a thick fur lining 
(Letters, I, 2-3). He also engages in epistolary rhapsody 
over the availability of "Museums, picture Galleries, 
Theatres, Gardens." There is an echo in these early 
letters, no doubt already self-conscious, of the moral 
conflict in John Quincy Adams's diaries over the guilty but 
absolute pleasure that he took in the plays and the opera in 
Paris of fifty years before. Though the theater is somewhat 
disappointing to the younger Adams, he does go "a good deal 
to the Opera House," which he describes as "glorious" with 
its "orchestra, scenery and the ballet." (Letters. I, 8). 
Still, the opera which he admires so intensely is gravely
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described as "a great temptation" (Letters, I, 19). Amid 
his delight in an extravagance no doubt born of a new sense 
of the freedom that accompanied his personal anonymity and 
the excitement of Berlin, he finds, as he grandfather had, 
that the "tone" in Europe is "low, selfish, and irreligious" 
compelling him to "a love for what is pure and good" 
(Letters, 1,10).
In the same letters that detail his qualified delight 
in his pleasures, Adams agonizes over his plan for life:
"Can I have enough time to do all this, or ought I to resign 
the Law and devote myself to Latin? ” Initially, he seems to 
have planned to study law for two years in Berlin and two 
years in Boston. He proposes to "emigrate" and "practice at 
Saint Louis" when he completes his self-prescribed course of 
study. Already, however, in November of 1858, when any plans 
for his future were necessarily embryonic, Adams fears 
failure.
I have a theory that an educated and 
reasonably able man can make his mark if 
he chooses, and if I fail to make mine, 
why, then— I fail and that's all...But 
if I know myself, I can't fail.
(Letters. I, 5)
Adams's oft-stated fears of failure, which persisted 
throughout his writing career, seem really to have been 
another way of saying that he feared he would fail in the 
public sphere and hence fail to acquit himself with his 
family. Always, in the midst of plans for a future lived out
of politics and away from Boston and his family, Adams's 
sense of his family intrudes. In response to one of his 
brother's letters Adams writes that "to be a lawyer I must 
cease to be what I am" (Letters I, 22) . St. Louis and 
Adams's tentative plans for the future dim and recede as 
Adams recalls the advice of Richard Henry Dana, who had 
treated his plans for Europe and life in St. Louis with 
contempt. Dana had "insisted" that Adams was already 
looking toward politics, and Adams ruefully admits to his 
brother that politics are probably an inevitable part of his 
life.
There are two things that seem to be at 
the bottom of our constitutions; one is 
a continual tendency toward politics; 
the other is family pride, and it is 
strange how these two feelings run 
through all of us.
(Letters. I, 5)
As Adams ponders his destiny, the tone of his letters always
shifts sharply when he invokes the specter of his family. He
believed that he had very few choices.
Here in Europe, away from home, from 
care and ambition and the fretting of 
monotony, I must say that I often feel 
as I often used to at college, as if the 
whole thing didn't pay, and if I were my 
own master, it would need more 
inducements than the law could offer, to 
drag me out of Europe these ten years 
yet. I always had an inclination for the 
Epicurean philosophy, and here in Europe 
I might gratify it until I was gorged.
(Letters. I, 5)
The qualifier here is Adams's "if I were my own master." He 
plainly believes that he is not his own master, and that his 
family is. The results for him are that he must "work, 
work, work," whether he seeks his fortune in St. Louis or 
not. The ideal life that he envisions for himself has 
little to do with the path of duty. For his part, Henry 
wonders if he will not derive the "most pleasure and 
...advantage from what never entered into my calculations: 
art" (Letters, I, 5).
Give me my thousand a year and free 
leave and a good conscience, and I'd 
pass as happy a life here as I'm afraid 
I never shall in St. Louis.
(Letters, I, 5)
Adams fails to find his "free leave," however. Art does not
seem to have been any more acceptable a vision of Henry
Adams's sense of his destiny than it was for his
grandfather John Quincy Adams. Within six weeks he is
musing on his destiny again.
But how of greater literary works?
Could I write a history, do you think, 
or a novel, or anything that would be 
likely to make it worthwhile for me to 
try?... it seems probable that the duty 
of editing our grandfather's works and 
writing his life may fall on one of us, 
and if it does, that alone is enough for 
a man, and enough to shape his whole 
course...
(Letters, 1/ 15)
Henry's sense of his duty to his family is mirrored and
underscored by his brother's exhortations. Henry's own
letters suggest that Charles Francis admonished Henry to
"combine in [himself] the qualities of Seward, Greely,(sic.)
and Everett" (Letters, I, 20) Henry is to engage himself in
"teaching the people and becoming a light to the nations"
(Letters, I, 24). Henry says that he and Charles are a
"modern Romulus and Remus, only omitting their murderous
propensities" (Letters, I, 23). Henry is to don the "mantle
of Cicero" and continue the Adams's tradition of self-
sacrifice and public service. One of the peculiarities of
Adams's sense of himself and his destiny which appears even
as he is drafting his first letters to his older brother is
his tendency to find his reality in mirrors provided by
literary or historical doubles. The first of his literary
and historiographic models was Gibbon. Charles Francis had
recommended that Henry read Gibbon, and not long after he
received his brother's letter, Henry is writing that he has
been trying to find copies of Gibbon. By May 9, 1860, Henry
was reading Gibbon's Autobiography and writing Charles
Francis that his reading had prompted him to recognize that
his earlier quandary about the law or literature might have
been misplaced.
...our house needs a historian in this 
generation and I feel strongly tempted 
by the quiet and sunny prospect...What 
do you think? Law and literature.
(Letters. I, 149)
On July 9, 1860, Henry wrote Charles Francis from Paris that 
he was working from ten to four every day, "la plupart du
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temps en suivant le plan de Gibbon que tu te souviendras 
d 'avoir lu dans sa biographie."
Adams thus found a resolution in the ’’quiet and sunny
prospect" of writing history. The tension between private
inclination and public responsibility, between the pursuit
of art and the defense of and continuation of a tradition of
family greatness thus emerges early. Adams's fascination
with Gibbon, however, was to continue throughout his career.
His claim that the Education and the "Rule of Phase" were
diversions and toys echoes his master Gibbon's claim that
the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire was a diversion
designed for his amusement. Adams's vision of history and
historiography entwines with his vision of New England and
the South. Both are intimately connected to his belief that
he was an eighteenth-century man, and that he had inherited
the values of a family drenched in the dogma of
enlightenment and enlightenment conceptions of society and
its institutions. Adams's early conception of history is
closely connected to enlightenment ideas of history. For
Adams, history rests on a theory of education.
You come down, in your political 
philosophy, to the principle of 
education; from different grounds I did 
the same here some time ago. It's the 
main idea of all progressists; it's what 
gives New England its moral power;
Horace Mann lived in this idea, and died 
in it. Goethe always said that his task 
was to educate his countrymen, and that 
all the Constitutions in the world 
wouldn't help, if the people weren't 
raised, and he and Schiller did more for
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it than anyone else. Our people are 
educated enough intellectually, but it's 
superficial and only makes them more 
willful; our task insofar as we attempt 
a public work is to blow up sophistry 
and jam down hard on morality...
(Letters. I, 105-106)
As his correspondence with his brother Charles confirms from 
1858-1860, Adams seems to have believed that America was to 
be a new Rome. The mission of the Enlightenment historian, 
for him, was to provide America with the modern equivalent 
of a religious vocation— a sense of political destiny. 
Adams's sense that American history, statesmen, and 
statecraft were necessarily tragic seems to have been 
present in embryonic form from the beginning. As a model of 
style, Adams adopted the ironic mode that was 
characteristically Gibbon's. At the beginning of his career 
he was disposed to believe, in the not-altogether-odd 
company of Thomas Arnold, that history, "read aright, is a 
mirror to reflect the true character of existing 
parties...and gives us this true mirror when we have learned 
to separate what is accidental and particular from what is 
essential and universal."14 Adams's early essays reflect 
what Hayden White calls the nineteenth-century's "rage for 
realistic apprehension of the world." This tendency 
manifests itself in a confirmation of the Enlightenment 
doctrine of progress at the same time that it offered a 
critique and a revision of this view. As White also notes,
however, an understanding of the nineteenth-century's 
passion for the real carries with it the necessity of 
considering the vast realm of experience that they dismissed 
as "unreal." The primary tendency of the Enlightenment 
philosophy of history was its faith in progress and reason. 
For the Enlightenment historian, the project of history was 
rather like the progress of the human being toward 
individuation. The origins of society lie in a primitive 
state where man is enfolded by and at the mercy of nature. 
History is the record of the triumph of rationality at the 
expense of the dimension of the natural. Beneath the 
Enlightenment critique of history, then, is the bedrock of 
the principle of reason, and its corollary, the principle of 
identity. By the end of the eighteenth century, Adams's 
model Gibbon as well as de Tocqueville and Burckhardt, not 
to mention the philosophers Hume and Kant, feared that a 
proper justification for the belief in progress, at least, 
had not yet been articulated. Enlightenment thinkers like 
Voltaire had operated under the assumption that history as 
the record of man's progress toward enlightenment would 
emerge as long as the proper historical methodology was 
used. For Voltaire, that meant separating the particular 
from the general, the private man and his incidental 
passions from his service in the public sphere. As Voltaire 
notes in his definition of "figurative language" in the 
Philosophical Dictionary [Works, IX, 64) "ardent
imagination, passion, desire...produce the figurative 
style." Voltaire goes on to say that the historian is not 
to "admit it [the figurative style] into history, for too 
many metaphors are hurtful...to truth...by saying more or 
less than the thing itself."15 Voltaire and his fellow 
apostles of enlightenment thus failed to realize something 
that Henry Adams saw clearly, though the idea remained 
substantially absent from his published works— the idea that 
historical truth could come from outside the chronicles of 
public service that comprise the documents of political 
history. Adams does, however, share with the Enlightenment 
historians the belief not so much in progress as in 
continuity, and his version of the mythos of rationalism is 
akin to Vico's; that is, Adams, initially at least, believed 
that there was a reasonable pattern in even the most 
irrational outpourings of the human mind as manifested in 
historical event as man asserted himself against nature in 
the unfolding narrative of human history. Adams's quest for 
a new focus of unity is tempered by the Viconian recognition 
that the province of history is the realm of states and 
laws and the narrative of human accomplishment, passion, and 
failure. Vico believed that, unlike nature, the realm 
created by God and hence inaccessible to the historian, the 
human experience was comprehensible for humans because 
humans experience the world in universal ways. He did not 
believe that there was anything universal or stable in human
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nature itself. Instead, Vico, and Adams long after him, 
believed that human nature was a phenomenon that was 
transformed through the experience of the multiple realms of 
discourse that we call by the singular name of history.
Adams's way of separating the life of the emotions and 
of figurative language from the life of reason in his own 
historical endeavors involved assigning the passions to the 
American South and to southerners like John Randolph or, 
later, Andrew Jackson. The life of reason was left to New 
Englanders like John Adams. Hamilton is dismissed as an 
opportunist and an upstart; Jefferson is portrayed as a 
moral coward and a liar. Thus, in further imitation of his 
accepted model Gibbon, whose subject had been the decline of 
Rome, Adams, although he was ostensibly dealing with the 
rise of a new western power, also told a story of inevitable 
decline. John Randolph, state's rights, slavery, and 
nullification collectively represented for Adams what 
Christianity had represented for Gibbon— the affirmation of 
the dangerous dogma that the individual and its interior 
provinces of mind and feeling are the world. In what he 
initially believed to be his ordained role as preserver and 
interpreter of family fame, Adams demonstrated that failure 
to heed the advice of the Federalist Adamses had determined 
the future and disastrous course of America, a course which 
had led to inevitable civil war. Adams's fatal symbols for 
this tragic turn of events were the life of John Randolph
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and the state of Virginia, and he was to write about each in 
both oblique and direct ways. Adams's first foray into the 
writing of history, where he, once again in imitation— this 
time of the philosopher Hume— seems to have thought he 
would find peace and certainty, was an essay on the explorer 
John Smith and the Indian heroine Pocahontas.
Adams's first serious historical essay, "Captaine John 
Smith,” separated myth from chronicle in the legend of John 
Smith and Pocahontas, and reflects a deeply felt belief that 
historical narrative could both replicate and refigure the 
past. In representing Smith who "maintained many different 
characters" and Pocahontas, whom seventeenth-century 
writers described not as an imperial figure but as a "well 
featured but wanton yong (sic.) girl," Adams did, in fact, 
create alternative lives for them. An essay on John Smith 
may seem far-removed from the Adamses and John Randolph, 
and yet, in the Viconian mvthos that Adams was erecting, the 
essay has its place. John Smith and his falsification of 
the chronicle of history becomes a type of the bad 
historian. Pocahontas, whose virtue is impugned, is the 
ancestress of many Virginia bluebloods, including Randolph. 
In demeaning her, Adams is deconstructing the sacred ground 
of southern genealogy. In particular, Adams is 
deconstructing the sacred ground of the Randolph family 
tree. He is also suggesting an antecedent in spirit for 
John Randolph. Just as John Smith is, for him, an icon of
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the bad historian, so John Randolph is an icon of the bad 
statesman.
Adams began the Smith essay in 1861, in the midst of 
the American Civil War. He was serving as his father's 
private secretary in London, and was in search of a 
compelling story that would help him realize his ambition to 
be his family's historian, the Gibbon of his century at the 
same time that it would permit him to set the Virginia 
aristocracy on its ears. Adams and his father were watching 
the lobbying efforts of "The Southern agents" in Parliament 
(Letters. I, 272), who were attempting to incite a popular 
movement in favor of intervention on the side of the 
Confederacy. While Adams and his father believed that "the 
Southerners" would fail in Parliament, they had "steady aid" 
from The London Times and firm support among the "Clubs, 
which are hopelessly anti-American" (Letters. I, 273). 
Adams's essay thus has a topical political purpose, but, in 
one of the paradoxes that characterizes everything about 
Adams's career, it remained unpublished until well after the 
end of the war. Characteristically, the essay, which was 
eventually published in 1867 in The North American Review 
under the unassuming title "Captaine John Smith," 
undertakes its two-fold mission of proving Adams's 
abilities as an historian and of suggesting in a veiled 
manner that Virginia aristocracy was a house built on myth 
and blind worship of a nonexistent past, not on science and
belief in the future- Though he claims merely to be engaged
in the Enlightenment project of purifying the chronicle of
history of the taint of myth and legend, Adams in fact was
already beginning the interminable project of defending his
grandfather John Quincy Adams from his detractors—
especially from John Randolph, who, as we have noted,
claimed descent— as did many Virginians— from Pocahontas and
her husband John Rolfe. In preparation for writing the
essay, Adams contacted John Gorham Palfrey in late 1861.
Palfrey was a Harvard professor, editor of The North
American Review, and author of a history of New England.
Adams informed him that he was doing some research on the
history of Pocahontas. After he had worked on the material
for a while, and concluded that Charles Deane, who had
recently produced a privately printed edition of Wingfield's
Discourse on Virginia, had been right in assuming that
Pocahontas's rescue of John Smith was pure fiction, he wrote
with some glee:
I fully expect that the ghost of John Randolf 
(sic.) will haunt you and Mr. Deane and me 
for this impiety, but it wasn't my fault...
(Letters, I, 280)
Elsewhere, Adams announced that "the Virginia aristocracy 
...will be utterly graveled by it if it is successful."16 
He wrote John Gorham Palfrey in 18 62 that "I can imagine to 
myself the shade of John Randolf turn green at that quaint 
picture...of Pocahontas clothed in virgin purity...turning
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somersets with all the little ragamuffins ...of Jamestowne" 
(Letters. I, 287).
In deconstructing the myth upon which many sacred
Virginia family trees were erected— Adams called it an
"article of American religious creed" (Letters. I, 287)—
Adams was already preparing the defense of John Quincy Adams
that would resurrect him in history. John Randolph and the
southern faction are simultaneously dismissed as lost in
intellectual darkness and enchained by the claims of
irrational myths and eccentric passions. The method of the
essay is remarkable. Juxtaposing passages from Smith's own A
True Relation of Virginia, which Smith had written in 1608,
with what should have been at least similar passages from
Smith's Generali Historie. which was printed in 1624, Adams
shows not only that Pocahontas is absent from the earlier
work, but also that the dimensions of all of Smith's
exploits have been similarly exaggerated and transformed:
Eight guards, which had been sufficient 
in 1608, are multiplied into thirty or 
forty tall fellows in 1624. What was 
enough for ten men...would feed twenty 
according to the later version.17
Adams also points out that Edward Wingfield's account 
of these same events, which was rescued from obscurity by 
Charles Deane and published in 1860, altogether ignores the 
existence of Pocahontas. That esteemed ancestress of 
nineteenth-century Virginians first appears in Smith's Map 
of Virginia, which was printed in 1612, though in this
account she does not yet throw herself between Smith and the 
blows that would have spilled his brains as she does in 
Smith's later versions of the story. Adams is perhaps 
most intrigued by what he, at least at that time, perceived 
to be Smith's ability to hoodwink even so eminent an 
historian as George Bancroft. In fact, as he notes, John 
Smith died quietly in 1631, but his book survived him and 
took on a life of its own as the "standard authority on 
Virginian history."18
When he was writing the Smith essay, Henry Adams was
deeply disturbed by the fact that fiction masquerading as
myth had managed to survive and prosper as national myth.
Yet, when he was writing the Education of Henry Adams
between 1905 and 1907, he places the work he had done on
Smith after the Civil War.
While drifting, after the war ended, 
many old American friends came 
abroad... among the rest, Dr.
Palfrey...When Dr. Palfrey happened on 
the picturesque but unpuritanic figure 
of Captain John Smith, he felt no call 
to beautify Smith's picture. The famous 
story of Pocohantas roused his latent 
New England skepticism. He suggested to 
Adams that...an article on Captain John 
Smith's relations with Pocohantas would 
attract as much attention...and break as 
much glass, as any other stone that 
could be thrown by a beginner...
(Education. 923)
The sequence was actually quite different. As we have seen, 
Adams's correspondence with Palfrey begins in 1861. When 
Adams first writes Palfrey, he says that he has been
"fascinated" by Palfrey's "historic doubts" about the legend 
of Pocahontas and John Smith ever since Palfrey had voiced 
"certain historical doubts" about them during a visit to the 
Adams' house in the previous spring. Adams writes that he 
has "had it in his head ever since" to examine the problem 
himself, and has spent some time in the British Museum 
delving into the problem. Palfrey sent Adams's letter to 
Charles Deane, who responded on 17 November that "I perceive 
he is not yet possessed of all the facts." The "facts," 
according to Mr. Deane, were that the earliest accounts of 
John Smith's adventures are "silent as to his rescue by the 
Indian girl."19 In the months that followed Palfrey's and 
Dean's confirmation of his suspicions about Smith's 
transformation of his experience into adventure story, Adams 
completed the essay. Ironically, his own final public 
reference in The Education to what was implicitly a study in 
the responsibility of the historian is couched amid 
fictional dates and fictionalized actions. The Henry Adams 
who tried to rescue historical fact from the shadowy realm 
of legend ends by abandoning the aims of Enlightenment 
historiography in favor of the fictions that permit the 
creation of a deterritorialized self in a narrative that is 
neither biography nor autobiography, neither legend nor 
history.
Adams's essay on Smith is the beginning of the 
realization of the choice of life he had made as a student
in Berlin— to deal with John Quincy Adams's papers and write 
his life. The project continued with the publication in 
1877 of Documents Relating to New England Federalism. Adams 
specifically set out to clear his grandfather of the 
lingering charge that he had failed to provide proof of his 
claims that he was innocent of having accused a number of 
extremists among the Massachusetts Federalists of plotting 
the dissolution of the Union in the days of the separatist 
conspiracy that had accompanied the seizure of the ship 
Essex in 1805. The British, of course, had defeated the 
French and Spanish fleets at Trafalgar, and were in a 
position to claim sovereignty over the seas, but Napoleon, 
for the time at least, exercised control over the land mass 
of western Europe. In the case of the Essex, a British court 
ruled that whether or not French and Spanish goods passed 
through American ports they were still enemy goods, and 
could be seized at any point in a continuous voyage. When 
the commercial provisions of Jay's Treaty expired in 1807, 
British interference with American shipping escalated. A 
complicated series of British Orders in Council followed, 
and were met by Napoleon's Continental Orders, with the 
result that American shipments were likely to be seized by 
either the British or the French on any continental voyage. 
To make matters worse, the British attacked the Chesapeake, 
an American frigate, when its captain refused to be 
searched. The British killed three men, wounded eighteen,
and seized four more, one of whom was later hanged for 
desertion from the British Navy. To avoid declaring a war, 
Jefferson proclaimed an Act of Embargo in 1807.20 
Predictably, it failed, and a group of New England 
Federalists, who claimed that Jefferson was in league with 
the French, revived the old Federalist cause. At this 
point, as Thomas Jefferson later recalled in 1825 at the age 
of eighty-three, "Mr. Adams called on me pending the 
embargo." According to Jefferson, Adams told him that 
"certain citizens of the Eastern States" were engaged in 
negotiation with British agents. The object of these 
negotiations was an agreement that the New England States 
should withdraw from the war, and that "without formally 
declaring their separation from the Union of the States, 
they should withdraw from all aid and obedience to them." In 
return, New England shipping was to be free from "restraint 
and interruption by the British." The "affair of the Essex 
Junto" as it came to be called, became a focus in John 
Quincy Adams's vicious political battle against Andrew 
Jackson in 1828. Adams had shed his Federalist affiliations 
in favor of Republican ones over the Embargo and the 
separatist controversy in 18 07. Angered by what were 
perceived as his neo-Federalist policies as President, some 
"old Republicans," most notably William B. Giles of 
Virginia, chose to revisit in 1825 the political decisions 
of nearly two decades before, questioning Adam's integrity
and charging him with personal treachery and self-interest. 
Giles obtained permission from Jefferson's grandson Thomas 
Randolph to publish letters that Jefferson had written him 
concerning his conversations with Adams about the Junto.
When the letters were published, Adams responded to them 
indirectly, through The National Intelligencer, denying both 
Jefferson's recollections of the events and Giles's 
interpretation of them. Giles responded by printing yet 
another letter which called John Quincy Adams an example of 
"human depravity." Adams again responded indirectly, this 
time through The Washington Expose. A series of similarly 
bitter exchanges followed, and Adams was even asked for 
clarification of his position by a group of Bostonians who 
felt their families' honor had been compromised. Adams 
refused to offer evidence to substantiate his claims on the 
grounds that they could not be proven in a court of law. The 
latter-day Federalists' "Appeal to the People" followed. 
Adams refused to respond to the document in any public 
forum, with the result that his behavior remained open to 
question. In his Constitutional and Political History of 
the United States. Herman von Holst wrote that the "final 
decision of history must be suspended" on the conduct of 
Adams and others in the affair of the Essex Junto.
With the help of Henry Cabot Lodge, who also had an 
ancestor, George Cabot, to defend, Adams set out to find the 
scientific evidence that would enable him to correct Von
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Holst's version of the story, and, with him, the chronicle 
of history. He found it in John Quincy Adams's unpublished 
reply to the Boston Federalists' "Appeal to the People."21 
Henry Adams's preface to his Documents Relating to New 
England Federalism. 1800-1815 begins with the 
characteristically outrageous claim that "this volume has no 
controversial purpose." While "the fires of personal and 
party passion" are buried under the "ashes of half a 
century," they still glow, he says for the student of 
history. His avowed aim is an appropriate one for an 
Enlightenment historian: he seeks to present the student of 
history with a volume compiled in a "broader spirit of 
impartial investigation," purified of filial and sectarian 
loyalties. His decision to omit some passages of "pure 
invective" from his grandfather's "Reply to the Appeal of 
the Massachusetts Federalists" is similarly explained. The 
younger Adams describes them as "passages of a personal 
nature;" following Gibbon and Voltaire he eliminates them so 
as to eliminate the distracting world of the passions and 
focus the reader on the relevant sequence of events in the 
"Reply." In his "Reply," John Quincy Adams calls his 
accusers the "mouldering relics" of the Essex Junto, which, 
in its time, had consisted of "partisans of Alexander 
Hamilton when he was publishing his pamphlets of slander 
upon my father." According to Adams, he had acted on 
Jefferson's behalf, and had informed him only that the
Governor of Nova Scotia was accusing Jefferson of being the
creature of the French government, and that there was
evidence of ongoing intrigue between Massachusetts
Federalists and agents of the British government in
Massachusetts. Adams states that he never accused any of the
Massachusetts Federalists of treason. Adams then presents
the documents, primarily letters, that attest to his
innocence. According to Adams, the real issue for Mr. Giles
and his other accusers was not his neo-Federalism, a charge
that stemmed from his statement to Congress in his first
address that "effective energy" must be tapped from "the
powers delegated by the people" for the "improvement of the
condition of the country." Invoking the ancient
controversies and even the language of the English Civil
War, Adams embarks on a vitriolic attack on Virginia and on
the doctrine of "State rights." Adams is a latter-day
Cromwell confronting the claims of English "cavaliers."
The patriotism of this portion of the 
people of Virginia was rallied by the 
cabbalistical watchword of 'State- 
rights.' The lurking jealousies of 
slave-holders were enlisted against the 
native of a State wholly free. The bone- 
bred dislikes of the cavalier race to 
the scion from the stock of Pilgrim 
Puritans were summoned to the array 
against him; and the Virginian and 
southern and slave-holding mind was thus 
predisposed to receive falsehood for 
truth, and sophistry for reason, to ruin 
the reputation and paralyze the power of 
a President of the United States...
(Federalism. 140)
With great bitterness, John Quincy Adams notes that William 
Giles was not content to speak alone, but that he also had 
to summon the mighty shade of Thomas Jefferson and the 
lesser presence of John Randolph to help him make his case. 
Adams excuses Jefferson’s lapses of memory. Of Randolph, he 
writes only that he will say nothing of "Mr. John Randolph's 
agency in this honorable conspiracy. I leave him and his 
unreproved potations of English porter for a more suitable 
occasion" (Federalism. 144). Adams ends the "Reply" by 
reminding his audience that the "lyre of Orpheus was 
transported to the heavens for its attractive virtues in 
civilizing and harmonizing the solitary savage of the desert 
into the social denizen of a community" (Federalism. 329). 
Orpheus, a type of the mythic civilizer, was a favored 
Augustan image of the artist, who had the capacity to 
envision the ideal political order. For Adams, the American 
politician must also be an Orphic poet. Like the 
Enlightenment theorists he admired, Adams believed that in 
matters of governance, the particular and sectarian interest 
must yield to the general good. Adams feared, rightly, that 
the general good in America was in danger of being 
sacrificed to private property interests.
Adams's "Reply" is addressed to the "Citizens of the 
United States," who had rejected him for a second term as 
president. Written for the widest audience, it remained 
unpublished until his grandson chose to give it life and
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speech by including it in the text of received history. The 
long narrative amounts to a revisionist history of the 
Jefferson and Madison administrations, as well as an attack 
on all of Adams's ideological enemies. Though he chose not 
to print his own revisionist history, his grandson Henry 
did, and spent the next ten years of his life taking the 
lives, to use the grandson's phrase, of John Quincy Adams's 
friends and enemies alike, first in the biographies of 
Gallatin, Randolph, and Burr, the last of which he never 
printed, and later in the History of the United States.
In his introduction to New England Federalism. Adams
says that his ancestor was "driven, in what he conceived to
be disgrace and humiliation, from the Presidency" when his
greatest wish had been to serve selflessly in the furthering
of the Enlightenment project in America.
His diary tells how, at this time, the 
sense of personal abandonment...had 
gained so strong a hold upon his mind 
that scarce a day passed when his ears 
did not ring with the old refrain:— 0 
Richard! 0 mon roi! L'univers 
t'abandonne.
(Federalism, vi)
As a student, Adams had felt that preserving his 
grandfather's papers and writing his biography was enough to 
occupy any scholar for life. The process of preparing even 
a few of his letters seems to have resulted in the sense of 
doubling through narrative that characterized all of Adams's 
work with history and biography. Writing to Elizabeth
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Cameron in late 1891 Adams recalled his grandfather's
obsession with Gretry's Richard Coeur de Leon again. In
this letter, however, the passage takes on a rather
different significance.
...hurried off to the Opera Comique to 
perform an act of piety to my revered 
grandfather... a century ago, more or 
less, President Washington sent my 
grandfather to the Hague, and my 
grandfather was fond of music to such an 
extent...that he tried to play the 
flute. Anyway, he was much attached to 
Gretry's music...when he was turned out 
of the Presidency, he could think of 
nothing for days together, but "Oh,
Richard, o mon roy l'univers 
t'abandonne...
(Letters. Ill, 594)
As early as 1877, Adams was creating the sort of fable 
for public consumption that John Smith had created in the 
seventeenth century, and which Adams himself would later 
create in the story of his grandmother's supposed exotic 
heritage as Southerner. The private significance of the 
story about the Opera Comique was that JQA, as Adams liked 
to call him, not unlike the Henry Adams of 1858 was deeply 
haunted by his passion for the arts. By 1891, Adams's 
identification with his grandfather as a sort of double is 
complete:
Nothing more delightfully rococo and 
simple could well be, than the music of 
Gretry. To think that it was fin de 
siecle too— and shows it in the words 
and led directly into the French 
Revolution. I tried to imagine myself as 
I was then— and you know what an awfully
handsome fellow Copley made me— with 
full dress powdered hair, talking to 
Mme. Chose in the boxes and stopping to 
applaud 'un regard de ma belle.'
(Letters, III, 228)
Adams is referring, of course, to the famous oval portrait
of his grandfather that had been painted by John Singleton
Copley in 1796. His playful experiment in attempting to
conjure his grandfather through his own experience of an
opera already echoes Nietzsche's claim to Burckhardt that
"every name in history is 'I. ,n22 Adams's obsession with
his grandfather's life never ceased. Even in 1909, long
after the Education was completed, he was still involved in
evaluating his grandfather's life, though by that time he
seemed to want him obliterated from the chronicle of
history. In responding to his brother Brooks's attempt to
write a biography of their grandfather, Henry condemns their
grandfather for the very acts that had constituted his
martyrdom in the Documents. and even doubts the old man's
patriotism.
I can't forgive him his vote on the 
Embargo, or his defense of Andrew 
Jackson. He was not punished half 
enough for either...he loathed and hated 
America..he never thought of going home 
without nausea...
(Letters. VI, 228)
In the same letter Henry also questions John Quincy's 
devotion to the arts, condemning him for his "indifference," 
as well as for his "didactic" tastes in literature. He
also describes him in terms that recall his treatment of 
John Randolph, suggesting that his biography of Randolph, a 
work he had claimed at one time to despise (Letters. II,
475, 479), was a work which had succeeded because he had 
managed to "put some depth and shadow in my picture." Adams 
implies that a similar treatment would be appropriate for 
John Quincy Adams, whom he describes as a tragic figure— the 
"prophet who ends in secret murder and open war, violence, 
and fraud, and hideous moral depravity." This is presumably 
the same John Quincy Adams whose "I" Adams had claimed in 
1891 as his own in a symbolic act of piety to his memory, 
and whom he had defended in 1877 (Letters, II, 323) for his 
love of truth, and whose deep reservations about Jefferson's 
moral character are meticulously preserved in Adams's own 
version of the text of history.
Puzzling and contradictory as Adams's attitudes toward 
himself, his projects, and his biographical and historical 
subjects are, he continued to produce biography and history 
throughout the 1880s and returned to it in 1911. With the 
Smith essay and the biographies of Albert Gallatin and John 
Randolph that he began in the late 1870s, New England 
Federalism seems to have been yet another "feeler," as Adams 
called his biographies, for the eventual writing of the 
massive History.
Feeling that he had at last donned the "cloak of 
historian" (Letters. II, 303) in his New Encrland Federalism
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volume, Adams began his massive biography of Albert
Gallatin in the summer of 1877 at the request of Gallatin's
son Albert. In writing the life of Gallatin, or, perhaps
better, in organizing a narrative around Gallatin's letters
and papers, Adams was literally giving life to a figure who
had left few documents to indicate anything other than years
of public service and a continuing interest in the language
and culture of the American Indian tribes. Gallatin was
Adams's ideal politician. His life was subsumed in service
and in the scientific endeavor that resulted in his
celebrated classification of the linguistic groups among
American Indian tribes on a large scale.
To do justice to Gallatin was a labor of 
love. After long study of the prominent 
figures in our history, I am more than 
ever convinced that, for combination of 
ability, integrity, knowledge, 
unselfishness, and social fitness, Mr.
Gallatin has no equal. He was the most 
fully and perfectly equipped statesman 
we can show. Other men, as I take hold 
of them, are soft in some spots and 
rough in others. Gallatin never gave way 
in my hand or seemed unfinished.
(Letters. II, 491)
Again, Adams's polarized sense of a moralized geography 
intrudes. Gallatin was opposed at every turn of his 
political life by the Southern faction that John Quincy 
Adams had hated. Gallatin thus interests Adams in part 
because Gallatin provides an oblique means of writing about 
John Randolph. In preparation for writing the volume, Adams
began an extended correspondence with Hugh Grigsby, the 
President of the Virginia Historical Society, explaining 
that without assistance from the Virginia archives he could 
not proceed with the biography. The Gallatin biography is 
probably the best example of Adams's efforts at writing 
objective history. He wrote Grigsby with some dismay that 
"Gallatin unfortunately detested letter writing," and that 
since Gallatin had also avoided gossip Adams was "debarred 
from the most interesting portion of biography"(Letters. II, 
317). His aim, however, avowed to both Grigsby and John 
Russell Bartlett, was that "as far as possible his story 
should be told by his own letters or writings" (Letters, II, 
347). Adams's own letters that record the process of writing 
the Gallatin biography show that Adams rapidly became more 
interested in what he was discovering about John Randolph, 
Thomas Jefferson, and the Adamses than he was in Gallatin, 
though Gallatin's life as biographical subject takes on the 
patterns of exile, alienation, and flight that characterize 
all of Adams's narrative portraits of all of his 
biographical and historical subjects. Adams's desire to 
allow Gallatin to represent himself through his letters 
extended to a decision not to translate Gallatin's French 
letters. Adams wrote Gallatin's son that there were several 
reasons for his not having attempted translation. The most 
telling of these is the last: "as regards M. de Voltaire, I 
have my doubts whether the man who thinks he can translate
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him, is not a little of a fool" (Letters, II, 330). At the
end of his preface to his biography of Albert Gallatin,
Adams acknowledges a perhaps exaggerated sense of
indebtedness to George Bancroft. Adams seems to have
absorbed most directly from Bancroft what he could have
gotten from reading any Enlightenment historian, including
Carlyle: the idea that the individual is representative of
his age. And, as we have seen, by the time he published the
Gallatin biography he had abandoned Carlyle's "hero-
worship." Thus, early in the Gallatin biography Adams
announces that "after the elevation of Geneva to the rank of
a sovereign republic, the history of the Gallatins is the
history of the city.23
The family, if not the first in the 
state, was second to none. Government 
was aristocratic in this small republic, 
and of the eleven families into whose 
hands it fell at the time of the 
Reformation, the Gallatins furnished 
syndics and counsellors with that 
regularity and frequency which 
characterized the mode of selection...of 
the other ten. Five Gallatins held the 
position of first syndic, and as such 
were the chief magistrates of the 
republic...
(Gallatin. 3)
The Gallatins, Adams writes, also counted "at least one
political martyr among their number."
...a Gallatin...charged with the crime 
of being head of a party which aimed at
popular reforms in the Constitution, was 
seized and imprisoned in 1698...
(Gallatin. 3)
Though they filled the ranks of the professions and died in
military service on nearly all of the great battlefields of
Europe, the Gallatins were Genevans, after all, and not
feudal aristocrats.
In another European country a family 
like this would have had a feudal 
organization, a recognized head, great 
entailed estates, and all of the titles 
of duke, marquis, count, and peer which 
royal favor could confer or political 
and social influence could command.
Geneva stood by herself. Aristocratic as 
her government was, it was still 
republican, and the parade of rank or 
wealth was not one of its chief 
characteristics.
(Gallatin. 4-5)
What they lacked in money and land they made up for in 
prestige. The family estate was one of "integrity, energy, 
courage, and intelligence." Despite his scrupulous attempts 
to let Gallatin write his own biography, and his refusal to 
usurp Gallatin's voice through translating his letters, the 
shape that Adams lends Gallatin's life is the shape provided 
by Adams's sense of his own family history and the 
lineaments of his own experience. In his quest for a 
destiny that lay outside his family's sphere of influence in 
Geneva, and in his profound restlessness, Gallatin's line of 
flight is similar to Adams's. Ironically, Gallatin first 
"began to feel his own powers and to see them recognized by
the world"(Gallatin. 53) in Boston, the city Henry Adams had
longed to escape. Unlike Henry Adams, Gallatin became a
victim of what Gibbon in speaking of the fall of Rome called
"immoderate greatness."
...the insidious elevation of Mr.
Gallatin, the displaying of him as a 
magician whose touch was superhuman; the 
ascribing to him every power and every 
act that emanated from government 
...destroyed his usefulness by 
indirection.
(Gallatin. 438)
There is an echo of Gibbon's elegy to Rome at the height of
its powers in this passage, and a tragic certainty of
Gallatin's coming "betrayal" at the hands of his former
associates Jefferson and Madison. Throughout the
difficulties of his association with the Jefferson and
Madison administrations, however, Gallatin sought always to
"preserve and invigorate the Union" (Letters, II, 481). As
Secretary of the Treasury in a financially troubled country
he had sought to forge a vision that was capable of
"providing for and guiding the moral and material
development of a new Era,— a fresh race of men."
It was not a mere departmental reform or 
a mere treasury administration that Mr.
Gallatin undertook; it was a theory of 
democratic government which he and his 
associates attempted to reduce to 
practice. They failed, and although 
their failure was due partly to 
accident, it was due chiefly to the fact 
that they put too high an estimate on 
human nature. They failed as Hamilton 
and his associates, with a different 
ideal and equally positive theories had
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failed before them. Yet, whatever may 
have been the extent of their defeat or 
of their success, one fact stands out in 
strong relief on the pages of American 
history. Except those theories of 
government which are popularly 
represented by the names of Hamilton and 
Jefferson, no solution of the great 
problems of American politics has ever 
been offered to the American people. 
Since the day when foreign violence and 
domestic faction prostrated Mr. Gallatin 
and his two friends, no statesman has 
ever appeared with the strength to bend 
their bow— to finish their uncompleted 
task.
(Gallatin. 492)
These are essentially the same claims that Brooks Adams 
always made for John and John Quincy Adams, and that Henry 
Adams's published works suggested during most of his career 
as an historian. In the chapter on Gallatin's diplomatic 
career, Adams acknowledges the "curious parallelism" between 
the "lives and characters" of John Quincy Adams and Albert 
Gallatin (Gallatin. 496).
In the process of writing about Gallatin, Adams 
developed his interest in John Randolph and the problem of 
what he called "Southern eccentricity." Adams thought he had 
identified the phenomenon as early as 1862, when he was 
working on the Smith essay. He was later to realize that 
this eccentricity was only another name for the tendency of 
all history in the modern world— a tendency to, if not be 
invented, then at least swallowed up by the individual mind. 
Subjectivity was hopelessly entwined for Adams with the idea
of entropy which influenced his vision of history in the 
Education. Adams first explores the problem of 
'•eccentricity" seriously in his biography of John Randolph, 
which he had in part researched during the writing of the 
Gallatin biography. The two works are conjoined— like a 
pair of medieval exemola. Randolph is the exemolum in malo 
of statecraft, whereas Gallatin is the standard by which all 
statesmanship must be judged.
Probably no aspect of Henry Adams's thought and writing 
is more complex than his attitude toward the American South 
and Southerners. Whether he found them compelling, and 
somewhat damnable, as in the case of Jefferson, or mostly 
damnable and still compelling as in the case of the 
archvillain John Randolph, Adams spent much of his career 
writing and thinking about Southerners. In part, this may 
have been a response to his sense of a moral topology of 
place. Whether he was writing of southern Europe or of the 
southern U.S., Adams tended to associate the South with the 
nether world of pleasure, passion, and art that is 
conspicuously absent from his vision of history. He usually 
claimed to despise Virginians, though he wrote in the 
Education that he "liked the Virginians." He also claims in 
the Education that he was Roony Lee's amanuensis, thus 
appropriating Robert E. Lee's son's "I" as his own. 
Acknowledging and underscoring his sense of kinship with the 
South, he gives the chapter in the Education that deals with
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the Civil War the title "Eccentricity," an echo of a chapter 
in the biography of John Randolph which he had similarly 
called "Eccentricities." Moreover, Adams transforms his 
English grandmother into a Southerner, though she herself 
claimed late in life that she had no sympathy with 
Southerners at all.24 One of the most famous passages in the 
Education describes the intoxicating aura of the Maryland 
spring, which Adams says he loved "too much" as though in 
its "delicate grace and passionate depravity" it were "Greek 
and half-human." The passage recalls nothing so much as 
Adams's letters about the Italian countryside that he had 
written on his travels at the age of twenty-two. Only much 
later, at the age of sixty-seven, could he say that the rest 
of his education paled by comparison with the "delight of 
this"(Education, 965). Adams's first analysis of Southern 
character is far less sympathetic. For Adams, John Randolph 
was a type of the South, just as Adamses were types of New 
England. In his biography of John Randolph, which he 
published in 1882, Adams creates a version of Virginia life 
which illuminates his idiosyncratic typology of place. 
Virginia--and, by extension, all of the South, was a region 
wholly dedicated to the notion that America should engage in 
the recreation of the gracious life of the English manor and 
build a model of a "future Arcadian America." This idea of 
the future of America opposes the urbanized and more 
technical Enlightenment model espoused by the Adamses, and,
to an extent, even by George Washington. Having noted at the 
beginning of the biography that John Randolph claimed to be 
a descendant of Pocohantas, in sly allusion to his earlier 
essay, Adams proceeds to paint Randolph as the 
"representative man of the South," a type of the "Slave 
Power" and eccentricity, of slavish devotion to English ways 
and pastoral myth. Randolph is described on the one hand in 
the History as a man who should have been the Archangel 
Michael, Adam's emblem of masculine power both in the 
Randolph biography and, later in his Mt. St. Michel and 
Chartres. and on the other as the hapless victim of a 
regional poison that he "sucked with his mother's milk." 
Randolph bought his books from English booksellers and aped 
English manners. "Eccentricity," which, as I have mentioned 
reasserts itself in Adams's Education, seems to have been 
Adams's private term for excessive concern with self and 
self-presentation and the subjectively engendered universe 
produced through reflection. Henry Adams, like John Quincy 
Adams, or perhaps Henry Adams in the guise of John Quincy 
Adams, believed that the drama of the early decades of the 
Republic resolves itself into a conflict between those who 
were dedicated to the public good, and who sacrificed their 
private interests like the heroes of Augustan Rome, and 
those who, like Randolph and other Southerners, served 
private vanity, "eccentricity," and a mental as well as 
literal human bondage. Necessarily, the forces of
eccentricity favored the dissolution of the Union— that
symbol of the general Good— while the forces of
Enlightenment served the cause of the Union's preservation.
Virginia was a dependent culture.
...the country had plunged into a war 
which in a single moment cut that 
connection with England on which the old 
Virginian society depended for its 
tastes, fashions, theories,and, above 
all, for its aristocratic status...the 
Declaration of Independence proclaimed 
that America was no longer to be 
English, but American,that 
is...democratic and popular in all its 
parts,— a fact equivalent to a sentence 
of death upon old Virginian society, and 
foreboding dissolution to the 
Randolphs. . ,25
Adams depicts Randolph as a sort of memento mori of American 
politics. For him, Randolph and the South are engaged in a 
war for survival with the forces of Enlightenment. Adams 
notes that Randolph believed that many of his more excessive 
personal characteristics came from his Indian heritage. In 
fact, Adams asserts, "The Indian owns no such person..or 
such temperament,...which... belongs to an order of animated 
beings still nearer...to the predaceous instincts of dawning 
intelligence" (Randolph. 253-254). In Adams's view, Nature 
cannot produce an aberration like Randolph, who is 
emblematic of a way of thinking and living that was as 
exhausted as the tobacco fields that surrounded him. The 
province of the rationalist historian is to explain Randolph 
to the chronicle of history. Randolph is explicable only as 
an agent of benighted thinking and a figure, who, in
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opposition to Albert Gallatin and John Quincy Adams, could 
prefigure the towering interests that were to collide in the 
American Civil War.
As I have indicated, Adams referred to his biography of 
Randolph, as he did to that of Gallatin, as a "feeler for my 
history" (Letters. II, 476-77). The latter work began as 
Adams's ultimate effort at scientific history-writing. He 
asked Justin Winsor, a Harvard librarian, to send him "six 
or seven volumes" of the American newspapers from 1807-09 
each week. He also wanted accounts of banking and education 
and of the "practise of medicine." He asked for a "good 
sermon, if such a thing existed." In addition, Adams 
searched archives all over Europe for documents that might 
illumine his recreation of the past. He believed, as he 
says in one of the early volumes of the history, that 
whereas lawyers had to give the shape of theory to their 
claims, "the historian need only state facts in sequence."
In the eyes of his reviewers, Adams's project
succeeded. One critic wrote that his history "approaches
nearer the standard of science than any extended historical
work yet written on this side of the Atlantic.1,26 Adams's
purpose was to define what he called "national character, "
and Adams conjures an almost Edenic vision of nature
undisturbed by man.
Even after two centuries of struggle, 
the land was still untamed; forest 
covered every portion, except here and 
there a strip of cultivated soil; the
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minerals lay undisturbed in their rocky 
beds...27
The only blight on this landscape of possibility, one which
Adams called "a cancerous disease" (History. 107), was the
fact that "one-fifth of the American people were negro
slaves" (History. 5). The nation was still an untamed
wilderness, in which "nature was rather man's master than
his servant." Following the organic model of Enlightenment
history, Adams proposes to trace something like America's
path toward individuation and cultural independence.
Adams's narrative which swiftly turns into an elegiac one is
a study in how the blight came to overshadow the
possibilities. The primary danger that he saw lay in the
southern states where "thought could find little room for
free development" as long as "it confined its action to
narrowing its own field" (History. 99). The paradox of the
Southern problem was epitomized not so much in John
Randolph, whose excesses of mind and spirit knew no bounds,
but in Jefferson, the acknowledged intellectual leader in
Virginia politics. Jefferson was a man of the Enlightenment
whose "instincts were those of a liberal European nobleman,
like the Due de Liancourt.” His "true delight was in an
intellectual life of science and art."
To read, write, speculate in new lines 
of thought to keep abreast of the 
intellect in Europe, and to feed on 
Homer and Horace, were pleasures more to
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his mind than any to be found in a 
public assembly.
(History. 99)
Adams describes Jefferson in moving terms as having been 
"beyond the ambition of a nationality." His vision "embraced 
the whole future of man," in the purest Enlightenment 
fashion.
Jefferson aspired beyond the ambition of 
a nationality, and embraced in his view 
the whole future of man. That the United 
States should become a nation like 
France, England or Russia, should 
conquer the world like Rome, or develop 
a typical race like the Chinese was no 
part of his scheme. He wished to begin a 
new era. Hoping for a time when the 
world's ruling interests should cease to 
be local and become universal; when 
questions of boundary and nationality 
should become insignificant...he set 
himself to the task of governing with 
this golden age in view.
(History. 101)
Adams's praise also damns. In his view, Jefferson's 
Enlightenment was the European Enlightenment, and as long as 
America's vision for itself was derivative of European 
versions of enlightenment, America would remain spiritually 
and intellectually colonized. The implied analogy between 
Jefferson's life and thought and those of a French nobleman 
are hardly careless when we recall Adams's disdain for John 
Randolph's slavish adherence to English customs and thought, 
and the accusations of illegal French connections that 
surrounded Jefferson's career in politics. With telling
irony, Adams qualifies his comparison of Jefferson with the 
Due de Liancourt by noting that "he built for himself at 
Monticello a chateau above contact with man" (History. 99). 
If his house was above the sphere of ordinary life, so was 
his theoretical stance on the nation's problems. Jefferson 
was inclined to "generalize without careful analysis," and 
he was willing to "risk the fate of mankind on the chance of 
reasoning far from certain in its details" (History. 100). 
Echoing John Quincy Adams, Henry Adams felt that Jefferson's 
plans for the nation's development, were in some ways 
"narrower than ordinary provincialism" (History. 101). In 
contrast to the vision of an urban and industrialized nation 
espoused by the Adamses, Jefferson feared that "cities, 
manufactures, mines, shipping, and accumulation of capital 
led...to corruption and tyranny" (History. 101). For Adams, 
the South and Southerners, including Madison and Jefferson, 
its primary intellectual exponents, was a terrain afflicted 
not only by slavery but its moral equivalent in mind. Of 
the Southern states, only North Carolina, the poor relative 
of Virginia and South Carolina, earned his approval. North 
Carolina, in Adams's perception, was "the healthiest 
community south of the Potomac," and was thus partially 
exempt from his criticism. Charlestonians, like Virginia's 
John Randolph, remained content to imitate "whatever 
reminded them of European civilization" (History. 102-103). 
In the planter society of tidewater South Carolina as
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a whole Adams saw the same "interesting union" between 
"English tastes and provincial prejudices" that disturbed 
him in Jefferson. Again, Adams preferred the poorer regions 
of the Southern states; in particular, he was fascinated by 
the mountainous Piedmont and its up-country farmers whom he 
saw epitomized in John C. Calhoun, whose "modes of thought 
were those of a Connecticut Calvinist," and whose mind was 
"cold, stern, and metaphysical" (History. 106). In the stark 
landscapes of the Carolina hill country, Adams found an 
analogue of New England habits of mind and their 
corresponding ways of seeing and being.
Adams's vision of the new republic, with its images of 
"a thousand miles of dreary and desolate forest" (History. 
107), echoes that of de Tocgueville with some of the same 
ends. Adams's aim, however, was not to show the 
possibilities of democracy in America, but to outline the 
ideological battle for its mind and soul. For the careful 
reader of the history, the dramatis personae of Adams's 
vision of what was to be a uniquely American tragedy are set 
in motion. The fatal weaknesses in the Jeffersonian vision 
of America were to be ignored; the Adamses' warnings were to 
go unheeded. In the history Adams demonstrates the sense 
indicated in the previously cited letters on his view of 
Madison and Jefferson. They were creatures inundated by 
historical forces that were larger than they were. 
Jefferson's tendency to inhabit the country of mind rather
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than the landscape of his countrymen, and the sectarian 
politics of New Englanders like the members of the Essex 
Junto, who had accused John Quincy Adams of "moral 
depravity" were fatal to the vision of a country liberated 
from the original sins contained in history. In the absence 
of a consensus, the outcome of the fatal election that saw 
Jackson and his version of democracy in triumph was assured. 
In Jefferson and Madison's day, "individuals retained their 
old interest as types of character, if not sources of 
power." The figures of John Quincy Adams, of Madison, and 
of Jefferson collide in the declining years of the old, 
organic model of a history that,in Adams's view, ended in 
1815.
The History outlines the demise of the eighteenth- 
century view of progress and history which necessarily 
evaporated in the face of a century of hero-worship and 
fact-finding that masqueraded in vain as science. Adams 
even came to maintain a revisionist view of Gibbon. By 
1905, when he was writing the Education, he is less inspired 
and more troubled than he had been when a first reading of 
Gibbon helped him map out his destiny as his family's 
historian.
...he was led more than once to sit at 
sunset on the steps of the Church of 
Santa Maria di Ara Coeli curiously 
wondering that not an inch had been
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gained by Gibbon or all the historians 
towards explaining the Fall.
(Education, 803)
Adams wrote Henry Osborn Taylor on 17 January, 1905, that he
"had no object but a superficial one, as far as [writing]
history is concerned." "Accuracy is relative," he said,
articulating a dramatic reversal of the feelings that had
dominated his career as an historian in the 1880s. By
February of 1909, he claimed to be unable to behold the
spectacle of American history without nausea:
...this mental paralysis has practical 
drawbacks. One is my nauseous 
indigestion of American history, which 
now makes me physically sick, so that 
only by self-compulsion can I read its 
dreary details...
(Letters. VI, 224)
Adams felt particularly nauseated by the very period of 
American history that had served as a focus for his 
histories and biographies. This was the era that had been 
dominated by men like his grandfather and by John Randolph 
and Thomas Jefferson. By the time Adams wrote of the despair 
that engulfed him as he contemplated the incomprehensible 
vistas of an unknowable history, his younger brother Brooks 
had written a biography of John Quincy Adams. Henry's 
responses, some of which have been suggested earlier, were 
overwhelmingly negative. He called the "picture of our 
wonderful grandpapa" that Brooks had painted a "psychologic 
nightmare." At the same time, he said that "the
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psychological or pathological curiosity of the study takes
possession of me."
The unhealthy atmosphere of the whole 
age, its rampant meanness...the one­
sided flabbiness of America; the want of 
self-respect, or purpose; the 
intellectual feebleness, and the 
material greed,— I loathe it all.
Adams had begun by believing that John Randolph and the 
South represented the accidental and particular. What he 
later realized was that what they represented was universal 
and essential. What he had at first painted as 
"eccentricity" was the same malady that Nietzsche had called 
the disease of historical self-consciousness. Like the 
Hawthorne of "The Customs House," but belatedly, Adams 
realized that the reconstruction of history was essentially 
an art form, and that the historian invariably faces 
crumbling fragments of the patchwork of past reality, not 
hard facts. The chronicle of history, practically speaking, 
purified of all that Voltaire and Gibbon alike would have 
found offensive did not exist. His view of historians and 
historiography thus changed drastically between 1858 and 
1888. When he was finishing his History of the Jefferson and 
Madison Administrations he wrote that as he "composed the 
last page of my history" he was "in vain trying to do Gibbon 
and walk up and down in my garden" (Letters, III, 144). As 
he began the publication of the history he also began the 
destruction of his diaries. For Adams, there was a 
necessary connection between his inability to imitate Gibbon
in life and his inability to imitate Gibbon's vision in
historiography.
The narrative was finished last Monday.
In imitation of Gibbon, I walked in the 
garden among the yellow and red autumn 
flowers, blazing in sunshine, and 
meditated. My meditations were too 
painful to last. The contrast between my 
beginning and end is something Gibbon 
never anticipated. I have brought from 
Boston the old volumes of this Diary and 
begun their systematic destruction. I 
mean to leave no record that can be 
obliterated...
(Letters. Ill, 144)
In what appears to be a conscious juxtaposition of the 
completion of the History and the destruction of his 
personal past, Adams adds that "of the four concluding 
chapters [of the History1 I have already written one-third." 
(Letters. Ill, 144). Adams continues to destroy his diaries 
(Letters. Ill, 146) as he "works ahead toward [his] demise"- 
-presumably the publication of his History. His brain, he 
says, "reels with the vividness of emotions more than thirty 
years old." A few weeks later, however, Adams records that 
he is still reading his diary, but that he "hesitates" to 
destroy more of his past, as he "may want to read it again." 
Adams thus juxtaposes the creation of a chronicle of the 
past— in this case an historical epoch with which he felt a 
passionate and personal identification— with an act of self- 
destruction which takes place not through physical violence, 
but through the destruction of a body of literary texts— the 
texts which of necessity incarnate both his personal history
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and human history. He destroys his diaries— which perhaps 
record a more "realistic" account of his life and feelings—  
in order to obliterate a record that would enable some later 
historian or biographer to do with his existence what Henry 
Adams had already done to John Randolph and John Smith and 
Albert Gallatin. Having demolished the possibility of 
writing history, Adams seems to have turned toward the 
stance he had assigned in the History to law: that of 
theorist. His last works combine the enterprise of 
biographer, autobiographer, philosopher, and historian of 
history.
* * * * * *
My epigraphs for this chapter are both taken from 
Faulkner. One, the first and more poetic but less coherent 
of the two, is part of Quentin Compson's musings on the 
nature of self and history in The Sound and the Fury. The 
other, and more articulate of the two, is provided by a 
fictional narrator— or biographer or, in Adams's view, a 
sort of secular historian-god. This second perspective, from 
Absalom. Absalom!. captures Quentin's peculiar status as a 
destabilized consciousness. It is more coherent because it 
is intended to provide a textual ground of community between 
reader and writer, just as Adams's histories were intended 
to produce a text that would provide his audiences with a 
sort of communion through an artificially conjured past.
Henry Adams spent a lifetime trying to articulate what a 
fictional Quentin Compson knew only in those moments when he 
began to feel the water engulfing him even before he came to 
that fatal, lichened bridge over the Charles River in the 
spaces of William Faulkner's imagination. In those moments, 
both Quentin and his creator knew that he was and could only 
be his "father's Progenitive;" in the modern world, we 
create not only the selves which imprison us, but also the 
history within which the self as subject is conceived and 
moves. Quentin's claim on his father's creation, is of 
course, both a tragic and ironic echo of what, for Sir 
Thomas Browne, writing on the opposite fringe of modernity, 
was a reassuring notion— the idea that "Eve miscarried of me 
before she conceived of Cain." Eve miscarries of Sir Thomas 
before she conceives of Cain in the comforting caverns that 
are part of a landscape of absolute being in the 
foreknowledge that is omnipresent in the mind of God. In 
the providential vision, we can invent our fathers and 
grandfathers with impunity because there is, after all, 
reconciliation in a time that is imbued with both a 
preordained shape and a meaning. Quentin Compson and Henry 
Adams conceive and miscarry of a few generations and a few 
alternative selves that are generated only by themselves 
within the confines of a time that is relentless and 
damaging— one thinks of Quentin's bleeding hand, cut on the 
crystal of a watch— precisely because it is unredeemed by
any access to anything outside a history whose limits and 
whose finitude are those of the very subject that it 
entraps. We recall the clock that presides over the tragic 
vestibule of Spenser's House of Pride, and with it,
Spenser's awareness that the clock-time of Augustine's City 
of Man would necessarily preside over the projects of a 
modernity whose presence he had already internalized. But 
because Quentin's and Adams's past, like their being, is 
generated by a self condemned to isolation, they can have 
life only through the agency of memory and the 
reconciliations provided by memory's record— the texts that 
constitute self and community alike in the political and 
personal spaces of the modern world. The agony of a 
historical consciousness that is both deific and imprisoning 
accompanies Quentin's "I invented him created I him,” and it 
is an agony shared by Henry Adams. And, like Quentin, Adams 
self-consciously and intentionally wrecks on the 
enlightenment project of modernity. His suicide in print, 
his destruction of his diaries, is a way of shattering the 
walls of subjectivity, of deterritorializing the problem of 
identity in a world that has been engulfed and devoured by 
mind, and by mind's hieroglyph and hand-maiden— history. 
Quentin chose a baptism in water; Adams, a baptism in the 
textual waters of history.
I chose the first of the two epigraphs because, in 
writing this chapter, I realized that, while Henry Adams may
be an ancestor in a genealogy of anti-mind that leads at 
least from Nietzsche to Gilles Deleuze, he is (and perhaps 
more importantly) the ancestor of Quentin Compson and of a 
modernist faith in a resolution in art that was not 
available to him because he was an Adams. Adams knew, as 
Faulkner did, that no one can narrate coherently from the 
interiors of Macbeth's solipsistic nightmare of a history 
that is horrific precisely because it is self-generated.
That species of narration is the province of artists who 
envision possibilities of coherence and who conjure the 
semblance of meaning for themselves and their audiences. 
Necessarily and ironically artists, like historians, engage 
in a activity which is above all a motion of mind, but which 
nevertheless embodies the possibilities of the 
deterritorialized consciousness. And what could be more 
descriptive of Henry Adams and his sense that he was not a 
being or entity at all than the haunting passage from 
Absalom. Absalom1 that forms my second epigraph: "his very 
body was an empty hall echoing with sonorous, defeated 
names; he was not a being, an entity, he was a commonwealth. 
He was a barracks filled with stubborn back-looking ghosts 
still recovering...from the fever which had cured the 
disease...” With Quentin, Adams was both monarch and 
subject of a commonwealth of echoes-— sounds that are 
articulated and heard only by the subject that produces 
them. Different fevers— those suffered by the fictional
Compsons and the literal Adamses, but perhaps— and Adams's 
and Faulkner's brilliance is that they recognized this— the 
same disease. In Sanctuary Faulkner has Horace Benbow, 
another Prufrockian male, fraught and tormented by the 
endless mirrors that reflect endless consciousness of 
himself and his hopeless— and quasi-incestuous desire— say 
that "nature is a she and progress is a he." That "nature 
made the grape arbor, but Progress invented the mirror."28 
The mirror of the self-reflexive universe is Narcissus's 
pool for the subject of modernity; the mirror embodies the 
nightmare of our enclosure in Macbeth's world where our 
image is, through our own desire, visited not on a 
successive line of kings who will endow history with our 
design, but on a successive line of selves. The mirror 
betokens our sense of both the presence and power of the 
past that engulfs both Quentin and Henry Adams. The pools of 
introspection and self-absorption that frame Sanctuary also 
frame Adams's career as modernist historiographer, 
biographer, and autobiographer. If Brooks Adams's bizarre 
claim that John Quincy Adams committed suicide for the sake 
of science is true, then perhaps Henry Adams's symbolic 
suicide through his publication of his theories of self and 
history is but a last act of imitation— one that is 
mirrored yet again when Quentin Compson is engulfed not by 
any southern stream, but by the deeply symbolic river of 
mind that flowed past Cambridge and Harvard, near the heart
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of an institution, which, like the republic itself, was a 
living symbol of the enlightenment project.
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CHAPTER 3
THE SOFT PARADES THE FORMS OF RADICAL NOMINATION 
AND THE SHAPES OF SIMULACRA
Your life has been prolonged until the 
world has changed around you. You have 
treasured up all that time has rendered 
worthless— the principles, manners, 
modes of being and acting, which another 
generation has flung aside— and you are 
a symbol of the past. And I, and these 
around me— we represent a new race of 
men— living no longer in the past, 
scarcely in the present— -but projecting 
our lives forward into the future. 
Ceasing to model ourselves on an 
ancestral superstition, it is our faith 
and principle to press onward, onward! 
Yet...let us reverence, for the last 
time, the stately and gorgeous 
prejudices of the tottering past.1
Hawthorne, "Old Esther Dudley"
A new idea is formed in view of the old 
one, whose defects it avoids and 
bypasses; but this means that the new 
idea has the old one inside it, thanks 
to which it was engendered. This is why 
many, many years ago it occurred to me 
to say that while in nature mothers bear 
offspring in their wombs, in history the 
female offspring that are new ideas bear 
their own mothers in their wombs.2
Ortega y Gasset, Historical 
Reason
In the first decade of the twentieth century, as 
theorist, as historian, as biographer, and as designer of a 
new kind of self for himself, Adams sets out, in Foucault's 
language, "not to discover what we are but to refuse what we 
are."3 Adams's works from 1893-1910 write an ongoing
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obituary for the idea of the autonomous self and for the 
enlightenment project in America. In them, Adams undertakes 
a prolonged flight into the theory of historiography and 
away from the Hegelian models of mind and identity that he 
had adopted so unquestioningly in his youth, but begun to 
abandon by 1875. First, and more subtly, in the anonymous 
and pseudonymous novels of 1880 and 1884, and in the memoirs 
he co-authored with the Aritamaii of Tahiti, and then more 
explicitly in Mt. St. Michel and Chartres and The Education 
of Henrv Adams. Adams addresses the same questions about 
modernity and subjectivity that are a perpetual subtext in 
the biographies and histories of the 1880s. His later work 
embodies an attempt to explore the sources and possibilities 
of identity solely for the purpose of escaping identity.
This chapter and the two which follow it are an 
artificially divided, but unified, triad that chronicles 
Adams's self-conscious transformation from historian and 
heir to the enlightenment traditions of the Adamses to 
theorist and nihilist. In them, I have myself engaged in the 
kind of artificial division and classification that is at 
the heart of the enlightenment project. I have arbitrarily 
divided Adams's late works into what the uninitiated reader 
might see as a logical or at least as a useful grouping; 
works of historiography and theory are separated from works 
of self-representation, which include Esther and Democracy. 
Adams's two novels. For Adams, however, and, ultimately for
his reader-initiates, if we read him rightly, the emerging 
theory of history that is the explicit concern of "The 
Tendency of History" (1894) is as "autobiographical" and as 
self-annihilating as Mt. St. Michel or the Education, or 
"The Rule of Phase Applied to History," the final sequence 
of his "autobiography," in which Adams takes a last willed 
flight from subjectivity, and in which he, posing as an 
homunculus scriptor, is at last as deterritorialized as his 
theories of language and history. After he wrote the 
Education and "The Rule of Phase" Adams liked to claim that 
he was already dead— that he had taken his life in his 
autobiographical enterprise. Of course, Adams had 
maintained for years, as his brother Brooks points out, that 
some earlier version of self had been dead since his wife's 
suicide in 1885.4 Whether or not it was because Adams-as- 
Adams had been killed off in his Mt. St. Michel and 
Chartres, and freed to inhabit his twin mansions of an 
imagined twelfth-century monastery, and the grave at Rock 
Creek Cemetery, there is no "I" in Adams's narrative 
landscape after Mt. St. Michel. Even there the "I" appears 
only as a record of the utterance of an unnamed Renaissance 
poet in the Preface, and sporadically, when for example 
Adams records the words of the simulacrum of self that he 
has constituted as the Uncle-Narrator, who begs the reader's 
pardon for "wasting your precious summer day on poetry which 
was regarded as mystical in its age and which now sounds
like a nursery rhyme11 (MSM, 430) . The rest of this strange 
hybrid genre of a work is part travelogue and part 
meditation on history. Having fashioned a double of himself 
in the uncle who is to be the narrative voice of Mt. St. 
Michel. and having manufactured an audience of "nieces," 
Adams aligns himself with the reading audience and stands 
with us behind the arras of the text, listening to the 
Uncle-simulacrum restore the text of medieval history. The 
text is either addressed to the reader directly, in the 
second person, or, in a recognition of the complicity 
between reader and author-reader, in the multiple voices 
implied by Adams's "we." The erasure of the "I" from the 
text of Adams's autobiography is even more apparent in the 
sequel to Mt. St. Michel. From its falsely attributed 
preface by "H.C.L." to its last sentence, The Education of 
Henry Adams is a portrait of a dehumanized "manikin," an 
emblem of the discontinuous being of a disembodied Cartesian 
cocfito drowning in the seas of its own thought and history. 
Appropriately, it is written entirely in the third person—  
Adams has assumed the voice of a reified self. "The Rule of 
Phase Applied to History," (1909) the third installment in 
his serial experiment in life-writing has no recognizably 
human characters at all; it is a critique of the presence of 
nameless, impersonal forces in history written by a voice 
that is liberated from the limiting construct of the 
personal self. "A Letter to American Teachers of History
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(1910), a sort of postscript to the previous triad of 
autobiographical works, continues and exteriorizes the aims 
of the Education. The "Letter," which is in fact an essay of 
more than one hundred pages, is directed toward the sphere 
of actual community and action. It is a textual grounding of 
Adams's emerging sense of the shape of an existence based on 
community. Adams chose the epistolary mode for this last 
presentation because "that literary form affects to be more 
colloquial and familiar than the usual scientific treatise" 
(Degradation. 138). The epistolary mode also has the effect 
of concretizing the writer's absence and the reader's 
presence, and of literalizing the status of the text as a 
ground of mediation between writer and reader. The "letter" 
is a demand for reform of the university system along the 
lines of a new spirit of philosophic vitalism— a recognition 
that a new conception of self and a new sense of the 
direction of society had to replace the ones inherited from 
the Reformation and the Enlightenment. Citing Rousseau, who 
reversed the Cartesian formula by insisting that he felt 
before he thought, and that the man who thinks is a depraved 
animal; and Bergson, whose Creative Evolution and embrace of 
the life of the instincts had influenced him deeply; Adams 
rejects the mode of thinking that universities and, 
particularly, historians had been forced to avow through 
their voluntary subjugation to the religion of Progress.
The historian is required either
expressly to assert or surreptitiously
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to assume, before his students, that the 
whole function of nature has been the 
ultimate production of this one-sided 
Consciousness,—  this amputated 
intelligence — this degraded Act, this 
truncated Will...the function of man is, 
to the historian, the production of 
Thought; but if all the other sciences 
affirm that not Thought but Instinct is 
the potential of Vital Energy...nothing 
remains for the historian to describe or 
develop except the history of a more or 
less mechanical dissolution.
(Degradation. 205-206)
In these last works, beginning with the Mt. St. Michel, 
which was privately printed in 1904, Adams forges a 
personal, and intentionally arbitrary, anchor in history and 
creates a succession of linguistic doubles and others who 
allow him to use the biographical mode to trace his origins 
and his dissolution as an emblem of western historical 
consciousness. Part of the reason that he emphasizes his 
disappearance from the Education and the essays which follow 
is explained in his claim that the historian of modernity 
could chronicle only the dissolution of self as subject and 
its replacement by the objectified simulacra modelled by the 
imperial mind. Adams's absence from his last 
"autobiographical" essays reflects his sense of the 
truncated nature of his being, which has been both 
determined and restricted by the Cartesian model of man as 
the "thinking thing." If man is, in effect, merely a 
floating consciousness which belongs everywhere and nowhere,
then Adams can pose as a universal and ahistorical subject, 
a fluid being on the stage of history, taking on an 
incarnation in whatever historical dimension he chooses, but 
incapable of manifesting himself in any sphere of action. 
That being so, as Adams notes in the "Letter to American 
Teachers of History," to trace the arc of western 
intellectual history through the examination of his own 
evolution from the twelfth-century to the present is to be 
forced to trace not self-creation but self-dissolution. This 
is the reality behind Adams's claims that he was dead or 
dying. In the Education he describes learning to ride a 
bicycle and acquiring an automobile in the final years of 
the nineteenth century when he was in his fifties. He took 
particular delight in the idea of being transported by 
automobile on his excursions to look at the glass at the 
French churches and cathedrals that interested him. He 
enjoyed his private conceit that the modern world was a 
machine that had been engineered into being by impersonal 
and non-transcendent force. In his mind, he was riding the 
machine of modernity into a vanished past. Even better, for 
his purposes, an actual machine transported him from the 
alien terrain of the present moment to the pastoral idyll of 
the pre-Reformation past that he preferred. Adams's 
experiences with the new machines quickly acquired a 
personal and metaphorical significance. For him, the actual 
automobile rides over a literal countryside mimicked the
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transport of imagination through the spaces of mind that he
required of his readers in the opening chapter of Mt. St.
Michel and Chartres. The machines, and particularly the
dynamo, were the tangible manifestations of his attempts to
grapple with his new anti-Carlylean suit of philosophical
clothes that his letters suggest he had begun to design in
the 1870s. At times, his retailoring of himself seemed to
provoke him to a sort of despair, and a longing to cling the
old model of self as mind and consciousness.
If you want to take charge of the
dynamo, you can. It all makes me look
with yearning eyes to my happy home at 
Rock Creek, where I can take off my 
flesh and sit on my stone bench in the 
sun, to eternity, and see my friends at 
quiet intervals of thousand-year naps.
(Letters, V, 202)
As always, in dealing with Adams, the reverse of this claim 
is also true. In dissolving Henry Adams as a pocket of 
consciousness, Adams points toward a new, more vital and 
nameless species of being, which lies beyond the limited 
realm of rational discourse. The first novels and the last 
works are thus Adams's history of the modern world—  
metaphorically and necessarily hinged on the progress of a 
single consciousness— his own. They are a culmination of 
meditations and experiments with the nature of the self, of 
thought, of history, and of the possibilities for 
representation in language that, as we have seen, begin to 
haunt Adams's letters in the 1870s and his published works
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in the 1880s, but which, in some form had always been with 
him.
* * * * * *
After "devouring" Henry James's William Wetmore Storv and 
his Friends in November, 1903, Adams wrote James that he 
found it difficult to judge the work's success or failure. 
For Adams as reader, the Story biography seemed to be an 
unhappy combination of an unintentional version of James's 
autobiography and a history of a generation of New 
Englanders from 1820-1870. The difficulty for him was that 
in James's representation, this generation was not made up 
of distinct individuals at all, but was a manifestation of 
"one mind and nature; the individual was a facet of Boston." 
(Letters. V, 524). Adams might have said with equal accuracy 
that Boston was a facet of the individual mind. Adams 
provides James with a list of alternative and 
interchangeable selves in which not only Story, but Alcott, 
Emerson, Longfellow, and Lowell are robbed of any claim to 
individuality, and reduced to multiple embodiments of the 
mind of Henry Adams. Through their inability to find what 
Emerson had described as an "unconditional ground for 
being"— that nebulous replacement for the certainty provided 
by religion, and a corollary promise of the enlightenment 
project — the Bostonians had come to languish in a kind of 
community of "self-distrust" that became a shared condition
of what Adams calls "nervous self-consciousness." Adams's 
analysis of the nature of his fellow Bostonians is 
reminiscent of his earlier images of Randolph and Jefferson 
and the other renegade Southerners whose "eccentricity" had 
distressed him when he was writing history as biography in 
the 1880s. "Southern eccentricity" seems to have been 
contagious, for in this letter and in all of Adams's late 
work, the disease afflicts not only James and Adams, but all 
of nineteenth-century New England. By the first years of 
the twentieth century, Adams had completely reconfigured the 
geography of the mind of America that he had— somewhat 
ironically— shared with Thomas Jefferson.5 Like Randolph 
and Jefferson and most Tidewater Southerners of an earlier 
generation, mid-nineteenth-century Bostonians were all 
"improvised Europeans," who were possessed of an "irritable 
dislike of America." Their sense of spiritual exile 
extended to their "antipathy" for their New England origins. 
The notion of a motionless ground for being was a tentative 
replacement for the certainty that religion had provided in 
an earlier age, and it was a corollary of the 
enlightenment's promise of intellectual certainty. From the 
domain of the individual consciousness Adams's Bostonians 
simultaneously "looked through each other with microscopes," 
and "feared each other's Knowledge." In trying to write 
Story's life, James had inadvertently written not the 
biography of a man or a generation, but a revelation of self
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and of the limits of subjectivity; he had configured the 
"type bourgeois-bostonien," but in the process had "written 
not Story's life, but your own and mine,— pure 
autobiography." James's work was thus an extension of 
Adams's own consciousness: "the whole thing spreads itself 
out as though I had written it...Verily I believe I wrote 
it. Except for your specialty of style, it is me" (Letters, 
V, 524). James's verbal simulacrum of Story was self- 
multiplying in Adams's imagination, and bore no more 
relationship to Story's life than it did to that of Adams or 
James or Alcott. The textual image of Story is merely an 
index of the text of the mind of Henry James. Whatever 
reality Story may have had has been erased and supplanted by 
the action of the mind of his creator, James, and James's 
creator and reader, Adams.
Six years later, Adams used the "failure" of the Story
biography as an excuse for not helping his brother Charles
write their father's life and as a sort of explanation for
his harsh criticisms of his younger brother Brooks's
efforts to write a biography of John Quincy Adams.
Harry James can fail as often as he 
likes in novels, but when he fails in 
biography he leaves mighty little of 
William Story. In biography we are 
taking life. I would never have anything 
to do with the life of our father, for 
that reason. I felt sure that his 
position in history would be the lower 
for it. As he stood, the public 
imagination filled all gaps and voids.
Had I botched it, he would have 
vanished.
(Letters. VI, 227)
In writing the Story biography, James had also given the 
simulacrum of a collective life lived by a generation of New 
Englanders from 1820-1870 a solidity in print that it lacked 
when it existed only in the private provinces of individual 
memory and the subjective universe. He had accomplished 
what Hegel said the historian should: "out of individual 
unreflected features" he had composed a portrait that 
"transforms the events, actions, and situations present to 
[him] into a work of representative thought."6 Adams's 
final response, "You make me curl up like a trodden-on 
worm...you strip us...like a surgeon, and I feel your knife 
in my ribs" anticipates his metaphor for the entire corpus 
of his own work— the haunting image of himself as a 
helpless, writhing "caterpillar that has lost its string." 
Adams's fear self-consciously reverses the fears of Pascal, 
who influenced him perhaps more than any other philosopher,7 
and whom he saw, even more than Descartes, as having 
articulated the dilemmas of the isolated subject of 
modernity. Adams found in Pascal an echo of his own sense of 
the separate spaces occupied by individual subjectivity.
Like Pascal, Adams was terrified by the "eternal silence" of 
"infinite immensity of spaces that know me not," but while 
Pascal's spaces were the spaces of a reconfigured physical
universe that lay outside the "little space" filled by his 
subjectivity,8 Adams's spaces were inner recesses of 
subjectivity, and they were as vast as the spaces of an 
infinite universe. Worse, these spaces had no uncontaminated 
contact with the unknown world that fascinated and terrified 
Pascal. The prism of perception was for Adams the instrument 
that accomplished the death of the world outside the self. 
Adams does not fear the spaces that "know not me;" he fears 
the idea of life as an endless hall of mirrors where the 
self is eternally replicated in the images that mind 
produces of world. Adams accepts Hegel's affirmation that 
"our minds are primarily conceptual and immediately 
transform all events into reports for communication," but 
for him the transformation of the matter of world into the 
spirit of mind was a frightening rather than an affirming 
phenomenon. Ironically, Hegel's belief that the critical 
historian should "wrest results from narrations rather than 
from events"9 was the source of Adams's belief that in 
writing history and autobiography we are taking life. The 
self-contained existence of Hegel's realm of spirit— of 
"Being within itself"—  and the union of the phenomenon of 
consciousness with the phenomena that consciousness could 
know was a prison sentence, not a harbinger of transcendent 
freedom.
Part of Adams's sense that he had seen the hieroglyph 
of his own crushed humanity mirrored in William Wetmore
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Storv and his Friends may have stemmed from having seen his 
being represented symbolically before, in one of Story's 
statues. Adams had visited Story's studio in Rome in 1860, 
as a twenty-two year-old student on tour in Italy. There he 
first saw Story's statue of Cleopatra. Hawthorne had only 
recently published The Marble Faun, with its famous 
description of Story's "Cleopatra." Adams, in quest as 
always for external affirmation of his own responses, 
unsuccessfully scoured all the bookstalls in Rome for a copy 
after he heard that Hawthorne had "introduced [the 
"Cleopatra"] into his new novel" (Letters, I, 155).
His statue represents Cleopatra seated; 
her head leaning on her hand; a figure 
thoroughly Egyptian in costume as well 
as feature. She is meditating apparently 
her suicide. To me, apart from the rich 
sensualism of the face and form, there 
is a great charm in the expression that 
she wears; it seems to be the same old 
doubt at God's great mysteries of life 
and death; a scornful casting up of 
accounts with fate and a Faust-like 
superiority and indifference to past, 
present, or future. Mr. Story has tried 
to breathe the mystery and grandeur of 
the sad and solemn old Sphinxes and 
Pyramids into his marble. I shall not 
undertake to say whether he has 
succeeded or not. I only know that his 
Cleopatra has a fascination for 
me,before which all his other 
works...seem tame and pointless.
(Letters, I, 147)
Adams's description of "Cleopatra" is strangely similar to 
and yet quite different from Hawthorne's. For Hawthorne, 
the statue embodied the "repose of despair" but there was
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still "a great, smouldering furnace deep down in the woman's
heart." The apparent calm, which is "as complete as if she
were never to stir hand or foot again" is deceptive, for
"such was the creature's latent energy and fierceness, she
might spring upon you like a tigress, and stop the very
breath that you were drawing, midway in your throat." Story
may have meant his viewers to perceive the statue as
contemplating her suicide, but Hawthorne saw a terrible
beauty and vitality in the strongly featured face. For him,
the most compelling aspect of the figure was its
extraordinary ambiguity.
The expression was of profound, gloomy, 
heavily revolving thought; a glance into 
her past life and present emergencies, 
while her spirit gathered itself up for 
some new struggle, or was getting 
reconciled to impending doom. In one 
view, there was a certain softness and 
tenderness, how breathed into the 
statue, among so many strong and 
passionate elements it is impossible to 
say. Catching another glimpse, you 
beheld her as implacable as a stone, and 
cruel as fire. In a word, all Cleopatra- 
-fierce, voluptuous, passionate, tender, 
wicked, terrible, and full of poisonous 
and rapturous enchantment was kneaded 
into what, only a week or two before, 
had been a lump of wet clay from the 
Tiber. Soon, apotheosized in an 
indestructible material, she would be 
one of the images that keep forever, 
finding a heat in them that does not 
cool down, throughout the centuries.10
Story's "Cleopatra" is the first of the many iconic 
images of human despair that compelled Adams throughout his 
life. What Hawthorne read as an embodiment of the terrible
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ambiguity of nature and of sensuality, Adams read as the
intoxicating aura of suicide. Adams saw the figure's
sensuality, but for him the physical beauty and power of the
"Cleopatra” was of far less interest than the image of the
triumph of a consciously chosen death that she seemed to
embody. For both Hawthorne and Adams, the statue captured
that moment that Nietzsche described a scant twelve years
later as the shattering of the comforting illusions provided
by the principium individuationis.
...Schopenhauer has described for us the 
tremendous terror which seizes man when 
he is suddenly dumfounded by the 
cognitive form of phenomena because the 
principle of sufficient reason...seems 
to suffer an exception. If we add to 
this terror the blissful ecstasy that 
wells from the innermost depths of man, 
indeed of nature at the collapse of the 
principium individuationis. we steal a 
glimpse into the nature of the 
Dionysian, which is brought home to us 
most intimately by the analogy of 
intoxication...These Dionysian emotions 
awake, and as they grow in intensity, 
everything subjective vanishes into 
complete self-forgetfulness.11
For Nietzsche, this escape from the layers of subjectivity
is a triumph, and produces a riot of sensual intoxication
and ecstasy. The recovery of the Dionysian realm of animal
nature and instinct was for Nietzsche a state of
forgetfulness that approached the sublime. Only through
forgetting could historical man escape the disease of
historical self-consciousness. The crippling dilemma of a
subjectivity configured through historical self­
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consciousness is at the root not only of Nietzsche's, but
also of Adams's view of modern life. Writing in 1874,
Nietzsche addressed the dilemma that Adams was coming to see
as the primary problem of modernity.
Take as an extreme example a man who 
possesses no trace of the power to 
forget, who is condemned everywhere to 
see becoming: such a one no longer 
believes in his own existence, no longer 
believes in himself; he sees everything 
flow apart in mobile points and loses 
himself in the stream of becoming: he 
will, like the true pupil of Heraclitus, 
hardly dare in the end to lift a 
finger...there is a degree of insomnia, 
of rumination, of historical sense which 
injures every living thing and finally 
destroys it, be it a man, a people, or a 
culture.12
The disease that unites Adams's nineteenth-century 
Bostonians is that of all of Nietzsche's "superhistorical 
men." As we have seen, Adams's rationalist conception of 
personal identity as a product of the exercise of sufficient 
reason through consciousness and as synonymous with the idea 
of humanity began to unravel even as he was writing his 
series of biographies. He was intuitively moving as early as 
1875 toward Nietzsche's view of the very concept of 
scientific history as a crippling and limiting weight which 
tied modern man to the enlightenment ideology in much the 
same way that a family name and a sense of identity 
imprisoned the individual and circumscribed his 
possibilities.13 For Nietzsche, "this famous inwardness of 
subjectivity" "sitting in its inaccessible little temple"
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was dangerous. In the nineteenth century, everything about
man had come to be counterfeit because all experience was
refracted through the all-powerful center of individual
consciousness and annexed to the personal self.
He must, as is well known, be measured 
by his thoughts and his feelings and 
these he now expresses in his books. If 
only it were not just these books which 
lately raise more than a doubt, whether 
this famous inwardness still sits in its 
inaccessible little temple: it would be 
terrible to think that it disappeared 
one day and all that now remains ..is 
his outer being...It would be almost as 
terrible as if that inwardness were to 
sit there hidden from view, a 
counterfeit rouged and painted, having 
become an actress if not something 
worse: as for example Grillparzer 
...seems to have come to believe though 
his dramatic theatrical experience. 'We 
feel with abstraction,...we hardly know 
any longer how feeling is expressed by 
our contemporaries; we portray 
expressions of feeling which no longer 
occur nowadays. Shakespeare has spoiled 
all of us moderns. '14
Nietzsche recognized, as Adams did, that, in 
anticipation of Descartes, late sixteenth-century figures 
like Montaigne and Shakespeare seem to have believed that 
man without the principium individuationis was a sham— a 
form without a soul— the self as simulacrum. The sleeping 
and the dead are only "pictures"15 in Macbeth; in Hamlet. 
Ophelia is "divided from herself and her fair judgment 
without the which we are pictures or mere beasts."16 
Similarly, in his essays, Montaigne self-consciously 
produces an iconic image of self which solidifies and
constitutes his being as a record of the process of 
thinking. The image cast in the form of the essay will 
escape and outwit the mortality of its author, a man who 
suffers from all the afflictions that are attendant upon 
what Spenser called the "condition of mortal state." In 
Descartes, of course, the certainty of existence itself is 
specifically dependent on the mind's activity. Unless the 
mind is engaged in the production of simulacra through its 
interchange with the world, there is no self. The idea of 
the tortured soul burdened by its own self-consciousness and 
mesmerized by the image of its own dissolution becomes the 
central motif in Adams's work. His response to the Story 
statue and to James's biography of its author reflects a 
unifying tension in his career. Though he spent his life 
trying to shape images of other people's lives and his own 
he seems to have been compelled not so much by life and its 
preservation in print as he was by an embrace of the death 
and dissolution of the concept of isolated selfhood. He may 
have wanted to produce iconic images of being, but Adams as 
a self acting in a privately constituted history could only 
produce simulacra of himself. The chief characteristic of 
these pseudo-Adamses, which they share with the Story 
biography, is their essential dissimilarity from their 
objects and even from Adams himself.17 The idea of suicide 
for Adams represented the ultimate possibility of flight 
from the inner prison of consciousness. Whether it was
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metaphorical or literal, suicide is perennially present in
Adams's work, and it is no accident that Hamlet both as
character and as play haunts his letters and the Education.
Like Keats, driven by too present a sense of the weight of
his consciousness of mortality, but without Keats's passion
for living, Adams was half in love with easeful death, and
whether he was looking at Story's statue, or taking his own
life in autobiography, Adams was as compelled by the idea
of a willed cessation of being— a willed division from self-
-as he was by the possibility of incarnating alternative
lives in print. In the inner kingdom of subjectivity Adams
was as tormented by bad dreams and solitude as Hamlet had
been three hundred years before him. The problem, as
Nietzsche also knew, was that for superhistorical
individuals death brings not only the "longed for
forgetfulness" but also a final sense of violation.
It [death] robs [man] of the present and 
of existence and impresses its seal on 
this knowledge: that existence is only 
an uninterrupted having-been, a thing 
which lives by denying itself, consuming 
itself, and contradicting itself.18
Writing in August, 1875, of the suicide of a "worthy
neighbor" at Beverly Farms, who "had had too much of all he
wanted in the world except content," Adams sees in the man's
perpetual ennui and violent death an emblem of his own
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condition as a man condemned to life as an "uninterrupted
having-been."
Our New England climate and soil do not 
even breed picturesque situations or 
incidents. We are but a rather improved 
low-country Scotland and our lives and 
deaths are too absolutely unimaginative 
to adorn a tale. One very worthy 
neighbor of mine a couple of months ago, 
being out of spirits because he had too 
much of all he wanted except content,
sat down in his neighbor's avenue and
blew his brains out as calmly and 
practically as a Britisher and was bored 
with life. There was no flourish, no 
pathos, no moral, and, except for his 
poor children and his old father and 
mother, no tragedy about it.
(Letters. II, 235).
The anecdote is half humorous, but the irony is worthy of 
Swift. Adams had been having trouble with his eyes, and was
bored, a "feeling not unnatural to a man who is more utterly
devoid of resources than any English squire outside of 
stables." The extent of his tragedy is that he has not "read 
a book" all summer, or even "[kept] a dog," though he is 
"looking for a bull terrier." Conscious of the absurdity 
and self-absorption in his claim, Adams juxtaposes his story 
of his neighbor's desperation and death with his own misery 
and failure of will; Adams, too, is a man who has everything 
he wants except contentment. He lives a kind of death-in- 
life, as his own simulacrum, denying himself, contradicting 
himself, immersed in and absorbed by the past. His 
neighbor's tragedy calls him only insofar as it is an 
extension of his own discontinuous being.
Adams's sense of the community of nineteenth-century 
intellectuals is one based on the exhaustion of the idea of 
mind as an adequate ground for history and for identity.
The community is not a living community of being at all, 
but a condition of emptiness, produced by the collapse of 
world into mind. In Nietzsche's language, subjectivity has 
"learned to leap, to dance, to use make-up, to express 
itself with abstraction and calculation and gradually to 
lose itself"19— in short, the mind can shape endless false 
versions of the world, but it cannot enable its subject to 
live as a sentient being in the world. For Adams and his 
fellow moderns, the self that they saw reflected in the 
mirror images produced by the action of mind on its objects 
had lost all ability to represent anything that lay outside 
itself. As mind imposes its simulacra on the world, the 
world as object disappears, and the subject is relegated to 
the sterile world produced by its own mirrors of itself. 
Quoting Ecclesiastes, Baudrillard points out that "the 
simulacrum is never that which conceals the truth— it is the 
truth which conceals that there is none. The simulacrum is 
true."20 This was partly what William Faulkner meant when 
he said forty years later that "progress invented the 
mirror." Man judges the world by first imposing a set of 
mental constructs on the world. The world, in consequence, 
ceases to be itself for man, and reflects back only the 
mirror image of the viewer and the ideology that produces
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both viewer and ideology. Thus, in the bankruptcy of the 
vision of Progress, the mirror of subjectivity can provide 
Adams only with images of death, despair, and a paralyzed 
will.
In some way, all of Adams's characters, including the 
"historical" ones like John Quincy Adams, Thomas Jefferson, 
John Randolph, and Aaron Burr come to the same end that his 
fictional heroines do. Madeleine Lee flees to the pyramids 
of Egypt. Esther flees to Niagara Falls in what her cousin 
George Strong describes as "a genuine flight and escape in 
all its forms."21 Esther falls "in love with the cataract 
and turn[s] to it as a confidant, not because of its beauty 
or power but because it seemed to tell her a story which she 
longed to understand" (Esther, 314). Something of the same 
impulse that attracted Adams to Story's statue sends his 
heroine Madeleine Lee to the pyramids to hide and 
contemplate the "polar star" "unseen." In 1884, in his novel 
Esther. Adams portrays Wharton, an artist who works in 
stained glass, in desperate flight from a disastrous 
marriage. Wharton appears as an already damaged figure when 
he is introduced in the novel, an escapee from a marriage 
that had taken place in part because of his fascination with 
his wife's preoccupation with suicide. Their troubled and 
tempestuous life together— which is only suggested in the 
novel; Adams is never quite comfortable with the life of the 
body— was apparently built upon Wharton's erotic fascination
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with her exoticism, her sensuality, her violence, and her
love of death. And while Democracy ends with a journey to
the great tombs on the Nile, Esther ends with its heroine
mesmerized by the cataract of Niagara Falls, and certain
that, "whichever way she moved, she had to look down into an
abyss and leap" (Esther, p. 33 0) . The journey that Adams
asks his invented audience of readers to take with him to
Chartres ends with the haunting reminder that if "faith
fails heaven is lost." The work ends not with the triumph of
the synthesis of reason and revelation, but with an image of
the broken arch and the failure of mind.
Of all the elaborate symbolism which has 
been suggested for the gothic Cathedral, 
the most vital and most perfect may be 
that of the slender nervure. the 
springing motion of the broken 
arch...The equilibrium is visibly 
delicate beyond the line of safety; 
danger lurks in every stone. The peril 
of the heavy tower, of the restless 
vault, of the vagrant buttress; the 
uncertainty of logic, the inequalities 
of the syllogism, the irregularities of 
the mental mirror,— all these haunting 
nightmares of the Church are expressed 
as strongly by the gothic Cathedral as 
though it had been the cry of human 
suffering...
(Mt. St. Michel. 695)
The Education, similarly, ends with the death of Adams's 
friend John Hay and Adam's own encounter with the final form 
of the force his heroines Madeleine and Esther had sought 
with such tentative results. Adams is thrown into "the 
depths of Hamlet's Shakespearean silence."
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One had seen scores of emperors and 
heroes fade into cheap obscurity even 
when alive; and now, at least, one had 
not that to fear for one's friend. It 
was not even the suddenness of the 
shock, or the sense of the void that 
threw Adams into the depths of Hamlet's 
Shakespearean silence in the full flare 
of Paris frivolity in its favorite haunt 
where worldly vanity reached its most 
futile climax in human history; it was 
the only quiet summons to follow,— the 
assent to dismissal. It was time to go.
(Education. 1181)
Adams's suicide in autobiography ends with his own encounter 
with a metaphorical Niagara, his own ultimate flight into 
that dissolution and death which is also a species of 
perverse communion. Something like the image of the 
nameless woe that Story had captured in his statue of 
Cleopatra forms the climactic point in each of Adams's major 
works. Just as he claims to be author, subject, and 
audience of the Story biography, Adams in contemplation 
becomes his despairing neighbor, dead in a nearby avenue, 
not, again, through any ability to share his neighbor's 
agony, but because of his ability to etch his own agony onto 
the face of every object that presented itself to his field 
of vision. He escapes Washington with Madeleine Lee, and 
finds himself checkmated at Niagara with Esther, conjuring 
again, as he recognized in 1911, not the figure of Bay 
Lodge's Herakles, but of another lifeless simulacrum, 
another image of a "wretched humanity." Significantly, the
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ultimate symbolic embodiment from his own being was not
verbal at all, nor was it created by Adams himself.
A monument is a symbol, and the symbol 
should be your's. If there is a single 
one in the whole innumerable catalogue 
of symbols that you feel. you should 
give that to the artist to put in form.
By a personal weakness, I have always 
felt most keenly the sense of a crushed 
humanity, and, do what I will this 
symbol comes out in everything I touch.
My true symbol is that of our 
caterpillar which has lost its thread; 
only I know that it is no use to turn 
when I am trodden on hard enough...So 
Saint Gaudens put it in form.
(Letters. VI, 483)
Augustus St. Gaudens had designed a monument to Adams's
wife, and, untitled and unmarked, it presided over what
Adams called his "mansion" in Rock Creek Cemetery. When
William Roscoe Thayer asked for a photograph of him to
include in his biography of John Hay, Adams refused: "I have
never had a photograph of myself taken. Early from Junius, I
learned to like best the nominis umbra." The refusal to
provide a likeness of himself— and the desire to stand
behind the particular shadow of linguistic protection that
he had provided in the sepulchre of his autobiography— was
not a simple one, however. Adams suggested an alternative
to a photographic likeness.
I would rather you gave no likeness of 
me, but, in its place... insert a 
photograph of St.Gaudens' monument, to 
show what a wonderful mastery of words
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he could command when the occasion rose
to his level.
(Letters. VI, 713)
Asked about the Five of Hearts Club— the circle of his close 
friends that had included John and Clara Hay, Clarence King, 
and Adams and his wife, he responded that "People who want 
to know us— we were not eager for notoriety at any time— can 
always go there. We shall tell no lies"(Letters, VI, 701). 
Just as Adams sought to embody a concept of history and of 
identity that transcended the limits of a subjectively 
conceived world, he sought to transcend the limits of 
language by taking refuge in an image as hauntingly 
ambiguous as Story's "Cleopatra." The last part of Adams's 
literary career is spent in a quest not for a vital 
existence of his own— he had taken too many lives in print 
for that— but for an image of that vast dimension of human 
experience that had been devalued and suppressed by the aims 
of the enlightenment project and its fixation on the realm 
of rational discourse. The non-verbal language of a world 
that lies outside the self is the story that the Falls were 
trying to tell Esther, and it is what the Maryland 
springtime taught Adams himself. His last works are thus a 
memorial to the most central facet of the failed experiment 
of modernity— -the fatal notion shared by Emerson that "mind 
creates the world." Adams's map of a route out of the self 
is also a route toward silence. The landmarks of Adams's 
being— his printed works— dissolve as the reader moves
toward their sentence. which in medieval style points toward 
silence in the face of a truth they cannot contain. Unlike 
his medieval models, hcwever, Adams's silence does not 
resolve itself in God, but in a denial of the capacity of 
language for containing any meaning except meaninglessness. 
For Adams, there was a corollary to the proposition that 
mind creates the world; subjectivity led not to self- 
affirmation, but to kind of exhaustion and even extinction 
of being. In reading the Story biography, Adams was aware 
that the modern reader engaged in the activities of 
Emersonian consciousness is a predator of mind who does not 
simply read texts or the self or the world, but enters into 
and devours whatever it encounters. In reading any 
biography, the life of both the biographical subject and its 
text is "taken" yet again, as the reader's consciousness 
envelopes and devours the life of the text. Increasingly, in 
his letters, Adams figures the reader as a carnivore and 
voyeur.
You cannot escape the biographer. When I 
read— standing behind the curtain—  
these repetitions of life, flabby and 
foolish as I am;— when I try to glug- 
glug down my snuffling mucous membrane 
these lumps of cold calves'-head and 
boiled pork fat, then I know what you 
will suffer for your sins...
(Letters. V, 526)
For Adams, the modern premise of the primacy of mind could 
lead only to the deafening silences of the solipsistic 
universe. In his vain attempts to escape his discontinuity
with the world outside the self, the modern subject would 
devour the world in the same way that Adams as reader, 
standing Polonius-like behind the arras of the text, had 
cannibalized James's biography of Story. Like Polonius, he 
is caught in his subterfuge and killed for his trouble; in 
the language of his earlier letter to James, he feels 
James's knife in his ribs. For Adams, the relationship 
between the subject and the world it is perpetually engaged 
in consuming was one characterized by a violence which could 
also be seen as perverse sort of creativity. Adams escapes 
his sense of the discontinuity of his own being by a kind of 
erotic cannibalizing— a sort of bizarre and forcible 
intercourse— of his mind with its objects.22 Through their 
death and dismemberment in his mind, Adams himself is 
paradoxically made more whole. The gulf that separates us 
through subjectivity is, as Georges Bataille points out, a 
kind of death, and "for us, discontinuous beings that we 
are, death means continuity of being."23 In Story's statue 
of Cleopatra, Adams, mesmerized by the otherness of 
Cleopatra's despair, discovers the possibility of a felt 
kinship with the world. Adams is thus restored to a 
paradoxical sense of continuity with the world through an 
image that conjured the death of the self for him. Within 
this frame, of a quest for an escape from the subjectivity 
of superhistorical individualism, Adams's equation of 
biography with murder and autobiography with suicide becomes
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explicable. In taking his life in print, in being reduced to
silence, Adams is reestablished as a continuous being. In
biography, similarly, the biographer cannibalizes his
subject, stripping him to the bones that are worthy of
veneration, and consuming and digesting the flesh of an
alternative being at the same time. The biographer for
Adams is a cannibal with imperialist designs. While he was
working on Mt. St. Michel and Chartres, and beginning to
plan The Education of Henry Adams. Adams wrote George Cabot
Lodge that the thing that he found most troubling in his own
work was its incapacity to "reflect what lies beyond its
field of reflection." Adams at last affirmed explicitly
that the enlightenment religion of mind and reason was an
imprisoning one.
The fact, which all the psychologists 
insist on, that the mind really reflects 
only itself, is to me the most
exasperating thing in the world. Until I
read over my own work, I never see the 
holes and bare spots in my own mind; and 
only then I feel how hard it is to 
scratch about and put on false hair and 
rouge and a grin...The application of 
all this twaddle is perhaps too obvious.
You can see it all, at a glance...by 
that tiresome faculty of seeing oneself.
Never— never— never— can you see it as I 
feel it, for in that case you would be 
somebody else.Yet by that stupid mental 
process on which men foolishly pride 
themselves— called reason— you can 
construct a doll-figure of my literary
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form, and see how it fits, or does not 
fit, yours.
(Letters. V, 490)
Like Spenser's Archimago, that prophetic emblem of 
modern man's perverse powers of artifice, the mind of the 
modern subject fashions lifeless doubles— Shakespeare's 
"pictures"—  of all it encounters. Thus, Adams can write 
that the individual Bostonian of his generation is a facet 
of Boston, and mean that Boston itself is a facet of the 
individual mind.
* * * * * * * *
Part of Adams's critique of identity involves, 
necessarily, a critique of the nature of the subject's 
relationship to power, both as private citizen and— in the 
case of his friends, and, in his own role as the historian 
and biographer of other subjects— as public figure. And 
indeed, the triumph of subjectivity in the West is tightly 
interwoven with the development and proliferation of power 
structures that are first apparent in the hierarchy of the 
Church, and later in the hierarchy of its successor— the 
modern state. Thus we should not be surprised that Adams, 
masquerading as a twelfth-century monk, and refusing to 
indicate his personal authorship of his Mt. St. Michel and 
Chartres on the title page of the privately printed version 
of the volume, tells his niece of the "marriage" of the
148
Virgin and St. Thomas Aquinas in one letter, and moves 
comfortably to Alfred T. Mahan's view of the necessity of a 
canal through the Isthmus of Panama in another. In the 
letter to Elizabeth Cameron, cited above, his longing for 
his "happy home at Rock Creek" (his burial site, unmarked 
but already landscaped and memorialized with the unnamed but 
immediately famous statue by St. Gaudens) is couched amid 
the details of political intrigue from his vantage point at 
the centers of power in Washington. Adams's entire oeuvre 
is an anatomy of power. He is not only an imperialistic 
biographer who colonizes his subjects, and assumes 
responsibility for the shape of their identity; he colonizes 
himself. In the Education, he is the subject and prisoner of 
his own Cartesian coqito. As Foucault recognized a half- 
century after Adams, the condition of radical subjectivity, 
which Adams found so simultaneously fascinating and 
alarming, was a manifestation of a particular form of 
power.24
This form of power applies itself to 
immediate, everyday life which 
categorizes the individual, marks him by 
his own individuality, attaches him to 
his own identity, imposes a law of truth 
on him which he must recognize and which 
others have to recognize in him. It is 
a form of power which makes individuals 
subjects. There are two meanings of the 
word "subject": subject to someone else 
by control and dependence; and tied to 
his own identity by a conscience or 
self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a 
form of power which subjugates and makes 
subject to.25
Adams's career— characterized as it always was by a 
quest for flight and deterritorialization of the self— is 
also characterized by a related effort to untie his sense of 
his being from his consciousness of himself and his 
preservation in history. Adams denies the power of extension 
through family and place that localizes, categorizes, and 
imprisons him within a set of family names and traditions 
and iconic places and received modes of knowing and 
understanding. Central to Adams's exploration of the 
possibility of the world outside what he called the "sea of 
introspection" is an exploration of the powers of language 
that fascinated every nineteenth-century writer from 
Coleridge to Matthew Arnold and Nietzsche. Adams was deeply 
aware that he inhabited a linguistic field of resurgent 
nominalism. He belongs to that period which saw the 
simultaneous advent of man as an object of study in what 
Foucault calls the "field of western knowledge," and the 
exit of a theory of the correspondence between word and 
thing which, however embattled, had served a dual purpose as 
a theory of language that was also a critique of the 
possibilities of knowledge until the beginning of the 
nineteenth-century.26 In Adams's time, language as the 
"spontaneous tabula, the primary grid of things, as an 
indispensable link between representations and things, is 
eclipsed in its turn."27 When language ceases to be the 
locus of reality— when words lose their meanings— language
may lose its specially privileged status, but its users are 
also magically empowered. In losing its "privileged status," 
language is deterritorialized; freed from representing the 
entrenched power structure, it can, like Adams's notion of 
an unbounded self, range at the whim of the individual will, 
acquiring new capacities with every user and every audience. 
Words, as Humpty Dumpty and Deleuze remind us, mean what the 
"I" who articulates them "wants them to mean."28 Adams's 
fear of representation in biography, autobiography, and 
history, stems from his sense that the nominalism he had 
first identified in Abelard was triumphant in his own time 
and, for better or worse, in his own work. Adams's obsession 
with form is itself reflective of his aesthetic nominalism, 
which Theodor Adorno defined as "a process taking place at 
the level of form; in fact, nominalism itself becomes form: 
an example of the mediation between particular and 
universal."29 Adams's experimentation with the forms of 
autobiographical representation mirrors his linguistic 
nominalism. As the forms of traditional biography, history, 
and autobiography implode and fuse in Adams's late work, he 
illustrates the impossibility of closure in the modern work 
of art. His frequently avowed aesthetic failure reflects 
the oxymoronic nature of the "open form," which in itself 
illustrates the nominalist critique of the idea of 
universal, closed, forms in genre and in language. In "The 
Rule of Phase" and "Letter to American Teachers of History,"
and even in the Education, having denied the organizing and 
guiding hand provided by a self-conscious subject, Adams 
moves toward mapping the forces and forms of chaos, with 
results that, judged from a vantage point of enlightenment 
notions of coherence and unity, were necessarily and 
intentionally disastrous. Despite the apparently historical 
subject matter-— that of mapping the motion of forces in 
history— or, in the case of the Education, mapping the 
motion of a reified self— there is no movement or 
development in the ordinary sense, only a motion around the 
single point of the subject's unwavering and inescapable 
consciousness. Adams marks time, but without any claim to a 
patterned development or sequence. The very principle of 
narrative itself is reduced to a hollow shell in the 
Education. As Adorno wrote of Beckett, Adams's principle of 
construction is "trans-dynamic," in that it "marks time, 
shuffling its feet and thereby confessing to the uselessness 
of dynamics." And in Beckett, as in Adams, the "only telos 
towards which the dynamic of the immutable moves is 
perennial disaster."30 The open form of the Education 
refuses and parodies the models from the picaresque 
tradition that provide the skeleton of its form. Adams as 
character is as isolated at the end as he is in the 
beginning— the old rituals of social integration and of 
autobiographical narrative as a progress toward 
understanding are denied and replaced with the motifs of
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perennial flight and perpetual uncertainty. As hero, Adams
does not move toward the revelation of meaning at all, but
toward the dissolution and death that had fascinated him
even at twenty-two. In the process, he shatters his own as
well as his readers' illusions of continuity.
On the high-explosive revelations,-— or 
revelation— I have hopelessly failed. So 
did Kelvin, as he took pains to affirm.
He fell back on the absolute necessity 
of a creation. I am inclined to think 
that my logic drives me further, to the 
unreality of all phenomena.
Unfortunately, this conclusion destroys 
mysticism, too, as well as the Ego, the 
Non-Ego, and ends in the Unknown. Q.E.D.
...To us old people, the universe 
resolves itself into an effort of the 
Ego to maintain an illusion of 
continuity...Of all the solutions 
offered for the universe, this is the 
only one which seems to be 
demonstrated...but only we old people 
may use it...You younger ones are 
obliged to deal with the illusion of 
continuity alone, though science is 
getting precious close to chaos...I 
speak strongly because I lost my own 
illusion of unity and continuity thirty 
years go, and I know how fatal the 
rupture is to one's scheme of life. Once 
hit by Zeno's arrow, one is a mere mad 
rabbit. I printed all this ten years ago 
in my Education and merely drivel in 
repeating it.
(Letters. VI, 692)
Writing to Charles Milnes Gaskell in August 1914, just after 
the explosive beginning of the first world war, Adams said 
that he felt like Browning's Childe Roland. He had come to 
the dark tower of revelation only to find a ruined chapel 
and a desolate landscape. "Childe Roland to the dark tower
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came! He came once too often...and was trapped like an 
octogenarian rat...He can't get out" (Letters. VI, 657).
Part of Adams's "illusion of continuity" was sustained 
by his nominalist approach to the shape of his own life. He 
liked to insist that he had been "born in 1138" (Letters. V, 
222). He also liked to say that his "mansion in Rock 
Creek" was growing more attractive, and that it was 
"idiotic, grotesque, convulsively laughable" to celebrate a 
sixty-third birthday in 1901, when he knew that he had been 
"born in the twelfth century with Abelard" (Letters. V,
202). Like the yearning for the grave and his claim that he 
was already dead, Adams's claim that he had been born in the 
twelfth century becomes one of his ongoing poses in his 
letters from the late 1890s until his actual death. Adams 
meant that the predicament of the subject of modernity had 
been conceived in the twelfth century and that it had borne 
fruit in his own particular burden of historical 
consciousness. Imprisoned in his own center of subjectivity, 
his particular burden of consciousness was the only one he 
could know.
For Adams, the crucial conflict in medieval philosophy 
had been the conflict between realism and nominalism, and he 
believed that it had begun in the twelfth century with 
Abelard. Paradoxically, nominalism's triumph had been 
ensured by the middle of the thirteenth century in the 
philosophy of Thomas Aquinas which, in its time, had acted
as a point of triumph for the principle of reason and 
linguistic realism. With its dependence on artificial and 
arbitrary designations in language, which originated with 
man not God, nominalism was also the necessary philosophic 
and linguistic stance that bound the Reformation to the 
Enlightenment project and underlay the transfer of power 
from Church to Sovereign and then to the State. Its 
continuation was implicit in the very idea of a "Universal 
History" that, with the notion of radical enlightenment for 
all, lay at the heart of the aims of the Reformation and of 
its offshoot, the Enlightenment. A universal history would 
become for man the sacralized secular text of a new age—  
replacing the universals implied by the sacred text of 
scripture. The need for a "universal history," like the 
eighteenth-century's need for handbooks of grammar and for 
compiling dictionaries which codified both spelling and 
meaning has its origins in the special privileging of the 
individual's powers of subjective interpretation that was 
attendant upon the Reformation views of the individual and 
his understanding. Brooks Adams wrote that "as Henry neared 
the end of his application of the development of the 
thirteenth century according to scientific historical theory 
in 'Mt. St. Michel and Chartres,' he turned more and more 
toward his next step in the 'Reformation,' on which he 
constantly talked with me."31 Adams was antagonistic to the 
Reformation, and not only because he felt that it
"dethroned" the Virgin as a unifying symbol of medieval 
society, though this was in his view symptomatic of a 
fundamental alteration in man's conception of his world. 
Adams saw the Reformation as the point where the 
"distinction between Reason and instinct" had originated.32 
The Reformation can be read as a crisis in the history of 
subjectivity, a moment when the liturgy and the hierarchy of 
the church with their dual claims to embody and represent 
both universal truth and the needs of a supplicant band of 
souls were no longer seen as a sufficient means of bridging 
the chasm between a subjectively constituted individual and 
his notion of a god. The Reformation was a response to 
western man's need to avail himself of the truths that lie 
in texts, as well as of a need to engage himself in the work 
of salvation as a full participant. Subject to none and yet 
subject to all, in Luther's famous formulation, the subject 
of modernity is king of the metaphysical forest. He no 
longer needs a pontiff who claims to be servus servorum Dei 
at the same time that he makes the believer subject to not 
only God, but the Church and its representatives. Adams's 
imaginatively constructed refuge in the twelfth-century with 
its images of Virgin and Archangel, of a harmoniously 
configured interior of mind and a corresponding exterior of 
action and words that matched their meanings was a 
manifestation of the Church's ability to make subjects out 
of believers through the exercise of its "pastoral power"
and its claim, through its concern for the individual soul 
and the individual life, to be engaged in the individual's 
production of truth. The prisonhouse of self and language 
that Adams seeks to escape was forged with manacles of 
religion, and made possible by the very sense of "unity" 
that made him regard the Christian Middle Ages as a point of 
spiritual refuge.33 Subjectivity, as Adams saw in a 
wonderfully perverse way, is the ultimate form of the 
pastoral mode— the conjuring of protected mental spaces that 
are valorized and then shepherded and controlled first by 
the Church and later by the state and its servant-of-the- 
servants of God— the Sovereign. It is hardly an accident 
that the pastoral mode in literature enjoys a spectacular 
revival in the tangled history of the early modern period 
with its sometimes conflicting strands of Renaissance, 
Reformation, and Counter-Reformation. The pastoral mode 
does for the literary artist and the reader what the Church 
did for man— it provides a safe space of textual 
containment, where the Blatant Beast of mortality can be 
enfolded and reconciled in the life of man. Lope de Vega's 
Arcadia. Sidney's Arcadia, Spenser's experiments with 
pastoral in the Faerie Oueene. the Shepheardes Calendar, and 
the Daphnaida; Montemayor's La Diana— all are of a piece. 
Perhaps the role of pastoral is most clearly illustrated by 
the English estate poem, which makes of the individual 
household and family a repository of the canonized political
and spiritual values of a nation— at least until Marvell's 
Upon Appleton House, when subjectivity itself usurps the 
power of pastoral space, and the poet is no longer able to 
escape either the sense of his mortality or the intrusion of 
the politics of modernity. The varieties of Renaissance 
pastoral all conjure protected— even Neoplatonic— spaces of 
thought, where the dilemmas of the artist, the individual, 
and of society at large can be examined in a refuge that is 
exempt from mortality at the same time that it is 
necessitated by the consciousness of mortality. In 
Renaissance pastoral we see the shift from the Church as 
good shepherd to the idea of the artist as shepherd and 
protector of the province of subjectivity. By extension, 
just as Augustine envisions the shape of history for the 
faithful, the Renaissance artist, recovering his Virgilian 
roots in Dante, envisions the shape of the political future 
from Spenser to Marvell and from Marvell to Dryden and Pope. 
Adams places himself in their company, but his visions 
displace the artist's subjective vision with a chronicle of 
the powers of force. Adams's private project of modernity 
may have been that of tracing the arc of subjectivity in the 
West, but his longing to reform the university system in 
America and to reshape the face and focus of American 
history are profoundly political and, in his view, were 
inseparable from his metaphysical enterprises. Adams's Mt. 
St. Michel and Chartres is an American analogue of the
English estate poem, transplanted to New England and the eve 
of the advent of urban, industrial society, and transfigured 
by the enlightenment sensibility. The historian, not the 
poet, is the seer, and Adamses and Jeffersons, not the 
Sidneys or Fairfaxes, are beacons of American enlightenment 
values. Rather than a literal estate, couched in real earth 
and complete with a dependent peasantry, the estate that 
Adams treats is that of the boundless territory of mind. 
Unfortunately, Adams finds that the beacons shed no new 
light in the night of modernity, and that he himself is 
rudderless and abandoned amid the forces that were shaping a 
new world. The Education, a monument to the disappearance of 
the personal self in the glare of self-scrutiny follows as a 
necessary sequel. Adams saw himself as completing the 
process of the sacralization of the secular34 which begins 
with the crisis in subjectivity, or the triumph of the 
private self, that accompanies, or perhaps culminates in the 
Reformation. Paradoxically, Adams explores this personal 
genealogy of mind only in order to escape it. Specifically, 
he aims to reject what he saw— and what is immediately 
recognizable— as a Hegelian model of mind, identity, and 
history in favor of a philosophy built on what he called a 
more "instinctual" way of seeing and being that he saw 
confirmed in the philosophy of Nietzsche and of Bergson.
As we have seen, Adams's multiple experiments with 
multiple identities have their origin in the biographies and
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histories of the 1880s, which were closely allied in both
time and spirit with his novelistic endeavors from the same
period. In Democracy and Esther. Adams concretizes his
tendency to extend himself through imitation— which we have
seen even in his student days in Berlin and Italy— by
endowing himself and his dilemmas with alternative names and
an alternative sex. As the anonymous author of Democracy—
Henry Holt, his publisher, was exhorted to the strictest
secrecy35— Adams embraces for the first time the possibility
that perhaps the kind of history and biography he has set
out to write only exacerbated the problem of radical
subjectivity. Like Adams, Madeleine Lee has been reading
nineteenth-century social theory. She has read "voraciously
and promiscuously one subject after another," with the
result that "Taine had danced merrily through her mind with
Darwin and Stuart Mill, Gustave Droz and Algernon Swinburne"
(Democracy. 7). She has also read Herbert Spencer
(Democracy. 3),and she is consumed by a desire to experience
the "action of primary forces" at first-hand.
Here then, was the explanation of her 
restlessness, discontent, ambition,—  
call it what you will. It was the 
feeling of a passenger on an ocean 
steamer whose mind will not give him 
rest until he has been in the engine- 
room, and talked with the engineer. She 
wanted to see with her own eyes the 
action of primary forces; to touch with 
her own hand the massive machinery of 
society; to measure with her own mind 
the capacity of motive power. She was 
bent upon getting to the heart of the 
great American mystery of democracy and
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government. She cared little where her 
pursuit might lead her...
(Democracy. 7)
Adams makes Madeleine Lee a modern-day, feminized version of
Marlowe's Faustus, or perhaps she is only a ten-years-later
version of George Eliot's Casaubon— determined to find the
"key to unlock all mysteries." Like Hamlet, the figure of
Casaubon haunts Adams's letters. Shortly after the
publication of Democracy. he wrote Henry Cabot Lodge that he
had always thought that he was something of a Casaubon, with
his investigations and his habitual "making little memoranda
of passages," and that "now I see the tendency steadily
creeping over me. Pleased with his analogy, he declares
that he is "touched" by Lodge's loyalty to his "venerable
professor;" he feels like "two Casaubons rather than one,
at the idea of standing in the attitude of a gray-haired
Nestor surrounded by you and Young and poor Laughlin"
(Letters, II, 400). Adams claimed to be seeking "amusement,"
in his studies of history and biography. Similarly,
Madeleine Lee claims to be seeking only "amusement," in her
exploration of political life, but she is really in search
of the roots of power.
What she wished to see, she thought, was 
the clash of interests, the interests of 
forty millions of people, and a whole 
continent, centering at Washington; 
guided, restrained, controlled, or 
unrestrained and uncontrollable, by men 
of ordinary mould; the tremendous forces 
of government, and the machinery of
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society, at work. What she wanted was 
POWER.
(Democracy. 8)
Lee's mistake, like Adams's own, is that she believes that 
she can explore the "passion of exercising power for its own 
sake" without incurring any personal cost, and without being 
altered by what she encounters. Henry Adams wanted to be an 
unseen observer on the backstage of history, and his Mrs.
Lee wants something like that privileged vantage point, too. 
She believes that she can "go quietly on among the 
supernumeraries and see how the play was acted and the stage 
effects were produced; how the great tragedians mouthed and 
the stage-manager swore." In her passion to observe power at 
close range, she also makes the mistake of confusing the 
"force of the engine" with "that of the engineer," and "the 
Power with the men who wielded it." (Democracy. 8). Mrs. Lee 
is caught in the web of ambiguity that Story had captured in 
his image of Cleopatra.
Adams also uses the figure of Mrs. Lee to explore his 
fascination with the regional basis for American character. 
Adams once again introduces what he saw as the intrinsic 
bond between New England and the South. Mrs. Lightfoot Lee 
herself is a hybrid— a product of the Middle Colonies. Her 
father is a famous Philadelphia clergyman, but her husband 
is descended from "the Virginia Lees." All of Adams's 
special seers— including himself— must possess some "taint"
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of southern blood. Like Adams, who chose to spend his life 
in voluntary and dogged exile from his native Boston, 
alternating between lodgings in Paris and a house in 
Washington, Mrs. Lee is a sort of fashionable nomad, another 
of Adams's picaros, offering a running commentary on a 
society within which they are perpetual aliens. Like Adams, 
Mrs. Lee is accepted everywhere, but feels at home nowhere. 
She frowns on Europe, but she is "bitter against New York 
and Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Boston." Her closest 
friend and confidante, and the helpless hero of the book,
who is hopelessly enamored of her, is John Carrington, a
Virginia aristocrat who has been financially ruined by the 
Civil War. Carrington carries the secret costs of the Civil 
War in his soul.
...the curious look of patient
endurance on his face was the work of a
single night when he had held his 
brother in his arms, knowing that the 
blood was draining drop by drop from his 
side, in the dense, tangled woods, 
beyond the reach of help, hour after
hour, till the voice failed and the
limbs grew stiff and cold.
(Democracy. 125)
Adams makes Carrington another defeated voice of reason who 
has been silenced by his confrontation with the forces and
the consciousness of history. Carrington is "troubled with
memories of civil war and of associations still earlier, 
belonging to an age already vanishing or vanished"
(Democracy. 108). In the formulation that haunted Adams and
would haunt other American literary artists, Carrington is a 
man whose imagination resounds with the sonorous names of 
the dead who people the spaces of his memory and sap his 
essential life. He is a sort of prefiguring of Quentin 
Compson and Horace Benbow and Jake Barnes. As he sets out 
to entertain Madeleine's younger sister Sybil with rides in 
Rock Creek Park and into the Virginia countryside he awakens 
in her a sense of the terrible presence of the past. 
Arlington Cemetery acquires a life in the normally 
unthinking Sybil's awakening imagination, as "though Cadmus 
had reversed his myth, and had sown living men, to come up 
dragons' teeth" (Democracy. 109). The Lees, "old family 
friends of Carrington's," are conjured as a ghostly 
presence, even though their abandoned mansion is an empty 
shell that plays host to "a grave-yard." Carrington 
explains that Robert E. Lee was "to be our Washington," and 
as he talks, and the road from Richmond to Appomattox comes 
alive for Sybil, Adams experiments with the simultaneous 
recreation of history and the invention of a receptive 
audience— of uncle talking to niece that was to characterize 
Mt. St. Michel and Chartres. Significantly, the fictional 
rides of Carrington and Sybil recapitulate Adams's rides 
along the same trails with his wife Marian. The favorite 
path is not the one that leads to Arlington, but to Rock 
Creek Cemetery. In the "quiet shadows" at Rock Creek Sybil 
and Carrington find a kind of "protection and a soft
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shelter;” there, they are free from the "risk of criticism 
from curious eyes." Adams was later to use these same 
phrases to describe both his "autobiography" and his grave 
at Rock Creek.
The villain of the novel, who teaches Mrs. Lee the 
reverse of Carrington's lessons about honor and virtue in 
history, also echoes Adams's fascination with regional 
characters. Silas P. Ratcliffe is an Illinois senator who 
is a transplanted New Englander. The Midwest introduces a 
new element into Adams's geographic eguation. If Southerners 
are voluptuaries and radical individualists, and New 
Englanders are all metaphysics and Calvin, Ratcliffe is the 
rising spirit of the new order— the product of a state whose 
primary city would serve, in Sandburg's words, as "hog- 
butcher to the world." He has what Carrington calls "Yankee 
eyes."
Cold eyes...steel grey, rather small, 
not unpleasant in good-humour, diabolic 
in a passion, but worst when a little 
suspicious; then they watch you as 
though you were a young rattlesnake, to 
be killed when convenient...His eyes 
only seem to ask the possible uses you 
might be put to.
(Democracy. 15)
Though Ratcliffe had ridden the crest of the tide of the 
anti-slavery movement in Illinois, the issues of mind that 
so perplexed Adamses and Jeffersons and Randolphs are alien 
to him. Adams has Ratcliffe come not from Peoria, but from 
"Peonia," Illinois. For Madeleine, "the Peonia giant" seems
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to be "the high priest of American politics" who will
initiate her into the mysteries of political power.
To her eyes he was the high-priest of 
American politics; he was charged with 
the meaning of the mysteries, the clue 
to political hieroglyphics. Through him, 
she hoped to sound the depths of 
statesmanship and to bring up from its 
oozy bed that pearl of which she was in 
search; the mysterious gem which must 
lie hidden somewhere in politics. She 
wanted to understand this man; to turn 
him inside out; to experiment on him and 
use him as young physiologists use frogs 
and kittens.
fDemocracy. 20)
Madeleine wants to put Mr. Ratcliffe to rack and torture, 
and in her quest for the pearl of political wisdom which 
lies buried in the "oozy bed" of Mr. Ratcliffe's 
statesmanship, she is quite willing to sacrifice his 
humanity. Adams frames Madeleine's anatomy of Senator 
Ratcliffe in Baconian terms, and, just as Bacon and the 
enlighteners who came after him sought power over nature, 
she seeks power over Ratcliffe in a peculiarly nineteenth- 
century manner. She seeks to classify him as a particular 
kind of beast, and to provide him with a name and a 
definition which will also serve to immobilize him in her 
mind. Like a biographer Madeleine thus intentionally sets up 
a discontinuity between herself and Ratcliffe that is also 
an assertion of her superiority over him. Madeleine attempts 
to place Ratcliffe in the grid of things known in her mind. 
In so doing, she engages in the characteristic activity of
modernity— she "cuts up the continuum of being into a 
pattern of characters."36 In short, she takes his life 
through the activity of her mind, and substitutes a 
simulacrum for it. Her inability to probe the depths of Mr. 
Ratcliffe's mystery stems not from any lack of coldness or 
intelligence on her part but from her complete lack of 
awareness that Ratcliffe is a new creature, made from the 
new cloth of industrial civilization, which, as Hawthorne 
had known thirty years before, would scarcely take the 
present into account, much less the past. Not content with 
having Madeleine place Senator Ratcliffe in a table of 
things known, classified, and limited, Adams insists that 
the reader replicate Madeleine's activity. Adams's method 
recalls that of Harriet Beecher Stowe, whose brutal 
constitutions of economic class guide the reader to reject 
the realm of slave traders. The reader rejects Haley, the 
slave trader we encounter in the tableau that opens Uncle 
Tom's Cabin not because his activity is morally repugnant, 
but because he had "coarse bejewelled hands" and "gaudy 
vests of many colors." The distinction that the reader draws 
between himself and Haley is based on an assertion of 
social, not moral superiority. The reader wants to feel 
superior to Haley; he wants to deny any kinship with this 
man who speaks in "easy defiance of Murray's grammar."37 
Adams's characterization of Senator Ratcliffe, similarly, 
draws on class distinctions that are designed to define him
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for Adams's audience as a creature separate from the world
of Madeleine and Carrington and Sybil, the old Baron Jacobi,
and most of their familiar acquaintances.
And he was a western widower of fifty; 
his quarters in Washington were in gaunt 
boarding house rooms, furnished only 
with public documents and enlivened by 
western politicians and office-seekers.
In the summer he retired to a solitary, 
white framehouse with green blinds, 
surrounded by a few feet of uncared-for 
grass and a white fence; its interior 
more dreary still, with iron stoves, 
oil-cloth carpets, cold white walls, and 
a large engraving of Abraham Lincoln in 
the parlour; all in Peonia, Illinois.
(Democracy. 20)
Ratcliffe's oil-cloth carpets and the solitary engraving of 
Lincoln that adorns his parlor contrast sharply with 
Madeleine's "melancholy Wilton carpets," and with the 
miscellany of sketches, paintings, and porcelain" that are 
scattered throughout her house on Lafayette Square. Her own 
"domestic altar-piece" is no engraving of Lincoln, but a 
"mystical Corot landscape" (Democracy. 9). As always, 
however, Adams's vision of Madeleine is not a simple one. 
Corot's landscapes, of course, had a special bourgeois 
vulgarity of their own, and Mrs. Lee's taste in paintings, 
like her taste in philosophy, is one of Adams's hints that 
this is a satire that cuts in all directions and does not 
shrink from spearing the character who seems to be a 
composite of Adams and his wife. Corot landscapes were 
popularized versions of a Rousseauesque fascination with
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nature. Along with other paintings of the Barbizon school,
they were most in vogue among newly monied city-dwellers who
liked to adorn their walls with emblems of a country life
they had no intention of living, and a life in nature from
which they were perpetually alienated by both education and
habit.38 In the summer of 187 5, as he contemplated the onset
of a new term as a history professor at Harvard where
"university priggishness" bored him, Adams wrote Sir Robert
Cunliffe that he was delighted to have decorated his own
summer-house parlor at Beverly Farms with English
watercolors, including a Cousens which he called "the best
thing I have." Adams's fellow professors found his tastes
alien. Their tastes, like Madeleine's, tended toward Corot
paintings, Morris wall-papers, Herbert Spencer, and
"culture." The obsession with "culture" as Matthew Arnold
had defined it made Adams "want to foam at the mouth." His
hostility extended to most of his university acquaintances,
and further, to most New England intellectuals.
We are a practical people. We are 
sternly conscientious. Our young women 
are haunted by the idea that they ought 
to read, to draw, or to labor in some 
way...to 'improve their minds.' They are 
utterly unconscious of the pathetic 
impossibility of improving those poor 
little hard, thin, wiry, one-stringed 
instruments ... which haven't range enough 
to master one big emotion...Our men in 
the same devoted temper talk "culture" 
till the word makes me foam at the 
mouth. They cram themselves with second­
hand facts and theories till they bust, 
and then they lecture at Harvard College 
and think that they are the aristocracy
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of intellect and are doing truly heroic 
work by exploding themselves all over a 
younger generation, and forcing up a new 
set of simple-minded, honest, harmless 
intellectual prigs as like to themselves 
as two dried peas in a bladder.
(Letters. II, 235)
In his assault on his fellow New Englanders, Adams despises
their continuing dependence on "European fashions in
'Culture.'" His chagrin at a kind of self-willed
intellectual colonialism is assigned seven years later to
Southerners, but in this letter, written in 1875, Adams in
private plainly feels that this is a phenomenon that is
endemic to American intellectual life, and perhaps to the
modern world. Most importantly, Adams is already moving
toward his embrace of the life of the instincts and of
feeling that will become of such crucial importance in his
later theories of history, of education, and of identity. In
the summer of 187 5, Adams has already identified what he
found to be the troubling tendency of modern education.
It is an atmosphere of "culture," with a 
really excellent instinct for all the 
very latest European fashions in 
"Culture." Matthew Arnold should be 
their ideal. Ruskin and Herbert Spencer,
Morris wall-papers, Corot paintings,
Eastlake furniture, are our food and
drink. The theories are the very best
and latest imported. Our young people 
have all the most novel intellectual 
fashions crammed into them with alarming 
conscientiousness. But I am aghast at
the result. Such a swarm of prigs and
all suffering under a surfeit of useless 
information, is new to human experience.
Are we never to produce one man who will
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do something himself, is the question I 
am helplessly asking...
(Letters, II, 234-235)
While Madeleine's tastes are built on prejudices 
against American intellectuals and their pretensions, Adams 
does not simply skewer his acquaintances in Democracy. He 
skewers himself and he skewers his readers. We innocently 
affirm Madeleine's tastes. We want to associate ourselves 
with her as surely as we want to dissociate ourselves from 
Ratcliffe. Adams's private joke is that we as readers are 
unknowingly mocked through the very tastes that we seek to 
affirm. The joke extends to him, however; Adams and his wife 
Marian had shopped, albeit unsuccessfully, for Morris 
wallpapers,39 and their own house was decorated with an 
array of objects not unlike those presented by Madeleine's 
parlor.
At the same time, Adams's own longings-"are we never to 
produce one man who will do something himself"— are echoed 
in Madeleine's question of five years later: "Why will 
somebody not grow to be a tree and cast a shadow?" 
(Democracy. 6). Similarly, Carrington's regret over the 
loss of "whatever it was that produced George Washington 
and a crowd of other men like him" (Democracy. 66) is 
Adams's regret. Madeleine's quest for the public good in a 
"maze of personal intrigue, this wilderness of stunted 
natures" (Democracy. 87) is Adams's own quest in his 
historical investigations. Madeleine's despair after
reading the lives and letters of the American presidents and 
their wives, and her disgust at the "melancholy spectacle" 
"from George Washington down to the last incumbent" 
replicates Adams's own— the fruit of his efforts at writing 
American history. Madeleine discovers, as Adams himself had, 
that all who had "aimed at high purpose... had been 
thwarted, beaten, and habitually insulted." With Adams 
himself, she asks what "deeper abyss could have opened under 
the nation's feet" (Democracy. 43). Madeleine's resolution 
to her discovery— through Carrington's intervention— of the 
proof of Ratcliffe's corruption— is also Adams's. She flees, 
exchanging Washington for Egypt, and consumed by a longing 
to "live in the Great Pyramid and look out forever at the 
polar star" (Democracy. 182). Like Adams himself, she seeks 
relief through entombment. The pyramids, after all, were 
mysterious monuments that served as both palaces and tombs 
for the restless dead. The novel closes in a sort of 
narrative disintegration, which mirrors the confusion and 
flight of Madeleine and her sister. Except for a postscript 
that notes that most of her countrymen would think she "had 
made a mistake" in dismissing Mr. Ratcliffe, we hear from 
Madeleine only through an amanuensis, Sybil. Sybil's letter 
is supplemented by a "thin strip of paper" advising Mr. 
Carrington to "try again" to win Madeleine. This novel is 
the first of Adams's works to use the nominalistic device of 
the open form. The novel collapses as a form as Mrs. Lee
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moves beyond its circle of action to embrace a different way 
of seeing and being that is withheld from the reader.
Mrs. Lee's secret— and the source both of her power
over others and her inner restlessness— in the narrator's
view, is that "she had artistic tendencies," which lent her
an air as "impalpable as an Indian summer mist and
nonexistent except to people who feel rather than reason."
Like her creator, Mrs. Lee may be a frustrated artist, but
she also shares with him a yearning for power, and for
exploring the possibilities of modernity and of democracy.
When Baron Jacobi, a seventy-five year old Bulgarian
minister notes the American tendency to believe itself
"excepted from the operation of general laws," with the
result that it will "be more corrupt than Rome under
Caligula," Mrs. Long wants to believe with Nathan Gore, a
New England historian and poet, that one can still hold a
faith in the possibilities of modernity.
But I have faith; not perhaps in the old 
dogmas, but in the new ones; faith in
human nature; faith in science; faith in
the survival of the fittest. Let us be 
true to our time, Mrs. Lee!
(Democracy. 41)
Mr. Gore does not recognize, nor does Mrs. Lee, though
Gore's analysis sounds hollow to her, that the idea of the
"survival of the fittest" is merely a reworking of the old 
Greek argument for governance based on the order of phvsis- 
-the rule of the stronger as it is represented in nature.
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Baron Jacobi's warning echoes Jefferson's warning in Notes
on the State of Virginia that Virginians, and by extension,
Americans, should look ahead to a time when corruption would
necessarily ensue,
They should look forward to a time, and 
that not a distant one, when corruption 
in this, as in the country from which we 
derive our origin, will have seized the 
heads of government, and be spread by 
them through the body of the people; 
when they will purchase the voices of 
the people,and make them pay the price.
Human nature is the same on both sides
of the Atlantic, and will be alike 
influenced by the same causes. The time 
to guard against corruption and tyranny, 
is before they shall have gotten hold on
The safeguard against corruption, in Jefferson's view was 
the rule of law— a source of order that lay outside the 
realm of individual caprice. What Madeleine learns in the 
course of the novel is the necessity of adhering to 
Jefferson's only political dogma: that in times of 
necessity, the American "enlists under no man's banner, 
enquires for no man's name, but repairs always to the 
standard of the laws."41 Jefferson haunts the narrative 
spaces of Democracy. Indeed, the novel provides a sort of 
alternative understanding of Jefferson and of democracy to 
the versions of history and biography that Adams was 
providing in New England Federalism and in his biography of
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Gallatin and the evolving project of the History of the 
United States.
Adams's relationship to both of his novels is a
peculiar one and belongs to a period when his many masks and
disguises began to proliferate. Madeleine Lee is the first
of Adams's fictional masks. While Democracy was
characteristically published under the veil of anonymity,
John Hay and Marian Adams were frequently named as possible
authors. One of Adams's little masquerades involved
pretending that Hay was the author of Adams's books. Hay had
in fact proposed to "redeem" the author of Democracy by
publishing a vindication of American politicians.42 Adams's
response to Hay's suggestion once again reflects his sense
that the act of writing both fiction and non-fiction
involved a species of "murder and self-destruction."
If you follow your scheme and write a 
story'by the author [of Democracy1.'I 
hope you will take the new motif under 
your eyes. Describe the sufferings of 
the anonymous author on hearing his book 
discussed in a foreign country, and how 
it gradually led him to murder and self- 
destruction. Although my brain is much 
disturbed by the whirl of authors known 
to have written your book [i.e.
Democracy1, and the vision of you and 
King and James listening to revelations 
on the subject is almost too much for 
me...Much as I disapprove the spirit of 
your book...I can see that in English 
reflection it must become more terrible 
to its creator than to anyone else...The 
situation is tragi-comic to an 
exceptional degree, and quite new to 
literature. You can make some atonement 
for your offence, by explaining the 
terrors of your atonement. This new
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crucifixion is unique in history, and 
should have great success.
(Letters. II, 474)
Adams's musings on a "crucifixion in history" through novel- 
writing accompany his announcement of the birth of Adams's 
version of John Randolph, the biography that was "part of 
myself" and wherein Randolph, must "live forever" and curse 
Adams as his literary father from his "silent tomb." Later 
on, Adams compares the first installments of the proofs of 
his history to the birth of a "baby." His equation of 
writing and publication with birth and death transcends all 
boundaries of time and genre.
The history of Adams's second novel, Esther. is even 
more complex than that of Democracy. It was published under 
a pseudonym. Adams was "Frances Snow Compton." Even Adams's 
closest friends were for a time unaware that he was its 
author. Adams convinced Henry Holt, its publisher, to allow 
the book to be published without any advance notices or 
advertisements, claiming that he wanted to see if the work 
could survive without the commercializing endeavors of the 
publishing industry. While Holt had been indiscreet about 
the authorship of Democracy. he never revealed that Adams 
had written Esther. Adams's authorship became generally 
known only after his death in 1918.43 When he began work on 
Esther in 1883, Adams wrote John Hay, who was rumored to be 
a possible author of Democracy, that he heard that Hay was
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publishing "another" novel. While Hay was, in fact
publishing the first installment of The Bread-Winners
anonymously, Adams was still playing with the idea that Hay
had authored Democracy.
I am glad to hear that you are 
publishing another novel. I was so 
frank in telling you my unfavorable 
opinion of 'Democracy' that I will try 
to read the new one in hopes that I may 
be able to speak well of it. Is it not a 
little risky to lay the scene at 
Cleveland after laying the scene of
Democracy at Washington? Two such 
straws must be fatal.
(Letters. II, 508)
Eventually Adams told Clarence King and then John Hay about 
his "melancholy little Esther" (Letters, III, 34), but only 
after his wife, Marian, had killed herself by drinking the
potassium cyanide that she used to retouch photographs in
December, 1885. Clarence King claimed that the reason for 
Adams's secrecy about the book stemmed from his guilt at 
having "exposed his wife's religious experiences, and, as it 
were, made of her a chemical subject vis a vis religion."44 
Adams wrote John Hay from Japan in 1886 that the book should 
die.
My poor boy, how very strong you do draw 
your vintage for my melancholy little 
Esther. Your letter of July 18 has just 
reached me...Now let it die! To admit 
the public to it would be almost 
unendurable to me. I will not pretend 
the book is not precious to me, but its 
value has nothing to do with the public 
who could never understand that such a
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book might be written in one's heart's 
blood.
(Letters. Ill, 34)
Whatever revisionist views Adams developed about the
novel which so eerily anticipated his wife's suicide a year
later, he began work on Esther in early 1883 in part because
he wanted to experiment with repx*esenting an American woman
in narrative, and felt that neither James nor Howells had
done so successfully. Writing John Hay in 1883 after reading
the first section of The Bread-Winners, he congratulated Hay
on having represented women more successfully than his
famous American contemporaries.
Howells cannot deal with gentlemen or 
ladies;he always slips up. James knows 
almost nothing of women but the mere 
outside; he never had a wife. This new 
writer not only knows women, but knows 
ladies; the rarest of literary gifts. I 
suppose he has an eastern wife?...If the 
author wrote 'Democracy' as is said, he 
has made a great stride in every way 
especially in humor, which is rather 
conspicuously wanting in that over- 
ambitious and hard-featured book.
(Letters, II, 513)
Once again, Adams maintains his private fantasy that Hay had 
written Democracy. He also feigns ignorance of the "new" 
author's identity. Meanwhile, Adams read proof-sheets for 
his own Estherf and kept the novel's existence a secret from 
all of his friends. Adams's motives for writing are, as we 
have seen, always complex; one is inclined always to recall 
Brooks Adams's warning in his introduction to his brother's
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last essays that "Henry was never, I fear, quite frank with
himself or with others" (Degradation. 1). However, if
Democracy represents in embryo Adams's doubts about the
nature and direction of historical process and of America,
then Esther is his exploration not of any such simple
dichotomy as "science and nature," or "reason and faith,"
but of his growing sense that individuals were all
imprisoned within their private castles of mind and their
private systems of belief. No community of being or of
meaning either through art or language existed. Wharton's
handsome glass saints, to use the language of Mt. St. Michel
and Chartres. preside over a dead church and a dead faith.
Hazard, the young minister who falls in love with Esther,
seems moved less by the mysteries of faith than by his power
over his flock.
He took possession of his flock, with a 
general advertisement that he owned 
every sheep in it,white or black, and to 
show that there could be no doubt on 
this matter, he added a general claim of 
right of property in all mankind and the 
universe. He did this in the name and on 
behalf of the church universal, but 
there was a self-assertion in the quiet 
air with which he pointed out the nature 
of his title, and then, after sweeping 
all human thought and will into his 
strong-box, shut down the lid with a 
sharp click and bade his audience kneel.
The sermon dealt with the relations of 
religion to society. It began by 
claiming that all being and all thought 
rose by slow gradations to God,—  ended 
in Him, for Him— existed only through
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Him and because of Him. The form of act
or thought mattered nothing...
(Esther. 189-190)
Hazard's first sermon denounces the claims of the Cartesian 
cogito. Hazard asserts that while philosophers may claim to 
know that they exist, the Church responds that they live and 
move and have their being only within the bounds prescribed 
by the Church: "No! You are not, you have no existence of 
your own. You were and are and ever will be only a part of 
the Supreme 'I AM,' of which the Church is the Emblem” 
(Esther, 190). Through Hazard, Adams articulates the 
problem of identity as he was coming to understand it. For 
him, identity is a kind of perpetual state of contingent 
being. Adams recognizes that the idea of a personal self 
requires the simultaneous existence of God and of world, and 
that without these constructs our individual names and our 
notions of identity are empty of meaning.45 What Adams, and, 
through him Esther, seeks is the realm in which identity is 
transpersonal and relational. That realm is available in 
Esther, but only through the possibility of suicide offered 
by the Falls. Esther's central problem is thus an 
existential one. Hazard, whose name implies the danger he 
poses to Esther's quest for an authentic existence, is 
almost disembodied. Even his desire for Esther is a longing 
to claim and conquer her soul. George Strong, on the other 
hand, and his profession— geology— suggest his more 
instinctual approach to existence, but Esther's longings
move her toward Hazard, not George. The other romantically 
paired characters in this psychomachia are equally 
allegorized. Catherine Brook, Esther's orphaned friend who 
comes from the West, is "nearer nature" than any woman 
Wharton, the artist figure, knows. Wharton, for his part, 
damaged by his unfortunate marriage, "lives only in his art 
since the collapse of his marriage" (Esther, 228-229). 
Catherine is thus unavailable to him. We later learn that 
Wharton met his wife in a Paris hospital, where she was 
suffering from an overdose of arsenic. Like Story's 
Cleopatra, she is "fierce, splendid, a priestess of the 
oracle! Tortured by agony and clinging to it as though it 
were a delight "(Esther, 251). In reality, she has the 
"temper of a Fury, and all the vices of Paris," and she 
eventually abandons him. Wasted by his encounter Wharton 
realizes Petrarch's secret: "I knew the secret of Petrarch 
and I could not tell it. My wife came between me and my 
thought. All life took form in my hands as a passion" 
(Esther, 252). The primary characters in Esther are bits and 
pieces of human beings— either all soul and thought, or all 
body and instinct. Only Esther and Wharton have the capacity 
to mediate between what Adams divides into two worlds. 
Wharton has retreated into thought and art— which he sees as 
an imitation of Petrarch's choice of the vita solitaria: 
Esther is left to choose between the "physical life," which 
she regards as the "unreal" part of existence; and a
spiritual life which she finds deadening and abhorrent. In
his passion for control of her being, Hazard finds himself
gazing into a "theological abyss" (Esther. 275). Esther,
meanwhile, flees to Niagara and a room that overlooks the
cataract, where she feels "herself being swept over it.
Whichever way she moved, she had to look down into an abyss
and leap" (Esther, p. 330). Her choice involves being swept
away by the Falls, or owned by Hazard, who admits that he
wants her "whole life, and even more." Esther conflates the
two poles of her choice— death by drowning in the falls or
death by self-annihilation in religion. She imagines the
"thunders of the Church already rolling over her head, and
that her mind was already shutting itself up under the
checks of its new surroundings" (Esther, 3 31). For Esther,
the church is "all personal and selfish." It proposes to
extend the personal self into eternity.
I despise and loathe myself, and yet you 
thrust self at me from every corner of
the church as though I loved and admired
it. All religion does nothing but pursue 
me with self even into the next world.
(Esther. 332-333)
The cataract becomes a central symbol in Esther. and 
just as generations of visitors to Adams's own memorial at 
Rock Creek Cemetery have argued over the sex of St. Gaudens' 
statue, Esther and her companion argue over the sex of the
Falls. For Esther, the falls are masculine: "It is not a
woman! It is a man!...No woman ever had a voice like that"
(Esther, 318). At the same time, Esther describes the falls 
as though they were feminine: "What a complexion, to stand 
dazzling white and diamonds in the full sunlight" (Esther. 
314). Esther's fascination with the Falls anticipates Kate 
Chopin's vivid personification of the Gulf of Mexico which 
calls Edna Pontellier in The Awakening with the same voice 
and the same story that Esther hears at Niagara. In 
Chopin's novel, echoing, repetitive passages that mirror the 
motion of the tides, center the novel in the stages of 
Edna's awakening to a condition of subjectivity that has its 
analogue but not its counterpart in a sense of physical 
ecstasy that she can feel only when she is alone, in the 
sea. Mrs. Pontellier's erotic visions, like all such visions 
in the universe of subjectivity are always onanistic. Adams 
writes his own version of Madame Bovarv in his attempt to 
problematize the issue of sexuality as a twin of the problem 
of subjectivity. The males around Mrs. Pontellier, like 
Adams's emasculated modern American males, for whom he 
repeatedly expressed his contempt, shrink from Edna's 
budding physical passion and the magnetic power over others 
that stems from it. For Edna, the "voice of the sea is 
seductive, never ceasing, whispering, clamoring, murmuring, 
inviting the soul to wander in abysses of solitude."46 Edna 
is able to hear the sea, because, like Esther, she has 
"begun to realize her position in the universe as a human 
being, and to recognize her relations as an individual to
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the world within and about her."47 Feeling embattled not by
the Church, but by lesser instruments of conventional
morality, a husband and children, Edna chooses the abyss of
solitude through drowning. Adams leaves his heroine poised
for such a choice, but unable to make it. Adams draws a
distinction between the falls and the sea.
The sea is capricious, fickle, angry, 
fawning, violent, savage, and wanton; it 
caresses and raves in a breath, and has 
its moods of silence, but Esther's huge 
playmate rambled on with its story in 
the same steady voice, never shrill or 
angry, never silent or degraded by a 
sound of human failings.
(Esther, 314)
Esther does not choose the abyss of solitude. She does not, 
in fact, choose anything at all within the frame of Adams's 
narrative, but whereas Edna Pontellier wants to drown in the 
sea of introspection, Esther, like Adams wants to escape it. 
The Church is an abyss not because it involves a rejection 
of the principle of identity, but because it seeks to 
project identity into eternity. The central characters each 
revolve in centers of their own. Whartcn loves Catherine, 
but is too damaged to claim her. Esther loves Hazard enough 
to "sacrifice herself" for him, but she declines to dissolve 
under the weight of the Church for him. George Strong loves 
Esther, but she loves him only as a favored brother. All of 
the traditional routes out of the finite center of self are 
blocked in Esther. Sex is linked with death and scandal; 
marriage and convention with ennui. The realm of
184
spontaneous desire is perpetually alienated from those who 
make it inaccessible by their very consciousness of its 
existence.
Adams took Esther's name from the last of the four 
stories that comprise Hawthorne's "Legends of the Province 
House" in Twice-Told Tales. Adams admired Hawthorne's 
work,48 and in explanation of his futile attempts to locate 
a copy of The Marble Faun in Rome in 18 60, wrote his brother 
that "when Mr. Hawthorne describes or praises anything it is 
time that other people should hold their tongues." "Legends 
of the Province House" deals with the imaginative 
restoration of the chronicle of New England history that is 
also at the heart of The Scarlet Letter. In each of the four 
stories Hawthorne explores the apparently lifeless surface 
of an historical anecdote, bringing portraits and otherwise 
uninteresting buildings to an unnatural life by drawing 
"strenuously upon [his] imagination."49 Hawthorne's narrator 
in the tetralogy is fascinated by how the "lapse of time" 
affords "opportunities for many variations of the 
narrative." "Despairing of literal and absolute truth" he 
does not hesitate to make such "further changes as seem 
conducive to the reader's profit and delight."50 History as 
entity is dismissed; it is redesigned as a product of the 
narrator's mind. "Old Esther Dudley" is the last of the four 
stories. Hawthorne's Esther is an old royalist woman who 
refuses to believe that King George has been defeated, and
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who continues to inhabit the abandoned mansion of a departed
government even after the Revolution is over, and the last
British General, Sir William Howe has left for England.
As the General glanced back at Esther 
Dudley's antique figure, he deemed her 
well fitted for such a charge, as being 
so perfect a representative of the 
decayed past— of an age gone by, with 
its manners, opinions, faith and 
feelings, all fallen into oblivion or 
scorn— of what had once been a reality, 
but was now merely a vision of faded 
magnificence...old Esther Dudley was 
left to keep watch in the lonely 
Province House, dwelling there with 
memory; and if Hope ever seemed to flit 
around her, still was it memory in 
disguise.51
Esther is an artifact, a creature who is one of the walking
dead. The world in which she lived and moved and possessed
an identity has vanished. When she beholds herself in her
mirror, which is popularly believed to have magical powers,
she sees an image that is "indistinct and ghostlike" in part
because she is constituted only through memory; she has no
part to play in any community made up of the living. Old
Esther continues to inhabit the "old historic edifice" of
the Province House, and as the years pass a body of myth
surrounds both the house and her. In the legends, Old
Esther became a sort of Merlin who could use "a tall antique
mirror" in the house to summon the shades of the past.
Among the time-worn articles of 
furniture that had been left in the 
mansion there was a tall, antique 
mirror...it was the general belief that 
Esther could cause the Governors of the 
overthrown dynasty, with the beautiful
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ladies who had once adorned their 
festivals, the Indian chiefs who had 
come up to the Province House to hold 
council or swear allegiance,the grim 
provincial warriors, the severe 
clergymen— in short all the pageantry of 
gone days— -all the figures that had ever 
swept across the broad plate of glass in 
former times— she could cause the whole 
to reappear and people the inner world 
of the mirror with shadows of the old 
life.52
As in so many of Hawthorne's stories there is an echo 
of Spenser here. Spenser aimed in his Faerie Oueene to 
provide Queen Elizabeth with a text that was also a "fair 
mirror," capable of conjuring for her an "antique image" of 
her "great ancestry."53 The Province House becomes an icon 
of history; Old Esther becomes a type of the modern magus—  
the historian who can conjure the simulacrum of the past in 
her mirror and through it, direct the course of the future. 
While, as Hawthorne adds, she is a "symbol of a departed 
system," she also embodies "history in her person."
Esther's is a tragedy of the modern subject: "living so 
continually in her own circle of ideas, and never regulating 
her mind by a proper reference to present things,"54 Esther 
appears to the world that has superseded her to be crazed. 
When a new governor is finally elected, and presents himself 
at the Province House, which is now refigured as the 
Governor's mansion, Esther realizes that she is no more than 
a ghost of a vanished past. The Governor's presence is an 
intrusion of a living embodiment of the otherness of the 
world outside the carefully constructed phantasm of life in
the Province House. Her collapse at the feet of the newly 
elected representative of a new order who confronts her with 
the speech that forms the epigraph of this chapter 
symbolizes her loss of access to meaning, both as character 
and as symbol. The new governor is a member of a "new race 
of men— living no longer in the past." If Esther is an 
embodiment of history, the new governor is an embodiment of 
the new religion of Progress. His duty is to move his 
fellow citizens "onward, onward," with the constant reminder 
that they are not the "children of the past" any longer.55 
There is very little humanity in his treatment of Esther; 
there is no space reserved for sentiment in this newly 
engineered order. While the Governor pays lip-service to 
honoring the old world that Esther represents, Esther is a 
curiosity— an object for scientific examination— whose death 
evokes not pity, but a hymn to progress.
Though Hawthorne's narrator and the "old Loyalist" who 
tells Esther's story lack her mysterious mirror, they too, 
can conjure the shapes of the past. Hancock's statement 
about Esther— "she hath done her office"56 also refers to 
the agency of the Province House. It has summoned the 
simulacrum of the past in such a way that the very clocks 
seem to strike in a "bygone century." Like Adams, Hawthorne 
conflates the related powers of memory and historiography 
with a sort of sorcery. His narrator leaves the Province
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House determined not to revisit it "for a good while hence— ■ 
if ever."57
Throughout his life, Henry Adams felt that he, too, was 
a sort of ghostly being. In his Education. Adams describes 
himself as a "child of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries." His name carried with it an "eighteenth-century 
inheritance;" he is brought up in an atmosphere that is 
"colonial, revolutionary, almost Cromwellian" and yet, "for 
him alone, the old universe was thrown into an ash heap and 
a new one created" (Education. 723-2 6). Hawthorne's Esther 
is one of Adams's doubles, and both she and he are literally 
and figuratively doubled again in Adams's Esther through the 
agency of Adams's narrative imagination. While Adams's 
Esther founders on the rock of an identity she is neither 
willing to relinquish nor affirm, her double and predecessor 
in Hawthorne help place the novel squarely in Adams's study 
of modern intellectual history as the record of a continuing 
crisis of subjectivity. Adams's habitual indirection about 
his motives is at play again. There is more of Adams and of 
the dilemma he was addressing in Esther in Old Esther Dudley 
both as story and as character than there is in his own 
novel.
In both Democracy and Esther Adams explores the 
problems of the historian of modernity that were 
crystallizing in his mind as he revised the History of the 
United States. At the end of the previous chapter, I
suggested that the enterprise of writing an authoritative 
history was intimately connected in Adams's imagination with 
the idea of self-representation. Esther as text scarcely has 
an identity of its own. It is rather a composite of other 
texts, a narrative discordia concors in which other 
authorial voices and other authorial dilemmas are refigured 
by Adams's magisterial imagination. Esther and Hazard, 
Catherine and Wharton are latterday configurations of other 
pairs of thwarted artists and lovers from the historical 
past. In Wharton's anguished imitations of Petrarch's 
uncertainty over whether life was best lived in the pastoral 
spaces of contemplation and retirement at Vaucluse, or amid 
the stench and chaos and excitement of the active life in 
Avignon, the novel invokes the origins of modernity. The 
corpus of Petrarch's work centers in his awareness of 
himself as an isolated subject at the culmination of a 
history from which he feels alienated. Modelling in small 
the progress of the entire corpus of Adams's work, Esther 
traces the self-conscious subjectivity of Petrarch to 
Spenser's passionate post-Reformation endeavor to mirror a 
usable past through art. It revisits Hawthorne's retelling 
of Spenser as part of the tragedy of America, and it reminds 
us always of Adams's self-conscious manipulation of all the 
texts of the past. Petrarch and Spenser, Adams and Hawthorne 
are unified by what Adams perceived as the haunting disease 
of modern historical consciousness. The very Petrarchan
canzoniere that Wharton employs as images of his personal 
tragedy in Esther underscore the warning that Petrarch as 
writer has Augustine offer the fictional Francesco of the 
Secretum: "the story of Narcissus has no warning for you."58 
Petrarch's curious modernity as autobiographical subject, as 
poet, and as historiographer stems from his tendency to 
mediate his experience through writing. Not only did 
Petrarch write autobiographical letters to posterity; he 
also wrote letters to the dead ancients with whom he desired 
to establish a "living" connection through writing and 
reading. As in Adams's own letters, fictive, historical, and 
living beings exchange places readily in Petrarch's 
Epistolae Familiare. and like the Laura whose actual death 
scarcely disturbs the progress of the poems she inspires, 
they are dependent on Petrarch's fantasia which breathes 
life into them all. Petrarch calls his recipients to him, as 
subjects, and moulds them into simulacra of themselves 
through writing and through memory. His autobiographical 
letters to posterity along with the Secretum. reflect his 
need to represent experience through the written word that 
mirrors Adams's own. "I desire to write but I know not about 
what or to whom to write."59 William Kerrigan and Gordon 
Braden note that in Petrarch's writing "the myth of Apollo 
and Daphne intersected the myth of Narcissus and Echo."60 
The same is true of Adams, and he saw in the tangle of 
literary and historical allusions that comprise the
narrative shape of Esther an emblem of the tangled web of 
his own identity, a composite of writing and speech, of 
texts and experience remembered and reconstituted— consumed 
by the subject in the recesses of the sepulchre of mind. 
Adams chose Petrarch as the central symbolic literary figure 
in Esther as self-consciously as he chose Hawthorne. Hans 
Blumenberg marks April 26, 1336, when Petrarch may or may 
not have ascended Mont Ventoux, as the "one of the great 
moments that oscillate indecisively between the epochs" of 
the medieval and modern worlds. The letter epitomizes the 
conflict between the inner and outer man, between "outside 
and inside," between "the world and the soul"61 and its 
resolution in self-contemplation that preoccupies Petrarch 
in La Vita Solitaria. Nature shrinks into insignificance in 
comparison to the "loftiness of human contemplation," in 
Petrarch's letter, as it had for his model Augustine, but 
for radically different reasons. Petrarch sacralizes 
Augustine's vision of the life of religious retirement, as 
well as the idea of contemplation. Petrarch seeks 
contemplation not because he seeks the infinite, or because 
he seeks a dialogue with God, but because "this pursuit of 
literature (my italics) by means of which we consecrate our 
own name to that of another, carving statues of illustrious 
men much more enduring than bronze or marble, can be carried 
on nowhere more successfully or freely than in solitude."62 
Petrarch uses the authority of Augustine, of the saints'
lives, and of the exemplary figures of solitude to advance a 
concept of secularized retirement. His vision of the retired 
life of a man of letters is the life of a monk in which the 
interior spaces of mind have supplanted the cloister. 
Petrarch's use of ecclesiastical authorities affords a 
priestly dimension to the scholar's vocation; his use of 
secular ones places his endeavor within the framework of 
human history— the spaces in which the individual life 
acquires real unity and meaning. After Petrarch, as Adams 
knew, unity and meaning are earned through the practice of 
interpreting and writing historical and literary letters to 
the world. If Petrarch's mission was to establish a vital 
continuum between his own age and that of the historical 
past through the literary vocation, Adams's mission is to 
assert that such connections are entirely subjective, and 
that the continuity they provide is bought at a price of 
imprisonment in the echoing halls of the past that doom 
Quentin Compson.
In the previous chapter, I alluded to Adams's decision 
to destroy sections of his diary as sections of his History 
were published. The surviving fragments of Adams's diary 
center in Adams's mother's illness, senility, and death; his 
own darkening depression; and his steady work on the 
"deadly routine" of history-writing. The routine was 
"deadly" not because Adams was bored. On the contrary, he 
was immersed in the battles of the War of 1812, and in the
drafting of the Treaty of Ghent. The work was "deadly" 
because Adams was writing about the man who had been the son 
of Abigail Brooks and Charles Francis Adams, and who had an 
extended identity as an Adams in Boston and in history out 
of existence. The History was his monument to that self. He 
had fulfilled his filial duty. Self-generated selves awaited 
him. On September 9, 1888, Adams wrote that he was "nearly 
Buddha" (Letters, III, 139). Aware that he was nearly 
finished with the history, he brought his diaries from 
Boston to Quincy, and in "long meditated action," he began 
their "systematic destruction." On 16 September, when he 
actually finished his narrative, and "walked in the garden 
among the yellow and red autumn flowers" "in imitation of 
Gibbon," he was finished not only with the narratives of 
Jefferson and Madison, but with the narrative of the 
original version of Henry Adams. The contrast between his 
"beginning and end"— something "Gibbon never conceived"—  
required the death of the self, and in the haunting phrase 
that would characterize the rest of his writing career,
Adams wrote that he meant "to leave no record that can be 
obliterated." The only "serious undertaking" that remained 
was for him to communicate with St. Gaudens about the 
sculptural monument at his wife's grave (Letters. Ill, 143). 
By September 20, Adams wrote that he was "steadily working 
towards my demise...I have read and destroyed my diary to 
the autumn of 1861" (Letters, III, 146). Obviously he never
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destroyed the rest of the diary, and perhaps the point that 
he intended to make— that the completion of the history was 
the end of his first life— is better made because the 
fragments of the diary remain to guide us readers as we poke 
about among his literary remains. Fragments remain from the 
rest of 1888 and end in 1889, shortly after the death of 
Adams's mother in early June. The last entry is for July 7, 
1889. In December, 1888, Adams recorded in the diary that "I 
am launched and must take my final course" (Letters. Ill, 
161). The death of Adams's mother, references to his 
dealings with St. Gaudens about "the Buddha" for Rock 
Creek, and the endless and tedious efforts that attended the 
publication of the History dominate the last of the entries, 
as they had dominated the fragments that record Adams's 
planned suicide through destruction of the literary texts of 
his outworn self. With these dealings accomplished, Adams 
was ready to make his exit.
Ernest Samuels appropriately calls the paired 
activities of publication and metaphorical self-destruction 
a "macabre ritual,"63 but for Adams this strange 
consignment of the textual self to flames was perhaps not 
"macabre" at all, but the flight of a phoenix that was to be 
consumed only to be reborn. Adams's destruction of his 
diaries symbolized a Nietzschean destruction of the old 
version of a personal self that must die in order for the 
man of the future to be born. Adams enacted his private
rites at the fireplace in his study in September, 1888, 
during the publication of successive chapters of the 
History. The ritual was the fulfillment of his affirmation—  
recorded in a surviving fragment of the diary from May,
1888— that he saw "the day near when I shall at last cut 
this only tie that still connects me with my time" (Letters. 
Ill, 114). The text of personal history that had enchained 
Adams from the time of his birth "under the shadow of Boston 
State House" to the time he completed his own version of 
American history from 1801-1817 was to be abandoned at last. 
Adams did not, it is to be noted, destroy his letters, or 
want them to be destroyed. On the contrary, he took pains 
to see that they survived. He chose rather to destroy his 
diaries, with all their evocation of what Porter Abbott 
calls an "intensity of privacy, cloistering, [and] 
isolation." Diaries are a ground of reflexive drama, and 
"creative cumulatively the effect of a consciousness thrown 
back on its own resources, abetted only by its pen."64 Adams 
burned the diaries in order to escape the idea of a self 
that he had inherited with his pew at Quincy, an idea of a 
self whose being was continuous with history, and which had 
been enshrined in the creation of the American republic.
At about the same time that he finished the History, he 
wrote Sir Robert Cunliffe that his "last long volume" was 
drawing to a close, and that he could foresee a time when he 
would be "free forever from my duties in life, as men call
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the occupations they are ashamed to quit, but are sorry to 
follow". Adams also told Sir Robert that, "once free," he 
intended to "begin a new life, in which the old one can 
hardly have any sequence" (Letters, III, 115). That his 
escape was prefigured in fiction and was to be constituted 
through a flight into other kinds of texts is but one of the 
many difficulties in framing an understanding of the complex 
of paradoxes that, taken together, were and are Henry Adams. 
Like Hawthorne's narrator in "Old Esther Dudley," Adams was 
ready to quit the Province House of history for a world 
that, if not broader, was at least different than the one 
Adams had inherited with the enlightenment project of his 
ancestors. A new self was required for such a world, and in 
the works that follow the history, Adams fashions a sequence 
of doubles in which the personal self is at last 
transcended. Adams's line of flight toward the world of 
sense took him first to the American West, and later, and 
more importantly to a literally new name and a new identity 
in Tahiti. The completion of the novels and histories 
combined with the destruction of his diaries to provide 
Adams with a kind of fictional and symbolic closure for his 
old life— the suicide through writing that is also a birth 
into a new life. Adams's ritualized suicide functions as a 
sharp divide between the old self and the old life and their 
replacements. Esther's dilemma at Niagara Falls, and 
Wharton's dilemma as he tries to provide a living art for a
dead church refigure not only Petrarch's dilemma in the 
Secretum. but also Adams's dilemma as artist and historian 
in a textual arena that he perceived as modern in a very 
different sense than Petrarch did. His dilemma is partially 
resolved in the destruction of the diaries that embody a 
personal self and in the writing of the autobiographical 
works that offer a new and transpersonal identity. While the 
surviving portions of the diary are a sort of extended 
suicide note, the actual disappearance of Henry Adams is not 
recorded in them. That remained for the final and more 
explicitly autobiographical enterprise that is the subject 
of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
HENRY ADAMS AND THE UNNAMEABLE 'I'
Nietzsche acutely observes that we are 
more influenced by what does not happen 
to us than by what does, and, according 
to the Egyptian ritual of the dead, when 
the 'double' abandons the corpse and has 
to perform its feat of self-definition 
before the judges of the world beyond 
the grave it makes its confession 
contrariwise, that is to say, it 
enumerates the sins it has not 
committed.1
Ortega y Gasset, "The Sunset 
of Revolutions"
Is not this rather the place where one 
finishes vanishing?2
Samuel Beckett, The Unnamable
Adams's quest for a deterritorialized self and, 
consequently, his more overt treatment of the problem of 
subjectivity, assumed an experimental form in the 1890s when 
he undertook to write the deposed Queen of Tahiti's memoirs. 
Having killed off his old identity, his unbounded 
consciousness was in search of a new mode of self­
definition, which was, in its turn, to be recreated and then 
destroyed in Mt. St. Michel and Chartres. The Education of 
Henry Adams. and the various essays and letters on history 
that he wrote between 1894 and 1910.
During and after the publication of the History of the 
United States. Adams, like many other literary figures of 
his day, undertook a journey to the tropics. Adams had been
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interested in Buddhism and in Japanese art for some time,
and he had travelled to Japan with John La Farge in the
summer of 1886 in pursuit of both interests. The trip had
whetted his appetite for further adventures outside the
bounds of western civilization. As the publication of the
History drew to a close, he planned a journey to what was
then called Polynesia. On 8 July, 1890, Adams wrote W.C.
Brownell that he had sent the title-page to his history away
(Letters, III, 249). He wrote John Hay the next day that he
was "melancholy," and that "life seems strangely unreal and
weird on this ill-balanced perch. One can so easily drop
out" (Letters, III, 250). In mid-August Adams set out for
the long western journey through the United States that
would make his further journey to what he imagined as a land
of exotica possible. He went first to Honolulu, and then set
out for what was then known as Polynesia. In Hawaii, Adams
took to painting again, producing what he called "a very bad
copy of my own ignorance" which nevertheless had "the charm
that I felt as a boy going about fishing." (Letters. Ill,
270-71). He found himself enjoying "much that is not to be
set down in literary composition" as well as the landscape.
I get softly intoxicated on the soft 
violets and strong blues, the masses of 
purple and the broad bands of orange and 
green in the sunsets, as I used to 
qriser myself on absynthe on the summer 
evenings in the Palais Royal before 
dining at Vefour's, thirty years ago.The 
outlines of the great mountains, their 
reddish purple glow, the infinite 
variety of greens and the perfectly
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intemperate shifting blues of the ocean, 
are a new world to me. To be sure, man 
is pretty vile, but perhaps woman might 
partly compensate for him, if one only 
knew where to find her. As she canters 
about the roads, a-straddle on 
horseback, with wreaths of faced yellow 
flowers, and clothed in a blue or red or 
yellow night-gown she is rather a riddle 
than a satisfaction.
(Letters. Ill, 280-81)
Adams was recovering— or, more accurately, discovering— his 
ability to live in a realm of pure sensation. He was 
learning, in Deleuze's terms, to experience the world as 
pure event. In his journey to Honolulu, Samoa, and Tahiti, 
Adams was able to experience what he saw not as "persons, 
characters, or subjects" but as "atmospheric variation, a 
change of hue, an imperceptible molecule, a discrete 
population, a fog, or a cloud of droplets." For the death 
wish that had accompanied the destruction of his diaries, he 
substituted a Deleuzian death-wish which was simultaneously 
an "apotheosis of will"3 and a declaration of a new mode of 
existence. On horseback-riding expeditions outside Honolulu, 
Adams recovered a delight in the "scenery, the sky and the 
ocean, the mountains, the valleys and ravines, the lights, 
and the constant pleasure of breathing" that he had "never 
expected ever again to feel" (Letters. Ill, 282) . By late 
September he was writing Elizabeth Cameron that he was "glad 
to be dead to the old existence, which was a torture, and to 
forget it, in a change as complete as that of another
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planet.11 (Letters. Ill, 285). When he resumed his journey he 
wrote from the Equator that he was "now fairly dead"
(Letters, III, 288). On Samoa he saw girls "with their 
dripping grasses and leaves and their glistening breasts and 
arms" seem to "come out of the sea" in the Siva dance. After 
the dance--and Adams was to see many versions of it in 
Samoa— Adams found himself and LaFarge lying about with the 
young native women "sprawling over the mats, smoking, 
laughing, trying to talk, with a sense of shoulders, arms, 
legs, cocoa-nut oil, and general nudeness most strangely 
mixed with a sense of propriety." Adams felt "that at last 
the kingdom of old-gold was ours" and that "no future 
experience, short of being eaten, will ever make us feel so 
new again." (Letters, III, 291). Later, as Adams developed 
a friendship with a Samoan village princess named Fa-a-uli, 
he also developed fascination with her splendid strong body 
and cat-like movements. Adams wrote that "Clarence King 
would go wild with envy if he could see me lying on the 
floor watching Fa-a-uli peeling sugar-cane for me to eat, 
then going through a whole cane on her own account...I never 
tire of watching her." Admiringly, Adams took the young 
princess's measurements, and was delighted to find a kind of 
physical double in her, a counterpart to the doubles in 
spirit that he had encountered in history and created in 
novels; her head measured exactly the same as his own. 
(Letters, III, 316-17). He fantasized about marrying "some
splendid creature, six feet tall, who would carry me in her 
arms like a child." Adams was fascinated by what he saw as 
the peculiar but unconfining sexual mores of the Samoans, 
which he described as "the strangest compound of laxity and 
strictness, of absolute freedom, and rigorous restraint, of 
charm, and repulsion" (Letters, III, 324). In the Samoan 
woman Adams saw a remnant of primitive reverence for woman 
as nature goddess that was to preoccupy him in Mt. St.
Michel and Chartres. In language that oddly anticipates his 
treatment of the power of the Virgin in the Middle Ages he 
writes that a princess like Fa-a-uli even "leads the 
warriors even to battle," wearing a "showy war-costume." The 
androgynous ideal that informs the St. Gaudens monument and 
shapes the tension between Virgin and Archangel in Mt. St. 
Michel and Chartres seems to have been born in Samoa.
As Adams became more used to his new surroundings, he 
began to feel more and more that he had escaped his own 
consciousness of himself. He wrote that he found himself 
"now and then regaining consciousness that I was once an 
American supposing himself real...my own identity becomes 
hazy" (Letters, III, 292) . Adams's identity was not so 
easily routed, however. He discovered on a visit to King 
Malietoa that he possessed status as a great ali. or 
nobleman, because all of the natives "knew the frigate 
'Adams," a warship that had been commissioned by the United 
States to give medical aid to Malietoa's faction in 1887
during a civil war in which British, American, and Samoan 
interests opposed German interests which had temporarily 
succeeded in toppling Malietoa from his throne (Letters.
Ill, 293). The Adams name and with it a fragment of his old 
identity had followed him even to Samoa. The irony was not 
lost on Adams. He was aware that his journey to Samoa for 
pleasure was not without its penalties for the Samoans. The 
missionaries, who had forbidden the Siva dance, excluded Fa- 
a-uli and other princesses from church membership. Adams 
realized, long before Levi-Strauss that the intrusion of 
Adamses— both frigate and man— signalled, along with the 
arrival of missionaries, the end of the life lived in 
harmony with nature and with one's fellow man that had been 
the Samoan past. If in Adams's view, missionaries proffered 
the apple which taught the natives about sexual shame 
(Letters. Ill, 324), his presence also added to the problems 
inherent in the inevitable collision of native and European 
culture. Nevertheless, in his account of his tropical 
sojourn he self-consciously lapses into Madeleine Lee's and 
his own earlier tendency to turn the people who came beneath 
his gaze into objects for scientific study. His sketches of 
Samoan society are designed to provide "entertainment" for 
himself and his western epistolary audiences. In attempting 
to translate his experiences into the language of his 
friends who tied him to late nineteenth-century America—  
Mrs. Cameron had replaced his History as his one remaining
"tie” to life in the modern world— Adams lapses back into 
the language of a self and the systems of value that he 
thought he had left behind. As he writes about the ecstatic 
moments when he felt that he had truly escaped the sense of 
discontinuity that had characterized the late 1880s, he 
exhibits a marked tendency to assume a kind of superiority 
over the "child-like" Samoans. Adams asserts his sense of 
personal superiority over the Samoans even when he admires 
them. The "back of a Samoan woman when she is in motion" is 
a "joy forever," and he "never tires of watching the swing 
of their arms and the play of light over the great round 
curves of their bodies" (Letters, III, 298) but they are 
like splendid animals to him. When Keats wrote that a "thing 
of beauty is a joy forever," he was being somewhat ironic. 
Keats knew that "things"— aesthetic objects— are necessarily 
devoid of a life of their own. They acquire life only in the 
imagination of the beholder. For Adams the Samoan women, are 
indeed, "things" of beauty. Because he can transform them 
into objects for study, he can draw analogies between them 
and "ivory image[s] of Benvenuto's;" (Letters, III, 316).
The men are creatures out of Homer (Letters, III, 319); the 
women summon images of a "dozen Rembrandts intensified into 
the most glowing beauty of life and motion" (Letters. Ill,
3 01). Despite his suggestions that Samoa is the last 
retreat of man in his most perfect form, Adams feels 
comfortable in asserting that "'love'" for the Samoan women
"is not a deep emotion," and that they "have no deep 
emotions or strong passions" (Letters. Ill, 326). At times 
in his letters he feels capable of narrating their 
otherness, and of asserting the control over them that only 
the values of scientific rationalism could provide. The 
Samoans are reduced to interesting creatures that serve as 
rewarding objects for Adams's aesthetic and sensual 
contemplation. Adams seems to have been aware of the 
paradoxes inherent in the very writing of the serial letters 
that record is time in Samoa and Tahiti for his closest 
friends. He wrote Lucy Baxter that he had discovered a world 
"so unlike anything I imagined that I can write a book more 
easily than a letter" (Letters, III, 323) . Communicating his 
experience in any form was problematic. Even photographs 
were unsatisfactory to Adams; they "take all the fun out of 
the tropics." They "vulgarise the women" and destroy the 
"softness of lights and colors, the motion of the palms, the 
delicacy and tenderness of the mornings and evenings" 
(Letters. Ill, 307). He sent John Hay some photographs, but 
wrote that Hay would have to supply for himself "the color, 
the movement, the play of muscle and feature, and the whole 
tropical atmosphere, which photographs kill as dead as their 
own chemicals" (Letters, III, 304). Photographs, which 
provide a "scientific" version of reality, had as little 
capacity to communicate the richness of Samoa, where Adams 
claimed to lose track of both self and clock time, as
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Adams's western language and his letters. They reduced
everything in Adams's words to "type." Adams, of course, had
had occasion to note the death-wielding capacities of
photography before, when his wife had died after drinking
her own developing fluids. In his more characteristic moods,
Adams believed that "the Samoans have an entire intellectual
world of their own, and never admit outsiders into it. I
feel sure that they have a secret priesthood more powerful
than the political chiefs, with supernatural powers."
Marvelling at the way the Samoans were "masters at playing
the missionaries off," Adams seems to have realized that the
Samoans were finally as impenetrable and mysterious as
westerners. However, he seems also to have believed that he
had encountered the world of sense that he had sought when
he set out on his Polynesian idyll.
Here are these superb men and women,—  
creatures of this soft climate and 
voluptuous nature, living under a 
tropical sun, and skies of divine purple 
and blue,— who ought, on my notion, to 
be chock-full of languid longings and 
passionate emotions, but they are pure 
Greek fauns. Their intellectual 
existence is made up of concrete facts.
As La Farge says, the have no thoughts.
They are not in the least voluptuous; 
they have no longings and very brief 
passions; they live a matter-of-fact 
life that would scare a New England 
spinster. Even their dances... always 
represent facts...The dancers play at 
ball, or at bathing, or a cocoa-nut 
gathering, or hammer, or row, or 
represent cats, rats, birds or devils, 
but never an abstraction...They have the
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virtues of healthy children— and the 
weaknesses of Agamemnon and Ulysses.
(Letters, III, 346)
What the natives represented for Adams was man freed from
the disease of self-consciousness, and its accompanying
prisons of sentimentality and artifice. Intent on becoming a
Polynesian, Adams responded vaguely to Mrs. Cameron's news
in January, 1891, of the world left behind. To her remark
that the later volumes of his History were "more critical"
than their predecessors, Adams responded in his role of the
walking dead man, that "they were written...in a very
different frame of mind from that in which the work was
begun. I found it hard to pretend either sympathy of
interest in my subject."
If you compare the tone of my first
volume— even toned down as it is, from
the original— with that of the ninth,
when it appears, you will fell that the 
light has gone out. I am not to blame.
As long as I could make life work, I 
stood by it, and swore by it as though 
it were my God, as indeed it was.
(Letters. Ill, 382)
Adams's epistolary record of his quest for a new self 
continues the obituary to a lost self and a lost world that 
ends the decade of the eighties, with its focus on 
histories, biographies, and novels. The public record of his 
new strategy for being was not about Samoa, but about 
Tahiti, and the "memoirs" were not about Adams, though they 
are, as we shall see, also his memoirs, but about the
surviving members of the Tahitian royal family, who had 
adopted Adams as one of their own. The narrative web in 
Tahiti; Memoirs of Arii Taimai. et. al. is thus a tangled 
one, for the memoirs are not really those of the former 
queen, Marau Taaroa, but of her mother, Ariitamai, the 
elderly widowed "chiefess," as Adams called her, of the Teva 
clan (Letters. Ill, 407). They are the memoirs of a family 
that is also a community in which life acquires meaning 
through relationships rather than a story of the solitary 
individuation of a personal self. In an effort that 
anticipates the narrative experiments of Gertrude Stein, 
Adams, who had been adopted by Ariitamai,4 merges his 
identity with that of the "Chiefess" and her extended 
family. Early in their visit, Adams and his friend John 
LaFarge exchanged names with Ori, one of the Teva 
chieftains. At that point, Adams found the idea amusing, but 
as he became increasingly fascinated with Ariitamai's family 
history and its inevitable progress toward decay and 
decadence, he came to realize that names in Tahiti still had 
a serious meaning, and an extension in place. As their 
relationship evolved, Ariitamaii bestowed personal family 
names on Adams and LaFarge in addition to their tribal 
names. Adams was not only "Ori," which signified membership 
in the general body of the clan; he acquired personal 
identity with his new name of "Taura-atua," which means 
"Bird Perch of God." He had been adopted by Ariitamai.
Thenceforward, she was his mother, and her family history 
was also his. Adams had found a literal replacement for his 
abandoned self. The title page of the original, privately 
circulated version of Tahiti, in characteristic Adamsian 
word play reads "Memoirs of Arii Taimai e/ Marama of Eimeo 
/Teriirere of Tooarai/Teriinui of Tahiti/ Tauraatua I Amo." 
Adams's actual name appears nowhere. In later editions of 
the memoir, the title page reads "Tahiti/ by Henry Adams/ 
Memoirs of Arii Taimai e Marama of Eimeo/ Teriirere of 
Tooarai, Terrinui of Tahiti/ Tauraatua i Amo."5 Adams 
shares equally in the memoirs with the other members of his 
acquired "family." By including his Tahitian name—  
"Tauraatua i Amo"— in the title he becomes not only the 
author of the memoir, but the agent through which the 
narrative of his adopted family's history is made accessible 
to western history. Just as Ariitamai gave Adams a name in 
Tahiti, Adams bestows a western identity upon the family 
through writing her life. At the same time, Adams became a 
mediating spirit, moving between two worlds and two kinds of 
consciousness.
Ariitamai's existence had hardly been a scene of 
uninterrupted pastoral. The complications of the intrusion 
of European life were everywhere, including Ariitamai's 
marriage to Alexander Salmon, a Londoner who had founded a 
kind of Tahitian dynasty through his wife's connections. 
Adams came to see the symbolic possibilities in his
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adoption, and took it quite seriously. The deposed queen, 
who assisted in compiling the notes and stories that make up 
Tahiti. is his "sister" (Letters. Ill, 471) and he writes to 
his Tahitian "family" of "our ancestors," while feeling 
"dead as Adam" to his old life (Letters. Ill, 479) . Adams's 
active quest for a new anchor in history thus begins with 
the book that is most often called simply Tahiti, and which 
has frequently been dismissed as a tangential piece of 
travelogue. In fact, as the title pages suggest, Tahiti is 
the first installment of Adams's autobiographical 
enterprise, the first version of a new state of being. In 
writing it, and in examining the curious mixture of European 
education and Tahitian tradition that were the life of the 
Teva clan, Adams found no escape from the dilemmas of modern 
life. Indeed, he may have chosen to write a Tahitian rather 
than a Samoan memoir because the Samoans were still 
sufficiently free of self-consciousness to lack a historical 
sense; their experience could not be communicated through 
the alienating medium of language. In the Teva clan, he 
found a record of the confrontation of European and 
Polynesian culture, and he also found an occasion for 
contemplating the problem of identity from the vantage point 
of the imperial traveller. In Tahiti, Adams explored all of 
the difficulties that his months in Samoa had presented.
Adams later claimed that his "historical neck" had been 
"broken" at the Chicago Exhibition of 1893. In reality, his
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visit to the South Seas seems to have raised a number of 
questions about colonialism and imperialism, about 
individual identity and community, as well as about the 
nature of personal and political power which took final 
shape at the Chicago Exhibition and in his "Letter to 
American Teachers of History," which is treated in the next 
chapter.
* * * * * * * * *
If Adams had embalmed and buried his old self in the 
text of his History and escaped it in Samoa, he turned to it 
as an object of study in Mt. St. Michel and Chartres. There, 
Adams undertook an examination of Christianity's fostering 
of the concept of the self, which he had left unresolved in 
1884 in Esther. Mt. St. Michel thus is vehicle for 
exploring the concept of self-doubling through narrative 
that had originated in the novels, and continued in Tahiti. 
Mt. St. Michel and Chartres is a response to Adams's growing 
interest in medieval history and art and a reversal of the 
motion of his Tahitian quest. Rather than explicitly seeking 
escape from his western identity, he sought to restore that 
identity through an immersion in the origins of modern 
history. Mt. St. Michel entwined in Adams's mind with what 
for him were the perennial questions of subjectivity, 
biography, biographers, and self-representation. By 1899, 
Adams's interest in twelfth-century architecture and glass
and his fondness for translating chansons de qeste— an 
occupation that dated back at least to 1893, had resulted in 
a plan for a experimental kind of history, one which would 
endow history with a sense of literary form.6 In an 
extension of the equation between autobiography and history, 
he seems always to have conceived of Mt. St. Michel and 
Chartres as a kind of personal memoir, if not as an 
autobiography. And for Adams, autobiography was always 
biography, a cage of form, in which a reified self could 
come under the scrutiny of the presiding deity of the 
historian's consciousness. By 1902 the new work had taken 
full form, and Adams was planning its sequel, which he 
cryptically described as an "historical romance of the year 
1200" (Letters. V, 378). The new "romance" would eventually 
take shape as the Education of Henry Adams. Adams's typical 
epistolary pose for writing both Mt. St. Michel and the 
Education was that of a "sexagenarian Hamlet."7 Adams was 
trying to make his peace with history, and, like his 
favorite literary character Hamlet, he was ready to announce 
his death to whatever Horatio was present to read him. Adams 
differs from Hamlet in that Adams wanted to tell his own 
story, and in so doing take his own portrait for the gallery 
of history. He was nearly finished with Mt. St. Michel and 
Chartres when he communicated the doubts about James's 
version of William Story and Morley's version of Gladstone 
that we have discussed elsewhere, but his doubts about
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biography had haunted him all along. In March of 1900,
shortly after he had begun serious work on what was to
become Mt. St. Michel and Chartres. Adams wrote Elizabeth
Cameron in his guise of "twelfth-century monk" who had a
"habit of tumbl[ing] into black holes" of his pain and
disgust at trying to read his brother Charles Francis's life
of their father.
I've been trying to read my brother 
Charles's Life of our father, and it 
makes me sick. Now I understand why I 
refused so obstinately to do it myself.
These biographies are murder, and, in 
this case, to me, would be both 
patricide and suicide. They belittle the 
victim and the assassin equally. They 
are like bad photographs and distorted 
perspectives...I have sinned myself, and 
deeply, but thank my diseased and 
dyspeptic nervous wreck, I did not 
assassinate my father.
(Letters, V, 102)
Adams's disapprobation of any verbal monuments extended even 
to collections of letters, and, recording his reaction to 
the publication of Robert Louis Stevenson's letters, he 
urged Elizabeth Cameron in an uncharacteristic moment to 
destroy his own to her: "Do not leave them knocking about, 
as a mash for female pigs who feed out of the magazine- 
troughs at five dollars a page, to root in, for scandal and 
gossip" (Letters, V, 103).
The schizoid focus of Adams's existence— part medieval 
philosopher, part shrewd political analyst— is nowhere more 
apparent than in the disparity between the imagined twelfth-
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century romance of Mt. St. Michel and the letters that 
record Adams's immersion in the centers of political power 
in the Washington of the first years of the twentieth 
century. However, in its way, Mt. St. Michel is as political 
a work as the Education or Tahiti; it is an exploration of 
the remains of a time when the State was still the subject 
of the church, and the personal self was the subject of 
both. Unlike the modern subject, who shapes his forms of 
government arbitrarily and changes them at will, the 
medieval subject was a part of a foreordained hierarchy of a 
vision of world order that doubled as source of social order 
and as an affirmation that words were the true coin of the 
meanings that they sought to represent.
While Adams may have seen Mt. St. Michel and Chartres 
as an "historical romance," he also wrote Elizabeth Cameron 
that he was the "Virgin's biographer" (Letters, V, 448), a 
curious claim given his usual assertion that "these 
biographies are murder." He seems to have seen this 
biography as life-giving. When he began to prepare the work 
for printing, he wrote that he was "so much absorbed in 
babies that I dreamt last week that I was going to have 
one." Adams goes on to explain that "one of [his] minds" was 
"rather surprised," but that his "other mind" had replied 
that "men always had babies." The dream is a sort of 
allegory of what Adams was actually trying to communicate.
He was completing his manuscript, which had "swelled to the
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size of an ox" (Letters, V, 452-453). Adams always regarded
the creation of a literary double as either a pregnancy and
birth, or as a wake and funeral for a self. He had regarded
the publication of his history as an occasion to engage in
ritual destruction of the literary self that had been
preserved in his diaries. Similarly, but with curiously
opposite intent, he had felt compelled to announce that
John Randolph was "just coming into the world" when he
finished the Randolph biography. As he prepared to circulate
a few copies of Mt. St. Michel. he felt that he was once
again with child, and ready to give birth to a new version
of himself. After his hundred copies were printed, Adams
wrote that he had just finished his Miracles de la Vierqe.
and that he was reconciled to the "premature demise" of
Thomas Aquinas and "the late Duns Scotus"(Letters, V, 618).
The meaning of the work, Adams explained to Henry Osborn
Taylor, was couched in the last three chapters, which, Adams
claimed, were his declaration of anarchy. (Letters, V, 624).
I am trying to work out the formula of 
anarchism; the law of expansion from 
unity, simplicity, morality, to 
multiplicity, contradiction, 
police....The assumption of unity which 
was the mark of human thought in the 
middle ages has yielded very slowly to 
the proofs of complexity... Yet it is 
quite sure...that, at the accelerated 
rate of progression shown since 1600 it 
will not need another century or half 
century to tip thought upside down. Law 
in that case would disappear as 
theory...and give place to force.
Morality would become police. Explosives 
would reach cosmic violence.
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Disintegration would overcome 
integration. This was the point that 
leads me back to the twelfth century as 
the fixed element in the equation. From 
the relative unity of the Prime Motor, I 
can work pretty safely down to Karl 
Pearson's Grammar of Science or 
Wallace's Man's Place in Nature or to 
Mach and Ostwald and the other Germans 
of today. By intercalating Descartes, 
Newton, Dalton, and a few others, I can 
even make almost a time-ratio. This is 
where my middle-ages will work out. I 
tell you this in order that you may 
explain...why the volume is not offered 
to the public...
(Letters, V, 627)
Adams's plan for Mt. St. Michel involved not "accuracy," 
which was "relative," but a sense of the necessity of 
bringing the "picture" of the Middle Ages "into relation 
with ourselves." Adams's desire was activated not by his 
fascination with the medieval world as much as it was 
necessitated by the fact that "nothing in all nature [is] so 
iconoclastic, miraculous and anarchistic as Shakespeare" 
[Letters. V, 628). As his letter suggests, he was already 
hard at work on tracing western intellectual history as the 
arc of subjectivity, and he saw Shakespeare as 
representative of the sensibility of 1600, the moment when 
he believed that all unity as having been finally lost.
After 1600, in Adams's view, man stood on the precipice 
overlooking an abyss of modernity. Beginning with the 
artificial assumption of medieval unity, then, Adams would 
move toward the triumph of law as "theory," and the point at
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which "morality becomes the police." Adams offered a more
personal view to Elizabeth Cameron.
...I deny that it is a book; it is only 
a running chatter with my nieces and 
those of us who care for old art. Vanity 
is a danger I can hardly fear 
now;... self-depreciation has always been 
my vice, and morbid self-contempt my 
moral weakness, as it was that of the 
12th century mystics, which is the bond 
of sympathy between us; but we each 
recoup ourselves by feeling a calm, 
unruffled, instinctive, unfathomed 
scepticism about the existence of a 
world at all... we are all that is; we 
know no other world...We never despised 
the world or its opinions; we only 
failed to find out its existence 
...Philosophy has never got beyond this 
point. There are but two schools; one 
turns the world into me; the other turns 
me into the world; and the result is the 
same.
(Letters. V, 659-660)
In Mt. St. Michel and Chartres. Adams turns the mirror on 
the world, conjuring simulacra of the shapes of time in much 
the same way that Hawthorne's Old Esther does in "Tales from 
the Province House" and with much the same end— that of 
forging vital links between past and present— that 
preoccupied Petrarch in his efforts to link himself with 
classical antiquity. Adams begins, however, with the notion 
that the past in itself is not recuperable, and that the 
links, like the story, will necessarily be both subjective 
and fictional. Thus Adams also turns the mirror on himself. 
For once, Adams was being straightforward when he told Henry 
Osborn Taylor that he was not interested in accuracy. He was
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interested in enabling his imaginary audience, the 
companions of his own voyage, to become "prematurely young," 
so that they can cross the "bridge of ages between us and 
our ancestors" (MSM, 343-344). The uncle says that the 
point of the voyage is not to recover the facts of medieval 
history, but the feeling. Our aim, he announces, is to use 
our "ignorance" to help us "feel what we cannot understand" 
(MSM, 394).
Upon the book's publication by Houghton Mifflin under 
the auspices of the American Institute of Architects in 1913 
Ralph Adams Crum read the work as Adams's affirmation of the 
"revelation of the eternal glory of mediaeval art and the 
elements that brought it into being."8 Later readers have 
tended to follow Crum's lead; even more skeptical readers 
have read the work as a sort of Ruskinian glorification of 
the unity of the Middle Ages. In fact, Mt. St. Michel 
consumes itself at every turn, pointing not to the 
possibility of recovering history through imagination, but 
to the impossibility of escaping our imposition of self upon 
history. In this work, Adams does not recapture the Middle 
Ages at all, but merely reconstitutes himself as a twelfth- 
century monk. In keeping with his pose and with the supposed 
medieval ideal of pictor iqnotus. the one hundred quarto 
volumes that were issued privately in 1905 gave no 
indication of authorship. The title page read simply "Mont- 
Saint-Michel and Chartres/Travels/France." As we have seen
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of course, Adams as Adams had absented himself from title 
pages before— specifically, from the first edition of the 
Tahiti where he is both subject and author of the memoir—  
but not as Henry Adams. In this case, however, he absents 
himself in part because he had aimed to pursue the school of 
thought that "turned me into the world" rather than the 
reverse. Thus, in writing this volume and its sequel, Adams 
had drowned in the seas of time and imagination. Having done 
so, he could proclaim three months into the first world war 
that "I am Saint Augustin! Read him! You will see me all 
through" (Letters, VI, 666).
The first warning that this is to be a perilous text
for the reader comes in the Preface, as Adams examines the 
tenuous relationship between the modern writer and his 
audience. Quoting an anonymous Elizabethan "poet or 
playwright", Adams begins by saying that he "who reads me,
when I am ashes is my son in wishes." Adams muses that this
sort of relationship is impossible; it is much too close for 
any relationship in the modern world. The closest kinship 
we as an audience can claim to him is nephews, but since 
modern nephews tend not to read, nephews will not do either. 
Besides, Adams adds, "the metre does not permit it. One may 
not say:— 'Who reads me when I am ashes is my nephew in 
wishes.'" Nieces are a possibility, however. The "change 
restores the verse," and they have been known to "read their 
uncles." Furthermore, they are like to "carry a kodak." The
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relationship is an easy one, "capable of being anything or 
nothing, at the will of either party." (MSM. 341).
Surprisingly, this preface has usually been seen as 
disarming or comforting.9 In fact, it is a nominalist 
manifesto. The aim of Adams's elaborate stage management of 
uncle and nieces is of a piece with Nietzsche's claim to 
Jakob Burckhardt in 1889, that "every name in history is 
' I .' "
Actually, I would much rather be a Basel 
professor than God; but I have not 
ventured to carry my private egoism so 
far as to omit creating the world on his 
account... The unpleasant thing, and one 
that nags my modesty, is that at root 
every name in history is I; also as 
regards the children I have brought into 
the world, it is a case of my 
considering with some distrust whether 
all of those who enter the 'Kingdom of 
God' do not also come out of God. This 
autumn, as lightly clad as possible, I 
twice attended my funeral, first as 
Count Robilant (no, he is my son, 
insofar as I am Carlo Alberto, my nature 
below) but I was Antonelli myself. Dear 
professor, you should see this 
construction; since I have no experience 
of the things I create, you may be as 
critical as you wish; I shall be 
grateful, without promising I shall make 
any use of it. We artists are 
unteachable.10
In Nietzsche's now infamous letter, the subject that is 
Nietzsche embraces centers of subjectivity other than his 
own in his frustrated guest for a place in the community of 
humanity. Consuming all the names in history, Nietzsche, 
like Adams after him, functions as an imperial subject who, 
in a newly acquired status as narrative god, imposes his "I"
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on all he encounters, including his readers.11 Adams's 
quest is a more extended one, however. By the time he wrote 
Esther. he had become disgusted with the perennial baggage 
of self-consciousness. Esther's primary complaint about the 
Church is that it wants to extend the personal self, which 
she "loathes," into infinity. Adams is moving in Mt. St. 
Michel toward his self-erasure in the Education, and, 
ultimately toward the quest that Beckett outlines in The 
Unnameable for the point where "one finishes vanishing.1,12 
In the Preface to Mt. St. Michel. Adams obliquely announces 
that he will explore the origins of the universe of 
subjectivity, and the nature and powers of language within 
that universe. The linguistic play of the Preface casts an 
ominous shadow over the text that follows. Adams as pilgrim 
and uncle has already made his voyage through the 
intellectual history of the modern world, and he knows that 
not realism, but nominalism has triumphed in language, and 
that the simplicity of the closed universe of the medieval 
world has given way to the infinite complexity of the 
twentieth century. Adams's audiences are thus whomever he 
decides they will be, and his words, like Humpty Dumpty's, 
mean what he alone decides they will mean.
Mt,. St. Michel does not grow more encouraging or 
comforting as we move through it. Not only are we asked to 
surrender our own personal selves to become Adams's nieces; 
in the first chapter, we are asked to heed Wordsworth's
"practical" suggestion from the ninth section of the 
Intimations ode, and embark "in a season of fair weather" on 
that "'immortal sea' which brought us hither from the 
twelfth century.'" Travelling backward over the tides of 
history, we are to reverse our motion and "travel thither" 
and "see the children sporting on the shore." Wordsworth's 
Ode was a response to a realization of the self's isolation 
from the realm of nature in the interiors of mind. However, 
Wordsworth not only accepts but celebrates the inwardness of 
being that Adams was trying to escape. Wordsworth can make 
the imaginative leap between self and world that Adams maps 
but cannot span in Mt. St. Michel. Wordsworth explains in 
the headnote to the poem that in childhood he was "unable to 
think of external things as having external existence;" he 
"communed with all that [he] saw as something not apart from 
but inherent in, [his] own immaterial nature."13 Wordsworth 
celebrates the "perpetual benediction" that comes from 
"those obstinate questionings/ of sense and outward things,/ 
Fallings from us, vanishings." Wordsworth finds an 
affirmation of his place in a community of being and a sort 
of benediction through the power of mind. Adams transforms 
the passage; the source of Wordsworth's hope is the source 
of Adams's despair. While we may be able to see the 
children of the Middle Ages sporting on the distant shore of 
the twelfth century, we will see them not as they were, but 
as they are recreated and reshaped into doubles of
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ourselves. Having extended the promise of an imaginative 
recreation of the past, Adams immediately proceeds with his 
customary action of doubling. The view from the Abbey Church 
is not simply itself; it "recalls the coast of New England," 
and Adams reminds us that "if you have any English blood at 
all, you have also Norman." This fact is multiplied into the 
presence of some "two hundred and fifty million arithmetical 
ancestors of the eleventh century." Adams's conditional "if 
we could go back and live again in...our ancestors" at first 
seems to complete the action of doubling. Unless we are 
reading very carefully, we find ourselves engaged in 
"ploughing most of the fields of the Cotentin" and going to 
Mass in "every parish church in Normandy." Moreover, we are 
"helping to build the Abbey Church at Mont-Saint-Michel."
We are not visiting an alien land at all, but looking out 
over "hills and woods, the farms and fields of Normandy" 
which are suddenly "so familiar, so homelike" that we feel 
that we have "known life once in them," and "never so fully 
known it since." The Uncle's "we" enfolds not only the 
present audience of nieces, but all of the arithmetical 
ancestors that Adams has conjured in his mirror of history. 
In the first three paragraphs of the first chapter, Adams 
has apparently managed to expand the Uncle-narrator and a 
single niece into a majestic "we of the eleventh century." 
The complication is that we have only journeyed in the 
conditional mode. The imaginative union of ourselves and our
numerous imaginary ancestors hangs on Adams's "If we could 
go back and live again" and its complement— "we should find 
ourselves doing many surprising things." Even if we miss the 
conditional base that this edifice of imaginary flight is 
built upon, we should notice that the tense has shifted to 
the past. From the moment we conditionally cross the "bridge 
of ages" and claim the coast of Normandy as an extension of 
the coast of New England, we are in the lost terrain of the 
past. We "were" a "great part" of the Church. We "stood" at 
the "world's center." "We were a serious race." And yet, we 
have not made the journey at all. Adams has trapped us in a 
web of words: "All this time we have been standing on the 
parvis. looking out over the sea and sands...or turning at 
times towards the church door which is the pons seclorum. 
the bridge of ages between us and our ancestors" (MSM, 347) 
We are like Esther, looking down into the falls at Niagara, 
and feeling the waters roar over us, but unable to leap.
Yet, "for the present, we are in the eleventh century," 
"tenants of the Duke or of the Church, or of small feudal 
lords." We are "helping to quarry granite for the Abbey 
Church." Adams recreates the life of a world in which we, 
like Old Esther Dudley, move as ghosts: "the year is 1058," 
but we have only begun to "get our minds into a condition" 
to cross the fatal bridge over time. What follows is not the 
completion of a Wordsworthian journey, but a sort of 
Adamsian crash landing. Adams moves from our stance on the
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parvis not to some reunification but to a tale of builders
who overreached themselves.
Yet in 102 0 Norman art was already too 
ambitious. Certainly nine hundred years 
leave their traces on granite as well as 
on other material, but the granite of 
Abbot Hildebert would have stood 
securely enough if the Abbot had not 
asked too much from it. Perhaps he asked 
too much of the Archangel, for the 
thought of the Archangel's superiority 
was clearly the inspiration of his 
plan...the structure might perhaps have 
proved strong enough...had not fashions 
in architecture changed in the great 
epoch of building...when Abbot Robert de 
Torigny thought proper to reconstruct 
the west front, and build out two towers 
on its flanks. The towers were no doubt 
beautiful... but their weight broke down 
the vaulting beneath, and one of them 
fell in 1300. In 1618 the whole facade 
began to give way, and in 1776 not only 
the facade but also three of the seven 
spans of the nave were pulled down. Of 
Abbot Hildebert's nave, only four arches 
remain.
(MSM, 347-48)
Just as we as the niece-audience have failed to bridge the 
seas of self and past, the abbots sought to erect overly 
ambitious architectural enterprises that were doomed to fail 
and fall. The legend of Babel, with its tower that was to 
have its "top in the heavens"14 informs Adams's account of 
the falling towers of medieval cathedrals, partly because 
Adams's medieval towers are used to suggest the 
fragmentation of Aquinas's synthesis of the possibilities 
of reason and revelation. After Babel, the single language 
which had represented unity among all men was lost. After
the nominalists of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth 
centuries, universality of meaning in language was lost; the 
via antiqua of Aquinas and those who followed him gave way 
to the via moderna of Scotus, and, in particular, of Ockham. 
Through the conditional phrasing that forms the bridge into 
our journey, Adams has taken us to the heights of a tower 
that is built on an insufficient linguistic foundation. We 
fall as it falls, and see our fall emblematically mirrored 
all around us. And, as readers, we have to pause over 
Adams's dates. In 13 00, the Papacy was on the eve of the 
crisis known as the Babylonian Captivity. The compromise 
provided by Aquinas had come to seem somewhat insufficient. 
Meister Eckhart was active, and in the more intellectual 
reaches of the Church, the philosophic quarrel over 
nominalism, which dominates the last three chapters of Mt. 
St. Michel and Chartres, was about to erupt— a crisis which 
would continue in overt form until at least 1500. Adams's 
second date, 1618, marks the advent of the heyday of 
European colonization in the new world as well as any date 
in the first two decades of the seventeenth century, while 
1776, for an American historian and an American niece, is 
the inescapable moment when an entire country was embodied 
as a construction of mind. The failure of the medieval 
architects is replicated in the failure of the architecture 
of the modern world. Adams has constructed a parable of 
late medieval and early modern intellectual history. The
fallen towers and the fallen choir, which gave way in 1421
"in the midst of the English wars," were replaced by "an
exuberant choir of latest gothic, finished in 1521" (MSM,
351) . Adams compares the Romanesque arches of .1058 to an
elderly man who lives pleasantly with the "beautiful woman"
of the choir of 1521. The primary difference between the
two, who harmonize pleasantly enough, is produced by the
displacement of the "simple, serious, silent dignity and
energy" of the eleventh century by "something more
complicated...graceful, self-conscious, rhetorical, and
beautiful as perfect rhetoric." The self-consciousness of
the tower mirrors the emerging shape of self-conscious
individualism in being and language alike, and replaces the
"naivete" of the masculine principle of pure action
represented by Saint Michael the Archangel. The
complications of the sixteenth-century choir cannot be
explored; our present journey awaits us, even though we have
just seen that we will never be able to embark upon it.
...we have no time to run off into the 
sixteenth century: we have still to 
learn the alphabet of art in France. One 
must live deep in the eleventh century 
in order to understand the twelfth, and 
even after passing years in the twelfth, 
we shall find the thirteenth in many 
ways a world of its own, with a beauty 
not always inherited, and sometimes not 
bequeathed.
(MSM. 352)
The attraction of these medieval regions— if only we could 
reach them— is that, for those whose "lives have been a
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broken arch," the simplicity of the Norman style has an
attraction. They "feel this repose and self-restraint as
they feel nothing else."
The quiet strength of these curved 
lines, the solid support of these heavy 
columns, the moderate proportions, even 
the modified lights,the absence of 
display, of effort, of self- 
consciousness satisfy them as no other 
art does. They come back to it to rest, 
after a long circle of pilgrimage,— the 
cradle of rest from which their 
ancestors started. Even here they find 
the repose none too deep.
(MSM, 349)
Looking at the simplicity of the Romanesque more closely, 
however, the uncle and his nieces find not repose, but a 
fierce and combative assertion of the unity of "Church and 
State, Soul and Body, God and Man." We feel only "the 
Archangel and the Unity of God" (MSM. 349). The realm of 
"private affairs," of the modern and alienated subject, is 
completely secondary in this irrecoverable world to the 
single mission of God, Church, and Sovereign. Unfortunately, 
all that presents itself to Uncle and niece are the ruins of 
that lost world of unity. "The simple, serious, silent 
dignity and energy of the eleventh century have gone"(MSM.
3 52). Rather than a landscape of artifacts restored through 
imagination, we find only "a mutilated trunk of an eleventh- 
century church" (MSM. 351). At Mont-Saint-Michel we have 
attained not to a vision of unity, but to Browning's ruined 
chapel in a landscape that is empty of meaning.
Adams next proposes to restore the Chanson de Roland 
for us. This venture looks more hopeful; the study of 
literature rests on the assumption that we can reclaim 
texts, and poetry, we assume, can be restored to at least a 
semblance of meaning. Moreover, we know that Adams made all 
of his own translations in the most exacting manner 
possible. Having been assured that "the Chanson is in poetry 
what the Mount is in architecture" (MSM. 3 53) we prepare to 
attempt a second journey, this time into a literary 
landscape. Adams begins his second chapter not with the 
Chanson de Roland, but with the Roman du Mont Saint Michel. 
As uncle, he cheerfully advises us nieces that "if the 
spelling is corrected, the verses read still almost as 
easily as Voltaire; more easily than Verlaine, and much like 
a nursery rhyme" (MSM. 354). Adams hesitates over the 
translations; translation is a necessary "evil," provided 
only in order to "lift" lazy tourists and nieces "over the 
rough spots, even when roughness is beauty." Having 
nonetheless provided a translation, Adams then announces 
that "one's translation is sure to be full of gross 
blunders, but the supreme blunder is that of translating at 
all when one is trying to catch not a fact but a feeling" 
(MSM. 354-55). Adams then proceeds to provide a translation 
of another fragment of a roman. only to tell us that if we 
are "not satisfied with this translation, any scholar of 
French will easily help make a better, for we...would rather
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be inaccurate in such matters than not" (MSM. 356). As 
readers and mental travellers, we are awash in translations 
whose worth is questioned even in the moment they appear 
before our eyes. Adams claims that he wants to demonstrate 
in the poetry the qualities that he admired in the Abbey 
Church.
The qualities of the architecture 
reproduce themselves in the song: the 
same directness, simplicity, absence of 
self-consciousness; the same intensity 
of purpose; even the same material.
(MSM. 369)
Adams presents us with fragments of the poems, while
continuing to remind us that it is almost as futile to try
to read medieval French poetry as it is to try to translate
it. Adams then translates the Chanson de Roland while
extending his discussion of the "evil" of translation. He
informs us that the Chanson and its language belong to a
separate narrative universe.
Of course the full value of the verse 
cannot be regained. One knows neither 
how it was sung nor even how it was 
pronounced. The assonances are beyond 
recovering; the 'laisse,' or leash of 
verses or assonances with the concluding 
cry,'Aoi,' has long ago vanished from 
verse or song.
(MSM. 364)
Our journey through seas of imagination is taking us only to 
ruined, "truncated" churches and presenting us only with 
poems full of the archaic sounds of lost words from dead 
languages. In the discussion of Gothic art which begins in
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Chapter III, Adams once again portrays the shift from
Romanesque to Gothic architecture in terms of sex.
The difference of sex is not imaginary.
In 1058 when the triumphal columns were 
building, and Taillefer sang to William 
the Bastard and Harold the Saxon, Roland 
still prayed his mea culpa to God the 
Father and gave not a thought to Alda 
his betrothed. In the twelfth century 
Saint Bernard recited "Ave Stella Maris” 
in an ecstasy of miracle before the 
image of the Virgin, and the armies of 
France in battle cried Notre-Dame-Saint- 
Denis-Montjoie. What the roman could not 
express flowered into the gothic; what 
the masculine mind could not idealize in 
the warrior, it idealized in the 
woman...
(MSM. 372-373)
Adams saw in the architectural compromise between Romanesque
and Gothic an emblem of erotic conjunction between male and
female: "the strength and the grace join hands; the man and
woman love each other still." In this harmony of masculine
force of will and feminine receptivity there was the
strength of the mvsterium coniunctionis. For Adams,
modernity is conceived in the decadence that attends the
loss of balance between the inner world of the Virgin and
the outer world of the Saint.
When men no longer felt the passion, 
they fell back on themselves, or lower.
The architects returned to the round 
arch, and even further to the flatness 
of the Greek colonnade, but this was not 
the fault of the twelfth or thirteenth 
centuries. What they had to say they 
said; what they felt they expressed; and 
if the seventeenth century forgot it, 
the twentieth in turn has forgotten the
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seventeenth. History is only a catalogue 
of the forgotten.
(MSM. 373)
Even as he affirms the world of the Archangel and the 
Virgin, however, Adams relentlessly carries us through 
buildings whose rooms have lost their names. The levels of 
the refectory, for example, look promising, but "every 
writer gives these rooms different names, and assigns them 
different purposes." In other words, the tourist brings a 
ready-made set of names for what he will encounter with him, 
in his travel bag. With the cathedral and the abbey, the 
refectory has the capacity to provide "an exceedingly 
liberal education for anybody... and would make the fortune 
of an intelligent historian, if such should happen to 
exist." Unfortunately, this medieval Scarlet Letter of a 
structure cannot perform its office at all. Adams insists 
that we are not looking for education, but for "poetry," but 
even that is not available; "here is only the shell— the 
dead art— and silence" (MSM, 377-78).
When we finally reach Chartres, we find that this 
journey is no more rewarding than the previous ones. With 
grim irony, Adams notes that, children of modernity that we 
are, we will no doubt prefer the more elaborate— and more 
modern— northern spire to the southern spire. The architect 
of 1500 has committed a sort of atrocity, in Adams's eyes, 
in order to keep his "self-respect." The newer spire
introduces the element of self“consciousness; the old 
affirms the original architectural unity of the church as a 
whole. And, once in the Church, unless we accept the 
"divine right in the Queen of Heaven, apart from the 
Trinity, yet one with it, Chartres is unintelligible" (MSM. 
414). Adams evokes the image of the ubiquitous presence of 
the Virgin in the building of the Church, and the careless 
reader is almost seduced into believing that Adams is once 
again using the magical capacities of language to evoke her 
presence. The Uncle affirms for us that "the Virgin was 
actually and constantly present in the building of 
Chartres...directing the architects" (MSM. 438). He also 
tells us that "it is this direction that we are going to 
study if you have now got a realizing sense of what it 
meant" (MSM. 438). Of course, Adams has taken pains to show 
us that the "burden of custom" (MSM. 424) and of our self- 
consciousness prevents our ever being able to acquire such a 
sense. The success of our journey depends on yet another 
conditional construction. If we are able to sense the truth 
of what we see, then we can study. If not, another abyss 
looms before us, for "without this sense, the church is 
dead," and the "pleasure consists not in seeing the death, 
but in feeling the life" (MSM. 438). Far from seeing the 
children "sport upon the shore" we move only from abyss to 
abyss. The possibility of meaning is forever being 
proffered, but is always deferred.
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By the time the Uncle is ready to tell us about the
glass at Chartres, he warns us that we "had better stop
here...unless you are willing to feel that Chartres was made
what it is, not by the artist, but by the Virgin" (MSM.
459). We do not stop, however, even when the Uncle warns
again that we are doomed to failure.
Therefore, let us plod on, laboriously 
proving God, although, even to Saint 
Bernard and Pascal, God was incapable of 
proof; and using such material as the 
books furnish for help. It is not 
much...One knows not even where to seek.
(MSM. 459-60)
We are reduced to a quest for fragmentary works which might 
make the glass easier to understand, although Adams warns us 
that since modern viewers tend to expect everything to 
depend on perspective, our attempts to understand are flawed 
at best, for "perspective does not enter into a twelfth- 
century window more than into a Japanese picture" (MSM.
463). The difficulty of the modern audience is that 
"everyone who has lived since the sixteenth century has felt 
deep distrust of everyone who lived before it" (MSM. 469- 
70). The Uncle claims to believe that the Virgin answered 
both pleas and questions, but even though he assures us that 
we, too, will feel her presence if we will "only consent to 
feel like a child," (MSM. 504-05) he assumes that we are 
incapable of feeling like children. Yet another conditional 
phrase intrudes.
240
...you, or any other lost soul, could, 
if you cared to look and listen, feel a 
sense beyond the human ready to reveal a 
sense divine that would make the world 
once more intelligible, and would bring 
the Virgin to life again, in all the 
depths of feeling which she shows 
here,...more eloquent than the prayer- 
book, and more beautiful than the autumn 
sunlight; and any one willing to try 
could feel it like the child, reading 
new thought without end into the art he 
has studied a hundred times.
(MSM. 505)
The revelation once again depends on a willingness to lose 
ourselves in the mysteries of faith through the Church— the 
same possibility that faced Adams's Esther. And, in the 
familiar formulation, if we fail to make that choice we 
"shatter the whole art by calling into it a single motive of 
[our] own" (MSM. 505) . The phenomenon that dooms the 
medieval sense of unity and separates us from it is that of 
self-conscious individualism.
Throughout Mt. St. Michel and Chartres. Adams presents 
us with the impossibility of recapturing the faith that made 
the architecture and glass of medieval France possible. The 
modern reader imposes the alien values of perspective on 
medieval art. Worse, he carries the alienating phenomenon of 
self-consciousness with him, and unintentionally imposes 
himself on the already nebulous centuries, thereby placing 
whatever it was they had to show him out of reach. A 
prisoner of the ideology of enlightenment, he demands facts 
and figures and accurate translations. As a result, when we
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leave the Court of the Queen of Heaven, we have failed 
entirely in our effort to cross the pons seclorum to our 
ancestors.
We have done with Chartres. For seven 
hundred years Chartres has seen 
pilgrims, coming and going more or less 
like us, and will perhaps see them for 
another seven hundred years; but we 
shall see it no more, and can safely 
leave the Virgin in her majesty, with 
her three great prophets on either hand, 
as calm and confident in their own 
strength and in God's providence as they 
were when Saint Louis was born, but 
looking down from a deserted heaven, 
into an empty church, on a dead faith.
(MSM. 522)
Adams's project in the next three chapters is to take
us away from the shrines of Gothic into the literary
landscape of the medieval romance and the legends of the
miracles of the Virgin. The uncle tells us that this should
not be an alien terrain.
After worshipping at the shrines of 
Saint Michael on his Mount and of the 
Virgin at Chartres, one may wander far 
and wide over France, and seldom feel 
lost; all later Gothic art comes 
naturally, and no new thought disturbs 
the perfected form.
(MSM. 523)
Unfortunately "tourists of English blood and American 
training" tend to get lost anyway. Their tendency to 
rationalize defeats their study of secular literature as 
surely as it defeated our study of architecture and glass.
The twelfth and thirteenth centuries, 
studied in the pure light of political
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economy are insane. The scientific mind 
is atrophied, and suffers under 
inherited weakness, when it comes in 
contact with the eternal woman,— ■
Astarte, Isis, Demeter, Aphrodite, and 
the last and greatest deity of all, the 
Virgin...
(MSM. 523)
Adams's avowed concern in these chapters is the "whole
subject of sex," and he intends to reverse Pope's claim that
the "proper study of man is man" by announcing that the
"proper study of man is woman" (MSM. 523). Adams's
fascination condemns him to bask in ignorance: "we do not,
and never can, know the twelfth-century woman, or for that
matter, any other woman" (MSM. 537). The legends of medieval
woman that Adams spins are tales of power, in which women
whom he overtly describes as "masculine" rule in triumph. In
the androgyny of the medieval warrior woman Adams sees a
figuring of the world of sense, and it is that wholeness
that is lost for him in the Reformation. Adams's claim that
the Virgin sealed mankind and God in an unbroken circle is
not so different from Steven Ozment's recognition that the
Protestant Reformation was a "revolution in religion" that
opened up an abyss between man and God which had been filled
with a host of ritual practices that were designed to take
the believer from birth to death.
In the first half of the sixteenth 
century cities and territories passed 
laws and ordinances that progressively 
ended or severely limited a host of 
traditional beliefs, practices, and 
institutions that touched directly the
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daily life of large numbers of people: 
mandatory fasting; auricular confession; 
the veneration of saints, relics, and 
images; the buying and selling of 
indulgences; pilgrimages and shrines; 
wakes and processions for the dead and 
dying; the doctrine of purgatory; Latin 
Mass and liturgy; traditional 
ceremonies, festivals, and holidays; 
monasteries, nunneries, and mendicant 
orders; the sacramental status of 
marriage; extreme unction, confirmation, 
holy orders, and penance; clerical 
celibacy; clerical immunity from civil 
taxation and criminal jurisdiction; 
nonresident benefices; papal 
excommunication and interdict; canon 
law; papal and episcopal territorial 
government; and the traditional 
scholastic education of the clergy.15
The spirit of reform affected virtually every country 
in Europe, whether its people remained loyal to Rome in the 
traditional sense or became reformers. All the beliefs, 
practices, and institutions of the medieval world whose 
conceptual unity Adams had admired and which had given 
security and foreordained meaning to the lives of the 
faithful for a millennium were either called into question 
or displaced. The Protestant quest for a disenchanted world 
paved the way to a belief in God that was dependent upon the 
subject's ability to conceive of him, rather than upon 
those reliable systems of ritual and sacrament that led man 
by certain steps back to the Augustinian country of the 
soul. Adams is probably quite right when he insists that the 
Virgin was the tangible embodiment of the accessibility of 
the realm of the sacred.
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The fact, conspicuous above all other 
historical certainties about religion, 
that the Virgin was by essence 
illogical, unreasonable and feminine, is 
the only fact of any ultimate value 
worth studying, and starts a number of 
questions that history has shown itself 
clearly afraid to touch. Protestant and 
Catholic differ little in that 
respect... Why were all the Protestant 
churches cold failures without her help?
Why could not the Holy Ghost,— the 
spirit of Love and Grace,— equally 
answer their prayers? Why was the son 
powerless? Why was Chartres Cathedral, 
like Lourdes today— the expression of 
what is in substance a separate 
religion? Why did the gentle and 
gracious Virgin Mother so exasperate the 
Pilgrim Father? Why was the Woman struck 
out of the Church and ignored in the 
State? These questions are not 
antiquarian or trifling...they tug at 
the very heartstrings of all that makes 
whatever order is in the cosmos. If a 
Unity exists, in which and towards which 
all energies centre, it must explain and 
include Duality, Diversity, Infinity, —
Sex!
(MSM. 582-83)
For Adams, the Virgin, "illogical, unreasonable, and 
feminine," "struck out of the Church and ignored in the 
State" was everything that the enlighteners, starting with 
the Reformers, had wanted to weed out of human existence. In 
old age, Adams claimed to have been "struck by Zeno's 
arrow," and avowed his faith in the Stoics. His attraction 
to the Virgin is of a piece with his attraction to the 
Stoics. Adams's commentary on the miracles of the Virgin and 
her mysterious presence in medieval life is part of his 
private effort to reverse the dualistic bent of western
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philosophy. In The Logic of Sense. Gilles Deleuze explains
that the philosophy of the Stoics "displaces all
reflection." The Stoics, like Adams himself, were in search
of the Something that "subsumes being and non-being,
existence and inherence."
...the Stoics were the first to reverse 
Platonism...for if bodies with their 
states, qualities, and quantities, 
assume all the characteristics of 
substance and cause...the 
characteristics of the Idea are 
relegated to the ...[the realm of] 
impassive extra-Being, which is sterile, 
inefficacious, and on the surface of 
things: the ideational or the 
incorporeal can no longer be anything 
other than an 'effect.'16
Adams was, of course, not entirely accurate in saying that
the Middle Ages exalted women. As David Noble has shown in
A World Without Women: The Christian Clerical Culture of
Western Science, women did play a significant role in the
first millennium of the Christian era, particularly in the
"culture of learning." Priests were commonly married during
this period, and the androgynous ideal of Johannes Scotus
Erigena— the idea that at the Resurrection, sex would be
abolished and nature reunified— was viewed seriously. All of
this, as Adams suggests in his images of vaulting towers and
the gradual emergence of self-consciousness in Gothic
architecture, began to change as the ideal of clerical
asceticism evolved. As the works of Aristotle were
recovered, and as Aquinas engaged in what William Wallace
calls the "aristotelianization of Christianity"17 which,
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once entrenched in universities, spread outward, the power
and position of women receded. In the Renaissance, as the
state gradually merged with or replaced the Church, women
were, in fact eclipsed in exactly the way that Adams
suggests that they were. There was no counterpart in
Renaissance society as constituted by the state for the
powerful feudal noblewoman of an earlier century.
'As the state came to organize 
Renaissance society...a new division 
between personal and public life made 
itself felt...the bourgeois sex-role 
system, placing man in the public sphere 
and the patrician woman in the home. '
Cultural and political power fell 
increasingly into the hands of men.18
Adams recognized the tremendous losses that had attended
upon the emergence of what would eventually triumph as
bourgeois individualism, and he found the roots of the loss
in the philosophy that dominates the final three chapters of
Mt. St. Michel and Chartres. Adams begins the philosophic
journey that leads to the Reformation and modernity's
deification of empirical science with Abelard. In Abelard,
Adams finds the same questions that haunt him, as well as
one of the last of his doubles of himself.
Time has settled few or none of the
essential points of dispute. Science 
hesitates, more visibly than the Church 
ever did, to decide once for all whether 
unity or diversity is the ultimate law; 
whether order or chaos is the governing 
rule of the universe, if universe there 
is; whether anything except phenomena, 
exists. Even in matters more vital to 
society, one dares not speak too loud.
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Why, and for what, and to whom is man a 
responsible agent?... Science only 
repeats what the Church said to Abelard, 
that where we know so little, we had 
better hold our tongues.
(MSM. 611)
For Adams, Abelard is the "portal of approach to Gothic
thought," just as the "west portal of Chartres is the door
through which one must of necessity enter the Gothic
architecture of the thirteenth century." In Adams's vision
of the history of western philosophy, Abelard's work is
extended and completed in the work of Albertus Magnus and
Thomas Aguinas (MSM. 607). The convulsion in medieval
schools of philosophy that Adams centers in Abelard was the
debate over Universals which Adams also sees as having been
at the root of the emergence of modern philosophy.
According to the latest authorities, the 
doctrine of Universals ...has never 
received an adequate answer. What is a 
species? What is a genus or a family or 
an order? More or less convenient terms 
of classification, about which the 
twelfth century cared very little, while 
it cared deeply about the essence of 
classes! Science has become too complex 
to affirm the existence of universal 
truths, but it strives for nothing else, 
and disputes the problem as earnestly 
as in the twelfth century, when the 
whole field of human and superhuman 
activity was shut between these barriers 
of Substance, Universals, and 
Particulars. The schools knew that their 
society hung for life on the 
demonstration that God, the ultimate 
Universal, was a reality, out of which 
all other universal truths or realities
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sprang. Truth was a real thing, outside 
of human experience.
(MSM. 611)
In Adams's explanation of the nominalist controversy, the
nominalists, or terminists, and the realists found their
philosophic origin at opposite points: "one, from the
ultimate substance, God,— -the Universal, the Ideal, the
Type;" and the other from "the Individual, Socrates, the
Concrete, the observed Fact of experience" (MSM. 613). The
realists, whom Adams represents in the person of William of
Champeaux, asserted that the Universal was "a real thing."
Abelard declared that the "Universal was only nominally
real." Truth for Abelard was merely the "sum of all possible
facts that are truth;" while truth for William of Champeaux
was, like "virtue" and "humanity," a real "unit and
reality." As he contrasts the two thinkers, Adams performs
another of his imaginative feats, extending his discussion
outward in the history of philosophy.
The Ideal bed is a Form, made by God, 
said Plato. The Ideal bed is a name, 
imagined by ourselves, says Aristotle.'I 
start from the Universe,' said William.
'I start from the Atom,' said 
Abelard...William of Champeaux, 
lecturing on dialectics or logic comes 
to the question of Universals, which he 
says are substances. Starting from the 
highest substance, God, all Being 
descends through created substances by 
stages...Humanity being like other 
essences or substances, indivisible, 
passes wholly into each individual, 
becoming Socrates, Plato,
Aristotle...Abelard turns the idea 
round, and infers from it that since
249
Socrates carries all Humanity in him, he 
carries Plato, too, and both must be in 
the same place, though Socrates is at 
Athens and Plato in Rome.
(MSM. 614)
As Adams points out, in the universe described by the 
Nominalists, truth and virtue and charity did not exist, 
and, while individual identity was a starting point, God 
could only exist as "an echo of your own ignorance;" the 
Trinity could be said to exist only "as a sound or a 
symbol."
In truth, pure Nominalism-— if, indeed, 
anyone ever maintained it,— afforded no 
cover whatever. Nor did Abelard's 
Concept help the matter... Conceptualism 
was a device, like the false wooden 
roof, to cover and conceal an inherent 
weakness of construction. Unity either 
is, or is not. If soldiers, no matter in 
what number, can never make an army, and 
worshippers, though in millions, do not 
make a Church, and all humanity united 
would not necessarily constitute a 
State, equally little can their 
concepts, individual, or united, 
constitute, the one or the other. Army,
Church, State, each is an organic whole, 
complex beyond all possible addition of 
unity, and not a Concept at all, but 
rather an animal that thinks, creates, 
devours, and destroys. The attempt to 
bridge the chasm between multiplicity 
and Unity is the oldest problem of 
philosophy, but the flimsiest bridge of 
all is the human Concept, unless, 
somewhere, within or beyond it, an 
energy not individual is hidden; and in 
that case the old question instantly 
reappears:— -What is that Energy?
(MSM. 620-21)
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In this single paragraph Adams outlines the entirety of his
philosophic quest. From Abelard, Adams makes an easy jump to
Descartes and Pascal: "The twelfth century had already
reached the point where the seventeenth stood when Descartes
renewed the attempt to give a solid, philosophical basis for
deism by his celebrated "Coqito ergo sum."
Although that ultimate fact seemed new 
to Europe when Descartes revived it as 
the starting point of all his 
demonstrations it was as old and 
familiar as Saint Augustine to the 
twelfth century, and as little 
conclusive as any other assumption of 
the Ego or Non-Ego. The schools argued 
according to their tastes from Unity to 
Multiplicity or from Multiplicity to 
Unity; but what they wanted was to 
connect the two. They tried Realism and 
found that it led to Pantheism. They 
tried Nominalism and found that it led 
to materialism. They attempted a 
compromise in Conceptualism...Then they 
lay down, exhausted. In the seventeenth 
century the same violent struggle broke 
out again, and wrung from Pascal the 
famous outcry of despair in which the 
French language rose, perhaps for the 
last time, to the grand style of the 
twelfth century.
(MSM, 639-40)
Adams's treatise on the mystics, which forms his bridge 
between Abelard and Aquinas is less focused on medieval 
mysticism than it is on Pascal and Descartes and the despair 
that accompanies the "true Promethean lyric" of modernity. 
And the chapter ends not with any affirmation, but with 
Saint Francis's remembering to thank "our sister death," the
"long-sought, never-found sister of the schoolmen, who
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solved all philosophy and merged Multiplicity in Unity”
(MSM. 661).
Mt. St. Michel and Chartres concludes with Adams's
treatment of the thirteenth century, and the vast
architectonic structure of Aquinas's philosophical
compromise. "What the schools called Form, what science
calls Energy, and what the intermediate period called the
evidence of Design, made the foundation of Saint Thomas's
cathedral" (MSM. 608). Aquinas followed Abelard in insisting
that "dimensional quantity is a principle of individuation."
The soul is thus an energy that exists in matter. This was
of course, a controversial stance, and it was one that
Aquinas proceeded to modify, but the initial assertion was
enough to ensure the emergence and triumph of fourteenth-
century nominalists like Duns Scotus and Ockham. In the
renewal of the quarrel over the duality of mind and matter
of body and spirit, Adams saw even in the midst of St.
Thomas's unity the demise of the medieval world.
As early as the fourteenth century signs 
of unsteadiness appeared, and before the 
eighteenth century, unity became only a 
reminiscence...The architects of the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries took 
the Church and the Universe for truths, 
and tried to express them in a structure 
which should be final. Knowing by an 
enormous experience precisely where the 
strains were to come, they enlarged 
their scale to the utmost point of 
material endurance, lightening the load, 
and distributing the burden until the 
gutters and gargoyles... all do work 
either for the arch or for the eye; and 
every inch of material, up and down,
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from crypt to vault, from Man to God, 
from the Universe to the atom, has its 
task, giving support where support was 
needed or weight where concentration was 
felt, but always with the condition of 
showing...to the eye the great lines 
that led to Unity and the curves which 
controlled divergence...one idea 
controlled every line; and this is as 
true of Saint Thomas's Church as it is 
of Amiens Cathedral... the result was an 
art marked by singular unity, which 
endured and served its purpose until man 
changed his attitude toward the 
universe.
(MSM, 694-95)
In the final passages of "Thomas Aquinas" Adams achieves a 
unity of his own, but it is a nominalistic assertion of the 
power of the artist to assert what he wants on his material. 
The shape of the cathedral and the claims of Saint Thomas's 
philosophy are revealed explicitly to be what Adams has 
shown them to be throughout our failed voyage--mirrors of 
one another and of a world view in which meanings were 
engineered by man, not created by God.
Adams intended Mt. St. Michel and The Education of 
Henry Adams to be read together. As he prepared one hundred 
quarto volumes of Mt. St. Michel for private distribution he 
wrote one recipient that "the two volumes go together, as I 
think of them, and the one is meaningless without the other" 
(Letters. VI, 102). While he was sending the volumes out 
for "correction," as he claimed, he also wrote his niece, 
Louisa Hooper, whose sister had just had a baby, that 
"nieces are fatal in the long run" (Letters. VI, 106).
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Adams had found St. Francis's and Quentin Compson's little
sister death on his journey in the company of constructed
nieces in Mt. St. Michel, and intended to bring her home to
America in the Education. His plan for the Education was
characteristically cryptic, and ambitious. In thanking James
Ford Rhodes for his "gratifying comments" on his "attempt to
realise the Unity of Thought in the Thirteenth Century,"
Adams explains that the Education is a much more "risky
experiment."
If you can imagine a centipede running 
along in twenty little sections (each 
with a little mathematical formula 
carefully concealed in its stomach) to 
the bottom of a hill; and then 
laboriously climbing in fifteen sections 
more (each with a new mathematical 
problem carefully concealed in its 
stomach), till it can get up on a hill 
an inch or two high, so as to see ahead 
a half an inch or so,— you will 
understand in advance all that the 
Education has to say. You will 
understand also why I believe the 
literary problem insoluble, and keep the 
experiment private.
Adams went on to explain to Rhodes that, in fact, the "two
works are designed as one, but no one will ever find it out
except the author" (Letters, VI, 117). As usual, Adams
described the work differently to different people. He wrote
William James that it was a "literary experiment," and "an
old story of an American drama." He explained what he called
the work's "failure" by claiming that form was an
unattainable ideal in the modern world.
254
Did you ever read the Confessions of St.
Augustine or of Cardinal de Retz, or of 
Rousseau, or of Benvenuto Cellini, or 
even of my dear Gibbon? Of them all, I 
think St. Augustine alone has an idea of 
literary form,— a notion of writing a
story with an end and an object, not for
the sake of the object, but for the 
form, like a romance. I have worked ten 
years to satisfy myself that the thing 
cannot be done today. The world does not 
furnish the contrasts or the emotion.
(Letters, VI, 118-20)
While the form of Chartres, which Adams described as the
only thing he had written that was worth reading, reflected
the final unity of the architecture it was intended to 
mirror, the Education could reflect only the open form of 
the triumph of the nominalist view of existence. Form is 
only a relative thing in the narrative universe of the 
twentieth century, and thus Adams describes the form of the 
Education as either a failed form, or, more accurately, as a 
"provisional form."
The most haunting claim about the Education is the 
counterpart of Adams's humorous remark that "nieces are 
fatal." In a letter to Henry James that has since becomes 
famous, Adams explained that the volume was a "mere shield 
of protection in the grave," and that James should "take 
[his] own life in the same way, in order to prevent 
biographers from taking it in theirs." Adams also claimed 
that the last three chapters of the volume were intended as 
"a completion and mathematical working out to Q.E.D. of the 
three concluding chapters" of Mt. St. Michel and Chartres.
Adams's vitriolic response to his reading of James's 
life of William Story which I have discussed in the previous 
chapter seems to have reflected a preoccupation with life- 
writing for Adams in late 1903, when he was preparing to 
print Mt. St. Michel. In Mt. St. Michel and Chartres Adams 
contrived to escape from the political arena which, as his 
letters suggest, continued to be a primary focus of his 
thought. As he worked away on Mt. St. Michel, he wrote 
Charles Milnes Gaskell that he felt that he must perform the 
•'pious duty" of writing a "letter of sympathy" about 
"Morley's murder of Gladstone." (Letters, V, 521). Adams was 
referring not to Gladstone's actual death, which had 
occurred in 1898, but to what Adams saw as a posthumous 
murder and second entombment in John Morley's three-volume 
Life of William Ewart Gladstone which had just been 
published. Adams notes that his own "few remaining white 
hairs" "stiffen[ed] with horror" at the biographical notes 
that Gladstone himself had provided for Morley. In 
particular, he notes Gladstone's willingness to tell Morley 
that he had made a mistake in declaring in the midst of the 
American Civil War that "Jefferson Davis had made a nation." 
This, Adams notes, would only be an appropriate admission 
"to a priest in the confessional, acting for a respectable 
deity who can't be hurt" (Letters. V, 517).
The focus of Adams's thoughts was in part a response to 
contemporary political events and in part the result of his
first-hand encounters with imperialism in his travels in the 
South Seas. His close friends, Henry Cabot Lodge and John 
Hay, were living their lives at the forefront of American 
politics. As Secretary of State for Theodore Roosevelt, Hay 
was more than aware of the military intelligence that had 
aided Philippe Bunau-Varilla, the chief representative of 
the Panama Canal Company, in the rebellion that separated 
Panama from Colombia. The U.S. Navy, with the full knowledge 
of Hay and Roosevelt, managed to block the sea lanes that 
would have enabled Colombia to engage in the only military 
response it could make, since the land routes to the isthmus 
led through the tangled routes of an almost impenetrable 
jungle. Hay managed not only to justify the rebellion, but 
immediately recognized the new Republic, and within a matter 
of days received Bunau-Varilla as its first ambassador.
While Ernest Samuels attests to Hay's doubts about his role 
in "'stealing Panama," and Hay repeatedly attempted to resign 
his office, the fact remains that he assisted Roosevelt in 
his efforts to subdue what Roosevelt regarded as a lesser—  
he was given to referring to the Colombians as "dagoes" and 
"contemptible little creatures— "19 and inconveniently 
located people. Unfortunately, the Colombians happened to 
stand in the way of the political aims of the latest version 
of the Enlightenment Project— that of widening the sphere of 
American commerce through an imperialistic endeavor that was 
to facilitated through the use of technology. Adams knew of
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the continual intrigues in the Roosevelt White House, and
repeatedly advised Hay that he should remain at his post.
Adams's reasoning was that Hay could temper Roosevelt's
tendency to make rash decisions. Nevertheless, within a week
of Hay's reception of Panama's new ambassador, and amid his
musings to other friends on the nature of biography, Adams
wrote Hay that he should read both the Story and the
Gladstone biographies so that he could "reflect" on what his
own fate might be.
Please read Harry James's Life of Story!
Also Morley's Gladstone! And reflect—  
wretched man!— that now you have 
knowingly forced yourself to be 
biographised! You cannot escape the 
biographer. When I read,— standing 
behind the curtain— these repetitions of 
life, flabby and foolish as I am:— when 
I try to glug-glug down my snuffling 
mucous membrane these lumps of cold 
calves'-head and boiled pork fat, then I 
know what you will suffer for your sin, 
and I see President Quiensabe of 
Colombia revenged...I foresee plainly, 
that the biographer's work on you will 
be strychnine. You will be convulsive.
You and the biographer together will 
make eternity solemn. When I think how 
all my friends are skewered, and how 
dreary poor Lowell and Story and 
Monckton Milnes and Motley and Sumner 
and Lincoln and Seward and I look in our 
cages with pins stuck through us to keep 
the lively attitude of nature, I smile 
grimly and see you turn ghastly green.
CLetters. V, 526)
Adams was seeing the brightest men of his generation 
corrupted in the same way that statesmen like Washington and 
Jefferson and John and John Quincy Adams and the characters
who were allegorized in Democracy had each in their way 
been either corrupted or destroyed by political life. An 
earlier generation had believed that in inventing America 
on the Enlightenment model they had somehow designed it so 
that it might be freed from the patterns of history. Adams 
seems to have seen Theodore Roosevelt's foreign policy as 
the certain proof that his generation was not to be freed 
from the burdens of the past but rather that it was 
condemned to repeat its mistakes. Hay's role in the Panama 
Canal Crisis of 1903 recapitulated John Quincy Adams's role- 
-and his change of party affiliation— in the affair of the 
Essex Junto as well, and more subtly, the old issues of 
masters and slaves and policy formulated on the basis of 
property interests. The question of subjugation and at 
least a metaphorical slavery had moved in Adams's time away 
from the American South and its "self-conscious" statesmen 
who were also on stage (Letters, V, 455) into the grand 
theater of the world. Unlike John Quincy Adams, however, 
Henry Adams did not fear the pains of Hell or the label of 
"wasted talent" that he had applied to John Randolph. He 
only feared being gibbeted in the zoo of history.
Perhaps the most fascinating passage in Adams's letter 
to Hay, however, is his claim that he envisions himself 
"skewered" in a cage with "pins stuck through [him] to keep 
the lively attitude of nature." Hay was probably Adams's 
closest male friend, and twenty years before, in 1883, when
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Adams was completing his own stint as a biographer and
beginning the massive endeavor that was to become his
History of the United States, he had written Hay that Hay
"should write autobiography" in order to protect himself
from the same biographers that still threaten in 1903.
Trollope has amused me for two evenings.
I am clear that you should write 
autobiography. I mean to do mine. After 
seeing how coolly and neatly a man like 
Trollope can destroy the last vestige of 
heroism in his own life, I object to 
allowing mine to be murdered by any one 
except myself. Every church mouse will 
write autobiography in another 
generation to prove that it never 
believed in religion.
(Letters, II, 532)
The only "biographer" that had taken Adams's life-— and had 
had the opportunity to "skewer" him— was Adams himself, who 
as we have seen, had systematically destroyed his diaries 
(except for the tantalizing fragments that remind present- 
day readers that they once existed) while he was overseeing 
the proofreading and printing of his History, and taken on a 
new name and identity in Tahiti.
The Education of Henry Adams is in part Adams's 
response to the culture of imperialism, which, as I have 
suggested earlier, is a perverse and sacralized extension of 
the Church's assertion of pastoral power over the lives of 
the faithful. Adams recognized that the imperial state and 
its representatives in the guise of businessmen and 
missionaries assumed diverse roles that were unified in
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their essential function as pastors of the "primitive" 
cultures of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Adams's vehicle 
for examining the political world of his time was not a 
history at all, nor even a biography or autobiography, but a 
critique of identity as a construct of power, in which he 
himself replaces the Samoans of his earlier experiences as 
the object of scientific scrutiny.
For the student of autobiography, The Education of 
Henry Adams. taken together with Mt. St. Michel and Chartres 
is both an interpretive nightmare, and an inescapable 
"bridge of ages" between Victorian notions of self­
representation, and the narrative experiments of Gertrude 
Stein and Samuel Beckett. It is an interpretive nightmare 
because Adams employs all the echoic and allusive tendencies 
that are at play in his earlier works, and because it is 
explicitly a record of a reification and murder of self, not 
a work of self-affirmation. The Education is nevertheless a 
sort of set piece in the literature of self-representation 
because Adams self-consciously framed it as an inescapable 
monument to the idea of the subjectively constituted self.
He chose the Confessions of St. Augustine and Rousseau as 
his models, and intended the Education to be a sequel to 
them that would complete the arc of self-representation in 
the West. Unlike his predecessors, who claimed public spaces 
for the soul and the passions of the private self, Adams is 
seeking in the Education not to affirm, but to escape
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whatever it is that he is. At the same time, he helplessly 
demonstrates what the universe looks like when it collapses 
into the mind of Henry Adams.
The map Adams draws for his readers in the Education is 
deceptively clear as the introduction to Mt. St. Michel and 
Chartres is deceptively reassuring. Lest we be lost, he tell 
us both explicitly and implicitly who his models were, what 
authors formed his taste, and what century made him. He even 
tell us why and how he came to write the Education. 
Nevertheless, the Education is a badly read book, partly 
because Adams adopted the authorial veils that shield him 
from us in all of his works, and partly because his readers 
have tended to confuse autobiography with chronicle. As a 
factual history of the enlightenment kind, the Education is 
an exceedingly unsatisfactory text. As a construction and 
annihilation of a double, and as a monument to the universe 
of subjectivity, it takes its place with Augustine's 
Confessions. Petrarch's Secretum. the essays of Montaigne 
and the Confessions of Rousseau as a marker in the history 
of self-representation in the West.
Some of the difficulty that readers have had with the 
Education is intimately related to the book's purpose. When 
Adams says he wants to provide a guide for young men, he 
means that he will offer his readers an exercise in the kind 
of mental gymnastics that have engaged his readers before in 
Mt. St. Michel and Chartres. The tone of the Education is
elegiac, and its frustrated motion is that of a would-be 
quest romance. The book claims to mourn the loss of the 
eighteenth century, but what it really laments is the 
continuation of the eighteenth century's values, in the 
shape of the enlightenment project, into the twentieth 
century. Nevertheless, the book does not celebrate 
"failure," as so many critics have claimed.20 Rather, the 
Education seeks to provide an escape from the sense of the 
private self that was born with Augustine, reached a crisis 
in Petrarch, and simultaneous disaster and deification in 
Rousseau. Written in the third person, the Education tells 
us very little about the homunculus scriptor that wrote it, 
and readers ever since T.S. Eliot have claimed that the book 
cannot be considered an autobiography because there is too 
little of the author in it. In a sense, Eliot was right; 
there is very little of Henry Adams in the Education. The 
being that bears the name of Adams in that text is an object 
for study that shares Adams's name, and is subject to him as 
narrator, but it is a disembodied consciousness, not even a 
complete literary character. Adams was as self-consciously 
modern as Petrarch, and he believed that he was living 
through the most important era of transition since the 
Reformation. He was prepared to offer a redefinition of the 
nature of identity as potentially paradigmatic as 
Augustine's valorization of the private self, or Rousseau's 
insistence on the value of the realm of the emotions. He
isolated Augustine as one of his two primary models because 
the Education was intended to be an end-mark in the history 
of self and history, perhaps more radical than that 
presented by any philosopher since Augustine had written 
The Confessions and The City of God with their assertion of 
the idea of an essential order in human life and in history 
that comforted western man as the Roman Empire was 
splintering into chaos around him. Adams chose Rousseau 
because he aimed at a general reform of the educational 
system, and because he believed that, while Rousseau had 
represented a kind of final collapse into the chaos of the 
universe of subjectivity, he had also recognized the 
limitations of a world and a self shaped in such isolation. 
In Adams's eyes, Augustine had written the essential memoir 
of the crisis of the classical world; Augustine marked the 
boundary between the world shaped by the polis in classical 
antiquity and the world that was made by medieval 
Christianity. Rousseau, for his part, articulated the crisis 
of the modern ego that Adams intended to explore and extend.
The Education of Henry Adams is Adams's demonstration 
that he can "one can know the universe only as oneself" 
(Education. 1114). If his primary task is to complete the 
work of Rousseau and Augustine, he also links himself in one 
of the books's two prefaces with the cosmic tailors of 
Carlyle's Sartor Resartus and Swift's Tale of a Tub. He 
tells us that man in his day is possessed of a "shrunken
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ego." If Adams was a twelfth-century monk in Mt. St. Michel 
and Chartres, he is a tailor and artisan in this narrative, 
and the object of study is not Adams at all (the manikin- 
ego) but his education (the garment). The garment Adams 
intends to offer is meant to "fit young men for life in the 
modern world," and aims to "show the faults of the patchwork 
fitted on their fathers" (Education. 722) . Carlyle's hero in 
his story of tailors and garments lends his name to a 
crucial chapter in the Education, but Adams subverts 
Carlyle's program for young men. Carlyle believed that the 
philosophical clothes of the hero could be peeled off like a 
second skin to reveal the essential man beneath them.
Carlyle as "editor" moves his readers "from those outmost 
vulgar, palpable Woollen Hulls of Man; through his wondrous 
Flesh-Garment, and his wondrous Social Garnitures; inwards 
to the Garments of his very Soul's Soul, to Time and Space 
themselves!1,21 Freed of its "wrappages," man's being stands 
"safe in the far region of Poetic Creation...where that 
Phoenix Death-Birth of Human Society and of all Human 
Things, appears possible."22 For Adams, the clothes of 
ideology are the only self and the only human reality that 
is available to man within the frame of human history. When 
his manikin's clothes are peeled away there are no absolute 
ideas, no transcendent realm of meaning. There is nothing 
but the cognitive capacity to perceive the singular and to 
form abstractions from them. Adams's vision of his "manikin"
265
and its capacities echoes Ockham's theory of cognition.23 
Concepts for Ockham are located in the mind of individual 
human beings. For him, concepts were "intentions" and they 
functioned as "natural signs." Speech in this view is 
reduced to a conventional social currency that facilitates 
exchange between individuals. Similarly, while our concepts 
are "natural" they do not necessarily mirror things in 
nature. Our knowledge is thus entirely contingent on our 
experience, and is restricted to us as individuals, though 
we can reason from it to an assumption about shared 
experience. Ockham posits a knowledge based on the 
probability that our knowledge of the world is true rather 
than the certainty that it is true that was available to 
Aquinas or Augustine.24
Though it at first seems quite distant from Carlyle's 
concern, Swift's Tale of a Tub, with its patchwork of 
religions and its absent god treats the same dangers and 
abuses in modern science and by modern authors that Carlyle 
does. When the layers of authors and texts are peeled away 
in the multiple prefaces of the Tale, only the history of 
the brothers who retailored the garment left them by their 
dead father remains, with all of its resonances of the 
Reformation's linguistic and spiritual legacy of 
subjectivity and fragmentation to the modern world, embodied 
most dangerously in Cartesian rationalism. Swift, too, 
revisits the linguistic and cognitive dilemmas of Scotus and
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Ockham, exploring, as Adams did the destructive legacy of 
the triumph of nominalism and the via moderna. Augustine, 
Swift, and Carlyle thus serve as Adams's symbolic markers 
for the history of subjectivity. What was a clearly 
delineated path to certain recovery of truth through memory, 
and meaning through history in Augustine, gives way in Swift 
to the ill-fated birth of the Enlightenment Project. In 
Carlyle, the hero is buried beneath his consciousness of the 
weight of his history, and the possibility that he is 
isolated within himself and separated from his fellow human 
beings. In Adams, the hero has disappeared, and his absence 
is not mourned.
The first problem we encounter in this work is a
Preface, dated September, 1918, in the original Houghton
Mifflin edition, six months after Adams's death, and
attributed to Henry Cabot Lodge. Lodge did not, of course,
write the Preface. Adams wrote it for him, and sent it to
him, with elaborate instructions on how Lodge was to treat
the manuscript of the Education after Adams's death. Adams
apparently did not want alien hands to touch his manikin.
I send you herewith a sealed packet 
containing a copy of my Education 
corrected and prepared for publication.
Should the question arise at any future
time, I wish that you, on behalf of the
Hist. Society, would take charge of the
matter, and see that the volume is 
printed as I leave it. With this view, I 
have written a so-called Editor's 
Preface, which you have read, and which 
I have taken the liberty, subject to 
your assent, to stamp with your
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initials. Also, may I beg that you will 
bar the introduction of all 
illustrations of any sort. You know that 
I do not consider illustrations as my 
work, or having part in any correct 
rendering of my ideas. Least of all do I 
wish portraits. I have always tried to 
follow the rule of making the reader 
think only of the text, and I do not 
want to abandon it here.
(Letters. VI, 725)
Adams's complaint with the Church may have been that it 
sought to extend personal identity into eternity, but he was 
quite anxious to see that his personal self was available 
only in the overdetermined form he prescribed. By 
appropriating Lodge's name, Adams assumes the role of 
statesman, and Lodge's presence, however pretended, 
announces the political aims of the Education. In the Adams 
files at the Massachusetts Historical Society, one can view, 
on microfilm, a hand-written copy of the Preface. At the 
end, in shaky letters, Adams has pencilled in the initials 
"H.C.L.," followed by a question mark. Lodge's Preface 
states Adams's formal aims for the Education, but the great 
statesman's historical presence infects our sense of things. 
Lodge's signature fixes our expectations of an autobiography 
after the fashion of Adams's own "life and letters" 
biographies. The reader is confounded. Are we in the 
narrative universe of Cervantes and Swift, or of Lodge and 
John Hay? Adams's point, of course, is that the boundaries 
between history and fiction have collapsed, and that his 
work, in which he once again, as he had in Mt. St. Michel.
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speaks in the third person is like Montaigne's essays— a new 
genre— a sort of anti-autobiography. Adams's use of the 
third person in Mt. St. Michel reflects his alienation from 
the world he described; in the Education, it reflects his 
alienation from himself as subject of himself. Whereas his 
model, St. Augustine, could directly address his God with 
his "I," conjuring the presence of the Logos through the 
articulation of the truth of his being, Adams is both 
Subject and subject. Like a self-conscious Hawthorne, he 
must create a shape for history. Like the omniscient god of 
his own narrative universe Adams alters the sequences of 
history, leaves out twenty years of his life, and reshapes 
himself not as Henry Adams, but as the Subject of Modernity, 
in whom all the tendencies of the modern world since Abelard 
converge.
Along with the labyrinthine references to manikin and 
tailor, the bogus preface is the reader's first indication 
that this is an autobiography more concerned with artifice 
than with life. In the Preface, Adams is tailor, manikin, 
and garment— Subject, subject, and materia. If Lodge's 
"preface" lends the book a kind of historical authenticity, 
it also turns the book into a parody of self-representation. 
The first section of narrative is constructed upon a lie. On 
the other hand, Adams had claimed that his generation of 
Bostonians were "but one mind and spirit; the individual is 
a facet of Boston." Perhaps part of his claim is that the
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manikin could just as easily be named "Lodge" as "Henry 
Adams." The Education is framed within a world where all 
words have lost their meanings. The preface not only reminds 
us of multiple and confusing prefaces of Tale of a Tub, it 
makes the text seem more like fiction than it is. The most 
famous stepfathered and edited manuscript in history is Don 
Ouiiote. a text in which Cervantes loses his story, finds 
it, and continually admonishes his readers to remember that 
their souls are in their own bodies and that neither they 
nor Cervantes have much to do with the fate of Don Quijote. 
In the Education. Adams blurs the boundaries of our 
rationalistic sense of the order of things. We are not sure 
that our souls are in our own bodies. We are somehow aware 
that we are, at least for the time that we engage with him 
on the shared ground of his account of himself, his 
subjects.
In his own Preface, the one he claimed, Adams warns us 
that his memoir deals not with the manikin-double of 
himself, but with the garment of education. The Preface 
begins with what Adams calls Rousseau's "appeal to the 
Deity."
'I have shown myself as I was; 
contemptible and vile when I was so; 
good, generous, sublime, when I was so;
I have unveiled my interior such as Thou 
thyself hast seen it, Eternal Father.
Collect about me the innumerable swarm 
of my fellows; let them hear my 
confessions; let them groan at my 
unworthiness; let them blush at my 
meannesses! Let each of them discover
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his heart in his turn at the foot of thy 
throne with the same sincerity: and then 
let any one of them tell thee if he 
dares: — 'I was a better man.'
(Education. 721)
Confessing himself to his fellow men, carrying his book with 
him to his God, Rousseau has managed to demonstrate Adams's 
central thesis in Mt. St. Michel— that the concept of world 
has collapsed into the idea of the personal self. Rousseau's 
confessions provide not a hand-book for readers seeking 
education, but an ironic "warning against the Ego." Adams 
points out that, since the time of Rousseau, the "Ego" has 
"steadily tended to efface itself," and, "for purposes of 
model to become a manikin on which the toilet of education 
is to be draped in order to show the fit of misfit of the 
clothes" (Education. 722). As Theodor Adorno noted, in the 
text that has haunted my own narrative of Henry Adams's 
efforts at self-representation, "the self, its guiding idea, 
and its a priori object, has always, under its scrutiny, 
been rendered at the same time non-existent."25 When man 
becomes the measure of all things, he also becomes an object 
for study. At the moment that he is thus objectified as 
material for analysis, he is included among all the things 
in the world outside the subject's private screening room 
that are designated as unreal. The individual's autonomy is 
renounced with his unity; he is alienated from himself, and 
subjugated to the mechanistic processes or rationalization 
which determine the order of things in the modern state. In
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such a world, which was born, as Adams had shown in Mt. St.
Michel. with the advent of medieval nominalism, the object
of study is necessarily a manikin, not a self. The "young
man" whom Adams as tailor is seeking to "outfit," is the
"subject of education," and in the greatest ironic moment of
a career built on irony Adams means that the self is the
final project of the enlightenment. Through the university
system, he would be reconstituted as the subject of the
"human sciences." Through the activity of life-writing, he
would be reduced first to a "geometrical figure of three or
more dimensions," and then "used" in the "study of
relation." Adams wants to kill off his manikin, and his
language confirms his intention.
The manikin...has the same value as any 
other figure of three or more 
dimensions, which is used for the study 
of relation.For that purpose it cannot 
be spared; it is the only measure of 
motion, of proportion, of human 
condition; it must have the air of 
reality; must be taken for real; must be 
treated as though it had life; — Who 
knows? Possibly it had!
(Education, 722)
The "manikin" is Adams's last simulacrum that bears his 
name, and it is inseparable from its original. It has as 
much life as Adams has, and as little. Just as Adams kept 
records of the measures of Tahitians and Samoans, he 
measures, defines, and limits himself before beginning his 
scientific history of himself. Whether or not Adams as a 
living being might have had life in a different world than
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that engendered by the Enlightenment project is the final 
question of the open form of the Education, which leads from 
the construction of the simulacrum in the Preface to its 
exit in the final pages of the appropriately titled final 
chapter— "Nunc Age."
Adams's choice of Rousseau for his primary model 
undoubtedly held an additional attraction for Adams. By 
Rousseau's own admission his being was constructed through 
and mediated by his reading of romances, and he dates his 
"unbroken consciousness of [his] existence from the time 
that he first learned to read."26 Rousseau's self- 
consciousness is thus mediated by literary texts, not by 
relationships to the world of sense. Rousseau later replaced 
novels with history and with readings from classical 
antiquity. The habit of constructing a romantic vision of 
the world through imagination was extended as Rousseau 
became the "character whose life I was reading."27 As 
Rousseau grew older his preference for the unnatural 
pleasures of the imagination over the natural ones provided 
by the world extended to sex. Rousseau become enamored of 
one Mile. Lambercier, the sister of the pastor who was his 
tutor. Inadvertently, when punishing him for some misdeed, 
she introduced him to the fatal joys of sexual pleasure 
induced through pain at the hands of an older woman. 
Thereafter Rousseau "feasted feverish eyes on lovely women" 
not because he wanted to imagine himself taking his pleasure
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with each of them as distinct individuals, but because he
yearned to "make use of them in [his] own fashions as so
many Mile. Lamberciers. "28 In the dominions of Rousseau's
imagination doubles of beautiful women could be constructed
as things of beauty, and discarded at will; all women were
thus his subjects. At the same time, Rousseau experienced a
painful discontinuity in his relationships with real women.
As he could never confess his desire to "fall of his knees
before a masterful mistress" and be punished and humiliated,
his actual sexual experiences were characterized by
unfulfilled longings which he suffered in silence.29 In
contrast to the role of helpless suppliant that he
constructs for himself as lover, he assumes a role of power
over the reader. Just as Rousseau fashions real women and
fictional characters into simulacra of themselves and
himself, he constructs the reader as a helpless audience,
constrained to listen to his confession.
I am well aware that the reader does not 
require information, but I, on the other 
hand, feel impelled to give it to him.
Why should I not relate the little 
incidents of that happy time, that still 
give me a flutter of pleasure to 
recall...let us strike a bargain. I will 
let you off five, and be content with
one..so long as I am allowed to take as
long as I like in telling it, in order
to prolong my pleasure.30
The reader becomes another of Rousseau's simulacra, a
creature constructed as the subject of Rousseau's imperial
"I." As we move through the Confessions. whole cities become
subject to Rousseau. In Rousseau's imagination, Paris, for 
example, is a "city of a most imposing appearance, as 
beautiful as it was large, where nothing was to be seen but 
splendid streets and palaces of marble or gold." When he 
goes to Paris, entering through the Faubourg Saint-Marceau, 
he is overwhelmed by "dirty stinking little streets, ugly 
black houses, a general air of squalor and poverty, beggars, 
carters, menders of clothes, sellers of herb drinks and old 
hats."31 Later on, he responds similarly to Versailles, and 
to the sea. Tangible realities are always inferior to the 
doubles shaped by Rousseau's imagination. Rousseau avoids 
owning property, favoring money instead, because it promises 
him freedom. He avoided ties with family, because, again, he 
sought to have no ties to any material reality. His life is 
bounded and determined by the text of self that he is 
constantly engaged in updating. His is model of life founded 
in discontinuity, and the narrative disarray of the final 
sections of the Confessions attests to Rousseau's 
imprisonment in a solipsistic universe. Adams's choice of 
Rousseau as a model is a rueful admission that his own 
manikin-self had been similarly entrapped, and that the 
truncated narrative available through subjectivity was the 
appropriate monument to the subject of modernity as well as 
to the way he had chosen to live most of his life, as a sort 
of childless vagabond. In such a world, as Adams was to note 
later in his historical essays, one could only chronicle a
sort of mechanical dissolution of being. As Adams explains 
in his Preface, "Jean Jacques erected a monument against the 
Ego," and "since his time, and largely thanks to him, the 
Ego has steadily tended to efface itself." (Education. 721). 
Like Hawthorne's Old Esther, the self reinoved from any 
participation in the life of the world of sense shrivels and 
disappears. Adams's statement that "the object of study" in 
the Education is the "garment not the figure" is his 
acknowledgement of Althusser's recognition that the idea of 
the personal self is an illusion, generated and perpetuated 
through an ideology that, through the entrenched power 
structures of western culture assumes the status of absolute 
reality. The Education is thus a study of the ideologies 
that constituted the simulacrum of Henry Adams as character 
in the Education. In turn, the simulacrum is the subject of 
Henry Adams as narrator, god, and creator of himself as a 
shrivelled double. It has the "air of reality" because 
Adams's readers constitute it as real, taking Adams's life 
in the process of doubling him once again in the act of 
interpretation and simultaneously revealing their own 
imprisonment in the cave of personal identity. The Preface 
is dated "February 16, 1907" because Adams was designating a 
birthday for his own simulacrum, that ultimate monument to 
a self that had been dead for twenty years before the 
education was printed. Adams's biological and historical
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self, it will be remembered, had been killed off with his 
diaries in 1888.
Adams begins his biography of himself in a fairly 
conventional way, with his birth, but he is born in the 
shadow of the great ideological constructs that had given 
rise to the American Republic. He is born "under the shadow 
of Boston State House," in a house below the tellingly named 
"Mt. Vernon Place," and he is "branded" and "crippled" by 
the presences not only of the State House, but of the First 
Church, Beacon Hill, John Hancock, John Adams, Mount Vernon, 
and Quincy. Adams is doomed to be crushed by the weight of 
history from the start, even while he is still "ten pounds 
of unconscious babyhood." The baby that was born on February 
16, 1838, was destined to live a life in which he, in 
Nietzsche's terms was "always attached to the past." No 
matter "how far and fast he runs, he is doomed to "carry his 
chain with him."32 Adams's dilemma was how to find what 
Nietzsche called a "usable past." Like Nietzsche's 
historical individual, he possessed "no trace of the power 
to forget," and was thus "condemned everywhere to see 
becoming." Nietzsche rightly recognized, as Adams himself 
did, that history was "a disguised theology,"33 which makes 
impotent subjects of us all.
In keeping with the Adamses' historical investment in 
the ideals of the Enlightenment, Adams "reached manhood 
without knowing religion, and with the certainty that dogma,
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metaphysics, and abstract philosophy were not worth knowing"
(Education. 752). Adams grew up among brothers and sisters
whom he described in the same phrases he used to describe
the Bostonians of his entire generation.
...all were conscious that they would 
like to control power in some 
form...Their form was tied to politics 
or literature. They amounted to one 
individual with half-a-dozen sides or 
facets; their temperaments reacted on 
each other, and made each child more 
like the other...What no one knew was 
whether the individual who thought 
himself a representative of this type, 
was fit to deal with life.
(Education, 753)
For Adams and his brothers and sisters, "books remained as 
in the eighteenth-century the source of life, and as they 
came out,— Thackeray, Dickens, Bulwer, Tennyson, Macaulay, 
Carlyle and the rest,— they were devoured." Like Rousseau, 
Adams's early sense of himself was formed through reading 
and through listening to his father read. In addition to the 
texts his father provided, he liked to lie "on a musty heap 
of Congressional Documents in the old farm-house at Quincy, 
reading Quentin Durward, Ivanhoe, and the Talisman." His 
favorite activity, however, and the one from which he drew 
most education involved "reading the garden at intervals for 
peaches and pears" (Education. 755). Novel-reading comes 
from Rousseau; pear-stealing from Augustine's Confessions. 
Nothing in Adams's existence bears a spontaneous 
relationship to the material world. He lived in "the
atmosphere of the Stamp Act, the Tea Tax, and the Boston 
Massacre" (Education. 758). His first encounter with the 
sensual world, which, as we have seen earlier, he always 
associated with the American South, came in his encounter 
with the nation's capital. There, "the want of barriers, of 
pavements of forms, the looseness, the laziness, the 
indolent southern drawl, the pigs in the streets; the negro 
babies and their mothers with bandannas, the freedom, 
openness, swagger, of nature and man" (Education, 760) stood 
in stark contrast to the Enlightenment ideals that formed 
Adams's image of America. Adams claimed the duality of 
America as his own, fabricating a southern ancestry through 
his great-grandmother, Louisa Catherine Adams that the old 
lady herself denied, and pairing it with his enlightenment 
heritage. Even as a child Adams claims to have recognized 
that Boston and Maryland were two worlds that could not live 
together, but he also felt himself powerless to choose one 
over the other. As in Adams's history, the blight over the 
sultry South for Adams was slavery, and the early sections 
of the Education recapitulate the horror that Adams 
expressed in his letters before and during the Civil War. 
Nevertheless, George Washington remained for him a steady 
figure, like the Pole Star, a "primary... an ultimate 
relation" who alone remained steady in Adams's youthful 
imagination. Adams's confrontation with the insoluble 
dilemma of slavery and freedom, of North and South, of
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Virginian ideals and Virginian realities echoed his early 
sense of the duality of all existence. At every turn in the 
early chapters of the Education. Adams announces that 
education had not begun. It seemed to him as a young 
graduate of Harvard that Karl Marx was "standing there 
waiting for him, and that sooner or later the process of 
education would have to deal with Karl Marx" (Education.
786) .
Adams's experiences with German education were as
limiting and as disappointing as his years at Harvard. In
his attempt to study Civil Law in Berlin, he found only the
"lecture-system in its deadliest form" (Education. 789). As
for the German model of state education, Adams found it
frightening.
All State-education is a sort of dynamo 
machine for polarising the popular mind; 
for turning and holding its lines of 
force in the direction supposed to be 
most effective for State-purposes. The 
German machine was terribly efficient.
(Education, 792)
Like Louis Althusser, Adams acknowledged and feared the 
complicity of education and the State, and in his rebellion, 
found that education for him lay only outside the schoolroom 
in "time wasted; studies neglected; vices indulged; 
education reversed; — it came from the despised beer-garden 
and music-hall; and it was accidental, unintended, 
unforeseen." Only at one moment, when he finds himself 
suddenly able to follow a Beethoven symphony does he feel
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that a "prison wall that had barred his senses" has fallen. 
Adams has contacted the primal world of sense, and 
experienced a "marvel of education;" the equivalent of 
learning to "read a new language" (Education. 793).
The unfailing sources of education in the Education are 
music, the arts, and the realm of the senses. The 
traditional quest for the aufklarunq. the progressive 
"unfolding in history of the force of the foundation" is 
dramatically abandoned, and with it, the ideas of even the 
possibility of truth and historical foundation are 
dissolved. What Nietzsche's calls a "philosophy of morning" 
in Human All Too Human is in fact a reorientation of self 
toward proximity rather than toward origins.34 The real 
world posited by the enlightenment project and more 
immediately by Adams's own ancestors had vanished, taking 
the apparent world produced through subjectivity with it. 
Adams was left with the realization that there is no self to 
be recalled— that, as he said in his letters on the writing 
of the Education— he cannot imitate Augustine's motion 
toward unity. Adams can only replicate the abandonment of 
the unifying vision of linear history in favor of a history 
of discontinuity and dislocation that denies any claim to be 
a universal history. The history that Adams came to espouse 
as "multiplicity" is a productive of subjective recollection 
which is also a distortion.
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Adams calls attention to the fact that his story is not
only the story of the production of a manikin, but also an
essay on the end of the enlightenment version of history by
structuring his narrative around successive returns to
the moment when Gibbon conceived of his history of the
decline and fall of Rome.
Anarchy lost no ground meanwhile. The 
problem only became the more 
fascinating. Probably it was more vital 
in May, 1860 than it had been in 
October, 17 64, when the idea of writing 
the Decline and Fall of the city first 
started to the mind of Gibbon, 'in the 
close of the evening, as I sat musing in 
the Church of the Zoccolanti...while 
they were singing Vespers in the Temple 
of Jupiter, on the ruins of the Capitol.
Murray's Handbook had the grace to quote 
this passage from Gibbon's 
autobiography, which led Adams more than 
once to sit at sunset on the steps of 
the Church of Santa Maria di Ara Coeli, 
curiously wondering that not an inch had 
been gained by Gibbon,— or all the 
historians since,— towards explaining 
the Fall. The mystery remained unsolved.
(Education. 804)
Adams, of course, had not read Gibbon in Murray. He had read 
the Autobiography in Germany, and, as we have seen, it had 
inspired him to become his family's historian, though in the 
Education he claims never to have intended to set himself up 
as a Gibbon. (Education, 804). In later years, he claims to 
have always returned to Rome, to sit "once more on the steps 
of Ara Coeli," (Education, 935), but the moment of 
revelation never came. Returning in 1868 he reflected that 
he knew no more than he had known in 1858, (Education. 936);
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in 1893, he sat down at the Chicago Exhibition, pondering
the mysteries of Richard Hunt's dome "almost as deeply as on
the steps of the Ara Coeli, and much to the same purpose."
Here was a breach of continuity,— a 
rupture in historical sequence! Was it 
real, or only apparent? One's personal 
universe hung on the answer, for if the 
rupture was real and the new American 
world could take this sharp and 
conscious twist toward ideals one's 
personal friends would come in, at last, 
as winners in the great American chariot 
race for fame...
(Education, 1032)
Of course, Adams's friends had in fact come in as "winners" 
in the "chariot race for fame," but their role in the 
history of the early twentieth century had been solely that 
of presiding over further folly. "Education ran riot in 
Chicago," and Adams was forced to "sit down on the steps and 
brood."
The historical mind can think only in 
historical processes, and probably this 
was the first time since historians 
existed that any of them had sat down 
helpless before a mechanical sequence.
Before a metaphysical or a theological 
or a political sequence, most historians 
had felt helpless, but the single clue 
to which they had hitherto trusted was 
the unity of natural force.
(Education, 1033)
In Chicago Adams saw his eighteenth century swept "into the 
ash-heap." He had "stood up for his eighteenth-century, his 
constitution of 1789, his George Washington, his Harvard 
College, his Quincy, and his Plymouth Pilgrims, as long as
anyone would stand up with him" (Education, 1034-35). He was 
faced with the recognition that "education must fit the 
complex conditions of a new society, always accelerating its 
movement, and its fitness could be known only from success" 
(Education. 1037). The old world and its attendant ways of 
seeing and being that had constituted Adams as a person had 
vanished, as certainly as Adams's diaries had been 
symbolically consigned to flames, almost in preparation for 
the Exhibition. Just as Gibbon's Roman vigil had haunted 
Adams in life, it haunts and informs the shape of the 
Education. forcing its narrative motion into a cyclic motion 
that declines to move forward. Adams as manikin perennially 
winds up where he began. The principle of construction, as 
we noted earlier, is an affirmation of the triumph of 
nominalism. There is no progression here. The narrative of 
Adams's education acknowledges the impossibility of a linear 
conception of narrative. As we noted before, the narrative 
refuses and parodies the possibilities of education inherent 
in the picaresque tradition. The illusion of continuity 
first fostered by Augustine is abandoned by Adams.
Adams has two other unifying devices in the Education. 
One is the image of the prototypic shark, Pteraspis. which 
Adams discovered in 1867, and which had fascinated him 
almost as much as Gibbon. The shark had managed to survive 
through aeons of change. Pteraspis. the predator of the sea 
serves in the Education as a kind of counterpoint to
Gibbon's eighteenth-century values. If Gibbon determined 
Adams's investment of himself in historiography, he claimed 
the shark and its relatives as his "cousins, great-uncles, 
or grandfathers" (Education. 929-930). The shark survives by 
living life as a predator, and Adams saw no more evidence or 
progress in the shark than he had seen in Gibbon's 
progressive vision of history. For Adams, the shark becomes 
an emblem of the modern subject, who is a predator of mind, 
devouring and digesting all that it encounters, as Adams had 
"devoured" the "boiled pork fat" of the biographies of 
Gladstone and Story in 1903. The Pteraspis offered proof 
that "uniformity...was not uniform; and Selection...did not 
select" (Education. 931). Pteraspis showed that even 
Darwinism was a "form of religious hope," a "promise of 
ultimate perfection," a "dogma to be put in the place of the 
Athanasian creed." For himself, he "had no Faith." The "idea 
of one Form, Law, Order, or Sequence had no more value for 
him than the idea of none;...what he valued most was 
Motion,...what attracted his mind was Change" (Education. 
931) .
Adams's other device of formal unity is provided by the 
images of paralysis that he himself acknowledged were the 
dominant symbols of his career. The "broken caterpillar 
that has lost its thread" of 1911 is America as "earthworm" 
in the Education. trying to "realise and understand itself; 
to catch up with its own head, and to twist about in search
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of its tail” (Education. 937) . Throughout the Education, 
characters have their "historical necks broken," and Adams 
himself perennially dangles on the lost thread of personal 
identity.
His identity, if one could call a bundle 
of disconnected memories an identity, 
seemed to remain; but his life was once 
more broken into separate pieces; he was 
a spider, and had to spin a new web in 
some new place with a new attachment.
(Education. 912)
The American people, like Adams himself, were "wandering in 
a wilderness much more sandy than the Hebrews had ever 
trodden about Sinai...They had lost the sense of worship" 
(Education. 1020). Education for Adams resolve itself in the 
ambiguities of the figure that St. Gaudens "had made for him 
in his absence." And the figure has no meaning, except to 
reflect the "response of the observer" (Education. 1021).
If Adams recorded his "death" in the fragments of his 
diaries, he also records his death by the narrative break in 
the Education that spans the years between his wife's 
suicide, his publication of the history, his journey to the 
South Seas, and his return to Washington in 1892. In that 
chapter, which he called "Twenty Years After," he begins to 
refer to himself as a dead man. "Even dead men allow 
themselves a few narrow prejudices," (Education. 1022). 
Elsewhere Adams is a "dead American." The remaining 
chapters, beginning with Adams's journey to the Chicago 
Exhibition, record the erosion of the principle of the self,
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and its replacement by the recognition that "Unity is 
chaos," (Education. 1091). The final sections end with his 
explanation of his writing of the Mt. St. Michel and 
Chartres, and the Education itself. Adams had reached 
Hegel's limits of contradiction (Education. 1134), and what 
lay beyond the self that could be framed in narrative was am 
embrace of the "supersensual universe." The man of the 
future "could be only a child born of contact between the 
old and the new energies" (Education. 1177).
The idea of education is defined and redefined 
throughout this text, and, as its meanings alter, Adams's 
vistas of understanding, and ours implode . Indeed, the 
shifting meanings Adams assigns to the word, which sometimes 
means American history and sometimes means experience of the 
world and sometimes means consciousness and sometimes means 
sensory experience underscore his sense that Abelard's and 
Ockham's radical doctrine of concepts had triumphed in the 
modern world. When Adams finds himself poised between "The 
Heights of Knowledge" and "The Abyss of Ignorance," he 
reminds us, and his manikin-double, of what his letters 
affirm over and over— that they come to the same thing--the 
world collapsed into the self, or the self collapsed into 
the world.
He seemed to know nothing— to be groping 
in darkness— to be falling forever in 
space, and the worst depth consisted in
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the assurance, incredible as it seemed, 
that no one knew more.
(Education, 1108)
Adams's revelation is that "one's psyche is like a "bicycle
rider, mechanically balancing himself, by inhibiting all his
inferior personalities" (Education. 1116). As a literary
artist, he engages himself in the construction of narrative
spaces which serve to free him from himself.
Eight or ten years of study had led
Adams to think he might use the century
1150-1250...as the unity from which he 
might measure motion down to his own 
time, without assuming anything as true
or untrue, except relation...He began a
volume which he mentally knew as 'Mt.
St. Michel and Chartres: A Study in 
Thirteenth-Century Unity.' From that 
point, he proposed to fix a position for 
himself which he could label 'The 
Education of Henry Adams: A Study in 
Twentieth-Century Multiplicity.'
(Education. 1117)
Adams intended to use the force that had lurked on the edges 
of his eighteenth-century childhood to symbolize the new 
age. Adams, the child of an alien century, who "got lost in
the study of the game of life and never got to play it" did
manage to fix a point in history from which he could
construct an identity which could be replicated in print.
Taken together, Mt. St. Michel and the Education move the 
reader from a world impelled by God and his angels to a 
realm created by Henry Adams and modern science. Like 
Nietzsche, the acrobat from whom he stole his metaphor,
Adams may have felt like "an acrobat with a dwarf on his
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back, crossing a chasm on a slack rope, and commonly 
breaking his neck," but his book paves the way toward a new 
order of things, an order that lies beyond the perilous seas 
of introspection in the realm of sense.
Late in the Education. Adams tells us that he is 
writing in part because since "every man must bear his own 
universe" he has decided to tell his readers how he bore 
his. If there is a unifying thread in the Education, it is 
in the idea of education itself. Adams is using the word in 
its Latin sense, as the process which leads men out of 
themselves and into communion with other human beings. Adams 
assumed in youth that education lay all around him, and was 
merely waiting to be claimed. By the time he wrote the 
Education, he understood that the paths of reason do not 
lead to the palace of wisdom. Abelard and Scotus and Ockham 
had ensured that through philosophic doctrines that struck 
at the heart of the ideal of community founded on a language 
that contained signs of the infinite. As we move through the 
chapters of the Education and the word "education" acquires 
its series of altered significances, Adams demonstrates the 
impossibility of the very universal enlightenment he claims 
to espouse in his Preface. At first, Education is an 
awareness of colors and sounds. Then it becomes an awareness 
of duality— the perception, for example, that life in Quincy 
and life in Boston are irreconcilable. In each succeeding 
chapter, Adams looks for education. He looks in Berlin and
Rome, and in Washington and London, and fails to find 
anything beyond insoluble dilemmas. In the course of the 
Education, the word "education” is thus emptied of meaning. 
If it comes to be synonymous with experience, with weighing 
and testing experience it is also synonymous with self­
creation. Above all, it becomes synonymous with what Deleuze 
would call the quest for "nomadic thought." What Adams's 
eighteenth-century childhood had regarded as a static 
journey through fixed stations of learning had given way to 
a process of mental gymnastics. When Adams describes the 
mind poised over the abyss of the conception of the
subconscious mind as a bicyclist engaged in the delicate
act of balancing himself, he counts on us to remember that, 
several chapters earlier, he had idly remarked that "at the 
age of fifty Henry Adams learned to ride a bicycle." The 
mind in the new age, he observed, would have to jump. As
Adams dismisses truth (Education. 932) and claims an
identity as a "flotsam or jetsam of wreckage" in a dead 
world (Education. 938), he prepares his final voyage into a 
mode of being that is chaotic, but not discontinuous. Freed 
of the principle of the personal self, the deterritorialized 
being could range at will over whatever historical or 
geographic terrain he wanted, oblivious of boundaries, and 
contemptuous of the concepts of definition and analysis. 
Adams's final essays in historiography and the theory of
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history prepare the way for a post-structuralist, if not a 
postmodern conception of history and of existence.
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CHAPTER 5
ADAMS, HISTORY, AND THE SUBJECT OF MODERNITY
Thinking begins only when we have come 
to know that reason, glorified for 
centuries, is the most stiff-necked 
adversary of thought.1
Martin Heidegger, "The Word of 
Nietzsche"
As we have seen, Henry Adams's self-consciousness about 
his role as an historian was present in his earliest letters 
from his student days in Berlin. His radical doubts about 
the possibilities for locating an adequate stance for 
narrating the past, along with his sense that traditional 
historiography belonged to the sphere of the dead languages, 
places him in the company of both modern and post-modern 
theorists. Adams seems always to have known that he was to 
be something both more and less than the Gibbon he sought to 
be, and that his chosen career of family historian would 
take him far beyond the progressive historians of his own 
day. In our study, the idea that Adams became progressively 
more convinced that such a thing as "history" did not and 
could not exist as long as we conceived of the past as 
recuperable or even a concrete entity has become a truism. 
The sense he shared with Marx, that "everything solid melts 
into air" is, of course, part of his stance as a self- 
conscious modernist. At the same time, Adams believed that 
he was a member of a long line of humanists. He found his
294
295
rightful antecedents in Swift and the "Battle of the
Books,"2 and in Erasmus and Machiavelli and Petrarch. Like
them, Adams recognized the power of the historian's
narrative for shaping present-day reality. He also shared
with literary artists like Petrarch, and Spenser after him,
the notion that the historian must provide the mirror in
which the past is, if not recovered, at least conveniently
deformed, for a contemporary audience. Adam's humanism as an
historian is, as all of humanism has been, wedded to a
theory of education. Adams recognized the necessary
complicity between the historian's narrative and the
university system he himself had brought back from Germany
to the United States and its complicity, in turn with the
mechanism of the State. The responsibility of the teacher
of history in Adams's view was awesome.
A parent gives life, but as parent, 
gives no more. A murderer takes life, 
but his deed stops there.A teacher 
affects eternity.; he can never tell 
where his influence stops. A teacher is 
expected to teach truth, and may perhaps 
flatter himself that he does so, if he 
stops with the alphabet or the 
multiplication table...A teacher must 
either treat history as a catalogue, a 
record, a romance; or as an evolution 
and whether he affirms or denies 
evolution, he falls into all the burning 
fagots of the pit. He makes of his 
scholars either priests or atheists, 
plutocrats or socialists, judges or 
anarchists, almost in spite of himself.
In essence incoherent and immoral, 
history had either to be taught as 
such— or falsified.
(Education. 994)
Adams, who "respected neither history nor method" had found 
himself caught up in Harvard's attempts at educational 
reform in the 1870s, and "he imposed Germany"— by which he 
meant German historical method— "on his scholars with a 
heavy hand...but he sometimes doubted whether they should be 
grateful." For Adams, "history is a tangled skein that one 
may take up at any point and break when one has unravelled 
enough; but complexity precedes evolution. Pteraspis grins 
horribly from the closed entrance" (Education. 996-998). The 
shark of subjectivity that threatens the world in the 
Education threatens the university system in Adams's 
historical essays in its thirst for more worlds to devour 
and in its unconscious and, hence, unchecked quest for 
power. He wrote his brother Brooks that "the teaching 
profession is, like the church and the bankers, a vested 
interest. And the historians will fall on anyone who 
threatens their stock in trade quite as virulently as do the 
bankers on the silver men" (Degradation. 97). Though Adams 
"quitted the university" in 1877, his certainty about the 
necessity of some kind of educational reform endured, as the 
title of the Education. and the historical addresses from 
1894 and afterward suggest. Adams had seen the Church's 
pastoral power as a positive force in the Middle Ages. To 
see it secularized and wedded to the modern state was 
disturbing, for, in Adams's eyes, the modern state exerted 
the same pastoral force over the citizen through the agency
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of state-sponsored education that the catechism had exerted 
in an earlier age. Unlike the medieval Church, however, the 
modern state with its ties to the enlightenment project, 
could claim only the quest for a great society as its aims. 
It had no capacity to mediate between the individual and 
eternity.
In 1894 as an "absent President" of the American 
Historical Society, Henry Adams discussed the necessity of 
devising a science of history that would "reduce history 
under a law as clear as the laws which govern the material 
world," and which would bring "order and the chaos" and 
transform "the darkness into light." Recalling the 
"astonishing influence" of a "mere theorist" like Rousseau 
or a "reasoner" like Adam Smith or a "philosopher... like 
Darwin" Adams muses that the production of a "science of 
history" would be vastly more violent in its effects than 
the dissensions roused by anyone or by all three of these 
great men" (Degradation. 127). The address, which was read 
by some nameless simulacrum of Adams, had already 
internalized a condition of radical doubt about the 
possibility of narrating a linear version of the past, and 
had, as we have seen, lost faith in scientific history even 
before he finished his History of the United States. At the 
same time, while he believed that the shape of historical 
narrative in the future would not be linear or factual or
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"scientific," his language in "The Tendency of History" is
still that of the enlightenment historiographers.
The world is made up of a few immense 
forces, each with an organization that 
corresponds with its strength. The 
church stands first...and cannot accept 
any science of history, because science 
by its definition must exclude the idea 
of a personal and active providence.
The state stands next; and the hostility 
of the state would be assured toward any 
system or science that might not 
strengthen its arm. Property is growing 
more and more timid, and looks with 
extreme jealousy on any new idea that 
might weaken vested rights. Labor is 
growing more and more self-confident and 
looks with contempt on all theories that 
do not support its own. Yet we cannot 
conceive of a history that would 
not...affect all these vast social 
forces.
(Degradation. 129)
Because he was aware of the political force inherent in
the narrative of history, Adams saw that in creating the
text of "history" we are agreeing on at least a temporary
shape for cultural identity. Thus, just as Adams believed
that "in biography we are taking life," and that in
autobiography we commit suicide, in writing history we drain
the essential life of the world, and replace it with a kind
of embalming fluid of interpretation. The historian's
narrative at its best threatens the fabric of received
systems of value and knowledge by forcing renewal upon them.
A science cannot be played with. In an 
hypothesis is advanced that obviously 
brings into a direct sequence of cause 
and effect all the phenomena of human 
history, we accept it, and if we accept
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it we must teach it. The mere fact that 
it overthrows social organizations 
affects our attitude...we must follow 
the new light no matter where it 
leads...Even if we, like Galileo, should 
be obliged by the religious or secular 
authority to recant and repudiate our 
science, we should still have to say, as 
he did in secret if not in public, "E 
pur si muove.'
(Degradation. 131)
Adams's complaint about the historians of his generation was 
that they tended to fall back on the old illusions of 
continuity and sequence, rather than attempting to 
articulate and analyze the new ground of what Heidegger 
would soon define as a rejection of the idea of being as a 
ground for existence. If Petrarch's account of his ascent 
of Mt. Ventoux records a break between the medieval and 
modern worlds, one in which the religious category of 
conversion is superimposed on a new consciousness of a 
secularized nature from which the subject feels alienated, 
Adams occupies another crack between worlds. In his late 
essays, Adams engages in a ritualized writing of 
enlightenment history, but he intentionally empties them of 
the enlightenment's guiding ideas and justifications, thus 
demonstrating the exhaustion of his own faith in reason and 
in the power of the individual to find a generalized meaning 
through the study of the fragments of the past. "History," 
like Petrarch's pilgrimage to the inaccessible mountain, has 
become a hollow shell or fragment in which the historian, to 
borrow Blumenberg's language, "reoccupies formal systems of
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positions" only to radicalize, parody, and transform them.3 
The "meaning" in history thus consists only in establishing 
a subjective connection with the past through 
interpretation. It has nothing to do with facts or 
chronology.
Part of Adams's point is made by his physical absence. 
Adams was in Guadalajara when his address was delivered 
elsehwere, by someone else. Through his absence Adams 
suggests that the historian and the university system must 
be purified of the mystique of what Marx called the "cult of 
personality" if they are to be of real service. His sense of 
his power over the students he taught at Harvard and of the 
damage he did them in making them "priests or atheists," 
"plutocrats or socialists" haunted him. Thus he chooses to 
be absent as a personal self not only in this address, but 
explicitly in the "Rule of Phase" and "Letter to American 
Teachers of History." Reader and audience alike, confronted 
on the one hand with a text, and on the other with speech 
articulated by some nameless Not Adams are forced to deal 
with the fragile vessel of words, not the manikin who 
articulates them. Part of the explicit construction and 
deconstruction of a self in Mt. St. Michel and Chartres and 
the Education seems to have been accomplished with the 
terrible experience of writing and teaching in mind. Adams's 
awareness of the teacher's power over language recalls his 
model Augustine's De Maqistro. with its haunting reminder
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that, since "speaking itself is a sign," there is
"absolutely nothing which can be taught without signs."4
For Augustine, of course, the danger was that the teacher
would draw attention to himself or his own words and point
the student away from the "universals of which we can have
knowledge [if] we do not listen to anyone speaking and
making sounds outside ourselves." These "universals" were
available only when we "listen to Truth which presides over
our minds within us," through the agency of "our real
Teacher who is said to dwell in the inner man."5
When the teachers have expounded by 
means of words all the disciplines which 
they profess to teach, the disciplines 
also of virtue and wisdom, then their 
pupils take thought within themselves 
whether what they have told is true, 
looking to the inward truth...And when 
they find inwardly that what they have 
been told is true they praise their 
teachers, not knowing that they really 
praise not teachers bur learned men if 
the teachers really know what they 
express in words. Men are wrong when 
they call these teachers who are not.
But because... there is no interval 
between the moment of speaking and the 
moment of knowing, and because they 
inwardly learn immediately after the 
speaker has given his admonition, they 
suppose that they have taught in an 
external fashion by him who gave the 
admonition.6
For Augustine, the rightly motivated teacher, while a mere 
simulacrum of the great original provided by Christ, is at 
least an agent of truth who can point his students toward 
the mind's road to God. Adams had a longing for universals,
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which seems in some finite moments— as when he wrote his 
"Prayer to the Virgin," to have merged with a faith in their 
existence. Nevertheless, as educator and historian he is a 
thoroughgoing nominalist to the end, though he maintains 
that he is an Augustinian. Adams sought to subvert the 
historian's stance as a secularized priest, and his 
masquerade as a purveyor of scientific truth.
Adams believed that the members of the Historical 
Association of the future would have to deal with the 
radical doubt about both pedagogy and history that had 
assailed him, and that its members, would, in the "span of a 
century" be "torn by some such dilemma." Caught up in his 
apocalyptic vision, Adams wrote of a coming "crisis" in the 
university, the "shadow" of which has "cast itself on me 
both as a teacher and a writer," he says, and "kept me 
silent." Despite this characteristic disclaimer, Adams did 
not remain silent, and, as we know, his later "fictional" 
works, from Mt. St. Michel to "The Rule of Phase" attempt to 
address the questions that have since been raised by 
Heidegger's modernist critique of the possibilities of 
language, and by modernist and postmodernist theorists as 
disparate as Althusser, Adorno, and Deleuze.
Complicating our vision of Adam's progress as an 
historian is the fascination with Marx that antedates his 
writing of his autobiography. Though he never actually 
called himself a Marxist historian, he approvingly
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identifies his brother Brooks as one (Letters. V, 54).
Adams had become interested in Marxist theory as early as
the 1880s, and the language and sensibility of his late work
is increasingly Marxist in orientation. Adams owned a
translation of Capital. the first part of which is annotated
in his own hand, and which was published in London in 1887.
Typically, in his 1910 "Letter to American Teachers of
History," which is an attack on the Hegelian model of
history, and which is the most Marxist of his essays, he
does not mention Marx. In June of 1894, however, he wrote
Charles Milnes Gaskell that, though he disagreed with Marx,
Marx had taught him a great deal.
In despair, I've taken to reading 
history again...I have taken up the 
story of the greater world, the Roman 
Empire, which went so inexplicably to 
the devil before us. Socially I am 
quite of the Roman empire...Did you ever 
read Karl Marx? I think I never struck 
a book which taught me so much, and with 
which I disagreed so radically in 
conclusion. Anyway, these studies of 
morbid society are not so amusing as 
Petronius and Petrarch.
(Letters. V, 194-95)
Marx may not have been amusing, but Adams was writing his
brother Brooks five years later for more information on the
Marxist vision of history.
...try and find out for me what is the 
best statement of the Economical Theory 
of History in the works of Marks (sic.).
Engels, and the socialists authorities.
Of course I've read Marx— at least 
Capital— but I've not read Engels...I 
may find it very convenient to know
about socialist theories; they seem to 
be now on the verge of ousting all 
others except the pure capitalistic.
(Letters. V, 49)
Brooks responded by immediately sending Eduard Bernstein/s
Die Yoraussetzungen des Sozialismus und die Aufqaben der
Sozialdemokratie (1899). Within four days, Adams responded
that "Bernstein is very much in my intellectual condition."
What Adams means by that is, as usual, cryptic. Bernstein
rejects the idea of a coming social cataclysm. For Adams,
this means the "bankruptcy of the only idea that our time
has produced." "The machine could run many centuries on that
time schedule," he adds, while at the same time asserting
that "the old rules of Peel's time are now quite laid aside
and abandoned. ...I have every day to reeducate myself, and
try to forget all I was ever taught" (Letters, V, 56). More
playfully— and cryptically— Adams says that Bernstein has
taught him "what Hegelianism is."
I knew I was a Hegelian, but never knew 
what it was. Now I see that a Hegelian 
is one who agrees that every-body is 
right, and who acts as if everybody but 
himself were wrong. What a delightful 
idea— so German— that Karl Marx thought 
himself a Hegelian!" It is equal to 
Wagner's philosophy.
(Letters. V, 57)
The language that describes a world moved by great 
unnameable cultural forces and which characterizes the Mt. 
St. Michel, the Education. the "Letter to American Teachers 
of History" and "The Rule of Phase" emerges for the first
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time in these letters of the 1890s. Adams's vision of the 
kingdom of force which permeates The Education may have been 
born as he claims in The Education at the Chicago Exhibition 
of 1893, but it was crystallized in his reading of Marx and 
Bernstein.
...the law of economy as the law of 
history is the only contribution that 
the socialists have made to my library 
of ideas, and I am curious to get their 
best statement. They are a droll set of 
plus que petits bourgeois, these 
socialists; but they have all the truth 
there is; that is, belief in themselves.
(Letters, V, 55).
Eleven years later, having completed his essay "The
Rule of Phase Applied to History," the supposed third part
of his autobiography, Adams wrote again to Charles Milnes
Gaskell that he had been writing in the deeply pessimistic
vein of Malthus and Marx and Schopenhauer.
Throughout all the thought of Germany,
France and England, for there is no 
thought in America— runs a growing 
stream of pessimism which comes in a 
continuous current from Malthus and Karl 
Marx and Schopenhauer in our youth, and 
which we were taught to reject then, but 
which is openly preached now on all 
sides. Next week I sent you a little 
volume I have written about it, not for 
the improvement of humanity, but only to 
prod up my historical flock. They are 
all feeble-minded and should be all shut 
up in your asylums; but I know no way of 
telling them so...
(Letters, VI, 316)
Adams had already mourned the exhaustion of the autonomous 
self in Mt. St. Michel and Chartres and chronicled its
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demise in the Education when he wrote the "Rule of Phase 
Applied to History" in 1909. He was sending Gaskell a copy 
of this along with "A Letter to American Teachers of 
History."
In these late essays, Adams claimed to have written a
sequel to his autobiography, one in which the individual as
a thinking thing has been supplanted as the focus of study.
No entity that could be described as an individual is
present at all in the late essays. There is only the problem
of blind force, and its implications for mankind. "The Rule
of Phase" is an overt rejection of the powers of reason and
of the principle of identity. "Reason," Adams writes, "can
be only another phase of the energy earlier known as
Instinct or Intuition" (Degradation. 192).
From the beginnings of philosophy and 
religion, the thinker was taught by the 
mere act of thinking, to take for 
granted that his mind was the highest 
energy of nature. Society still believes 
it, as asserts its supremacy, on no 
other ground, with a sustained force 
which is the chief theme of history, and 
which showed no sign of relaxation until 
attacked in the eighteenth century in 
its theological or supernatural 
outposts. Society must still continue 
to act on it, as the Platonist, the 
Stoic, and the Christian did, for the 
obvious reason that it was and is their 
only motive for existence— their 
solitary title to their identity.
(Degradation. 207)
Adams's "little volume" on the "Rule of Phase" is, in 
reality, a meditation on subjectivity and an attack on
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philosophic idealism that is properly seen as his response 
on the one hand to his belief that a modernist philosophy of 
history was needed. On the other hand, he sought to 
articulate the sense, one which he felt he shared with 
Schopenhauer, von Hartmann, and Nietzsche, that any 
credible philosophy of history must reconcile the kingdom of 
force and the kingdom of mind. In doing so, it would 
"threaten human history with fantastic revolution." 
(Degradation. 196).
In his prefatory letter to the larger "Letter to
American Teachers of History" Adams explains his choice of
the epistolary form as his vehicle for his own forays in his
personal version a new science of man.
If I call this volume a letter it is 
only because that literary form affects 
to be more colloquial and more familiar 
than the usual scientific treatise; but 
such letters never require a response, 
even when they invite one, and in the 
present case, the subject of the letter 
involves a problem which will certainly 
exceed the limits of a life already far 
advanced, so that is solution, if a 
solution is possible will have to be 
reached by a new generation.
(Degradation. 138-39)
Adams echoes his model Petrarch, who affected the use of 
letters even when they were ostensibly addressed to the dead 
in order to establish a more "familiar" ground with his 
audience. The letter conjures the idea of absent presences 
on both the part of the recipient and the audience. The
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letter— speech and gesture translated into the written word
by a speaker whom the reader contacts only in imagination—
provides a kind of ghostly company for the solitary Adams
and for his solitary reader. To deepen our sense of
puzzlement about Adams's reforming mission, he claims that
the essay is not to be published, but is instead a document
"unofficial and personal". His reasoning he says, is that
"touching as it does some of the most delicate relations of
University Instruction in rival departments, the book has
too much the air of provoking controversy."
I do not know that controversy would do 
harm, but I see nothing to be gained by 
provoking it. For the moment, the 
problem is chiefly one of technical 
instruction; of grouping departments; at 
most, of hierarchy in the sciences. Some 
day, it may become a question whether 
one department, or another, is to impose 
on the university a final law of 
instruction; but, for the present, it is 
a domestic matter, to be settled at home 
before inviting the world to interfere.
Therefore the volume will not be 
published, or offered for sale, or sent 
to the press for notice.
(Degradation. 137-38)
Though Adams claims to despise the power vested in the 
university and in historians, he nevertheless pens his 
ruminations on reconceptualizing both pedagogy and 
historiography for an elite audience made up of his fellow 
men of letters. He addresses a group that is not very 
different than the audience Petrarch addresses in his 
letters and treatises. Unlike Petrarch, however, Adams sees
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himself not as an anchor for history both past and present,
but rather a sort of floating consciousness. He desires no
response, and assumes his impotence as a reformer because of
his own uncertainty about his motives and his aims.
For the same reason, the volume needs no 
acknowledgement. Unless the questions 
which it raises or suggests seem to you 
so personal as to need action, you have 
probably no other personal interest than 
that of avoiding the discussion 
altogether. Few of us are required to 
look ten, or twenty years, or a whole 
generation ahead to realize what will 
then be the relation of history to 
physics or physiology, and even if we 
make the attempt, we are met at the 
outset by the difficulty of allowing for 
our personal error, which is, in so 
delicate a calculation, an element of 
the first importance. Commonly, our 
error takes the form of inertia, and is 
more or less constant and calculable.
For myself, the preference of movement 
over inertia is decided. The risk of 
error in changing a long-established 
course seems always greater to me than 
the chance of correction, unless the 
elements are known more exactly than is 
possible in human affairs; but the need 
of determining these elements is all the 
greater on that account; and this volume 
is only a first experiment toward 
calculating their past, present, and 
future values.
(Degradation. 138)
Adams's indication that the "Letter" is yet another sequel 
to his autobiography is marked by the date he assigns it. He 
dates the "Letter" "16 February, 1910," the birthday of yet 
another fictional self. Like the Education, this is a text
that records another version of self. This time, the self
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has no name but is a mere troublesome and truncated self-
consciousness, referred to as "the historian" or "the
unscientific student." The "Letter" records Adams's embrace
of philosophic vitalism.
Since the Church had lost its authority 
the historian's field had shrunk into 
narrow limits of rigorously human 
action; but...within those limits he was 
clear that the energy with which history 
had to deal could not ge reduced 
directly to a mechanical or a physico­
chemical process. He was therefore 
either obliged to deny that social 
energy was an energy at all, or to 
assert that it was an energy independent 
of physical laws. Yet how could he deny 
that social energy was a true form of 
energy when he had no reason for 
existence, as professor, except to 
describe and discuss its acts? He could 
neither doubt nor dispute its existence 
without putting an end to his own; and 
therefore he was of necessity a 
Vitalist, or adherent of the doctrine 
that Vital Energy was independent of 
mechanical law. Vitalists are of many 
kinds.
(Degradation. 146)
Adams wants to know what thought is and what the subject
that produces it is, and he proposes to find out not by
turning inward, as his models Augustine and Petrarch had,
but by turning outward, to a study of the problem of
entropy (Degradation. 142). The late Adams, unlike the
Adams of the 1850s, regards thought as an "enfeebled
function of will."
The historian is required either 
expressly to assert or surreptitiously 
to assume...that the while function of 
nature has been the ultimate production
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of this one-sided consciousness,— this 
amputated Intelligence,— this degraded 
Act, this truncated Will. As the 
function of the crystal is to produce 
the order of its cleavage, and that of 
the rose, the beauty of its flower, and 
that of the peacock the splendors of its 
tail, and as, except for these purposes 
neither crystal, nor rose, nor peacock 
has as much human interest as a thistle 
or a maggot, so the function of man 
is,to the historian, the production of 
Thought; but if all the other sciences 
affirm that not Thought but Instinct is 
the potential of Vital Energy, and if 
the beauties of Thought-— shown in the 
intuitions of artistic genius,— are to 
be taken for last traces of an instinct 
now wholly dead or dying, nothing 
remains for the historian to describe or 
develop except the history of a more or 
less mechanic dissolution.
(Degradation. 209)
Adams's critique of identity anticipates Louis 
Althusser's view of the problem of subjectivity in "Ideology 
and Ideological State Apparatuses." Althusser defines the 
"superstructure" of a society as a spatial metaphor which 
consists of two sections--the political-legal (law and the 
State); and ideology (the ethical, legal, and political 
ideologies.7 Ideological state apparatuses, on the other 
hand, are those "realities which present themselves to the 
immediate observer in the form of distinct and specialized 
institutions." Althusser's definition includes lists of 
ISA's that encompass the dimensions of religious, 
educational, familial, political and cultural life. His 
treatment of the evolution of these structures is quite 
similar to Adams's discussion of them in his 1910 analysis
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of the problem facing the modern historian. Ideology, 
according to Althusser, has no history. Like Adams's vision 
of reason and thought, it is an "imaginary construction 
whose status is exactly like the theoretical status of dream 
among writers before Freud."8 Ideology for Althusser is "the 
imaginary relationship of individuals to their real 
conditions of existence." Individuals, in Althusser's view, 
believe in God, Duty and Justice because they "live in an 
ideological representation of ideology." Modern subjects 
conceive of themselves as living in the context of their 
ideology. More radically, Althusser claims that "there is 
no ideology except by the subject and for its subjects."9 
The category of the subject— which Althusser equates with 
the soul— is the constitutive category of all ideology.
...the category of the subject is only 
constitutive of all ideology insofar as all 
ideology has the function (which defines it) 
of 'constituting' concrete individuals as 
subjects.10
Personal identity, then is determined by the 
ideological matrix which is generated by the ideological 
state apparatus which, solipsistically, is generated by the 
subject itself. For Althusser, St. Paul's claim that it is 
in the Logos that we "live and move and have our being" is 
in reality an affirmation that it is in ideology that we 
live and move and have our names and our illusion of 
identity.
Seen in this light, some of Adams's initial revelations 
of the new view of the human past that accompanied his 
initial work on Tahiti acquire a variant significance. Adams 
sent "The Tendency of History" to the members of the 
American Historical Association as a "communication" from 
the vantage point of his presidency of the Association. In 
his "regret" for his "constant absence" epitomized in the 
epistolary mode and captured in his actual physical absence, 
Adams manages at least to escape the confines of the 
personal self. In fact, Adams's absence is an extension of 
his claim that he had died with the publication of his 
history, and an announcement that he intended to remain 
alienated from the members of his profession. The "Letter to 
the American Teachers' of History" and "The Rule of Phase" 
vacate, reoccupy, and redefine the spaces of identity in the 
same way that Adams's assertions about teaching and history 
vacate and reoccupy the idea of the historical past.
Sixteen years later, he presented another address, this 
time in a letter— the "Letter to American Teachers of 
History"— which developed the theories that had been present 
in embryo in the "Tendency." With "The Rule of Phase," the 
two essays completed the autobiographical efforts that had 
occupied Adams since the Tahiti. He hoped that they would 
complete his textual self-transformation from historian to 
theorist.
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Adams's contact with philosophic vitalism, mediated by
his reading of Henri Bergson, colors these last essays.
Bergson, whom he later met and entertained at his salon in
Washington, offered an affirmation for Adams's own sense,
gleaned in Tahiti, that there were other ways of organizing
self and community than through the idea of consciousness,
historical sense, and personal identity.
...I have been amusing myself with a 
fable for instructors of history. I've a 
notion of printing a Letter to 
Professors. Pure malice! but History 
will die if not irritated. The only 
service I can do to my profession is to 
serve as a flea. I like best Bergson's 
frank surrender to the superiority of 
the Instinct over Intellect. You know 
how I have preached that principle, and 
how I have studied the facts of it. In 
fact, I wrote a whole volume— called my 
Education— which no one ever saw, and 
which you must some day look into,—  
borrow William James's copy, in hopes 
that he may have marginally noted his 
contempt for me,— in order to recall how 
Education may be shown to consist in 
following the intuitions of Instinct.
Lobe calls it 'Tropism,' I believe, 
which means that a mother likes to nurse 
her own child.
(Letters. VI, 272)
Adams's conviction that the riches of existence lay in the 
realm of sense became progressively stronger. He wrote 
Albert Stanburrough Cook, a professor of English at Yale, 
that he had himself taken on a new identity as an 
emeritus, a "teacher of teachers," but that in his efforts
to avoid overburdening his "students" he had "not even
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published [his] books of late." He had aimed, in his 
privately circulated works, to refigure the shape of 
history.
The Chartres volume was the second in 
the series, and intended to fix the 
starting point, since I could not get 
enough material to illustrate primitive 
society, or the society of the seventh 
century B.C., as I would have liked. I 
wanted to show the intensity of the 
vital energy of a given time, and of 
course that intensity had to be stated 
in its two highest terms— religion and 
art. As our society stands, this way of 
presenting a subject can be felt only by 
a small number of persons. My idea is 
that the world outside— the so-called 
modern world— can only pervert and 
degrade the conceptions of the primitive 
instinct of art and feeling, and that 
our only chance is to accept the limited 
number of survivors... and to intensify 
the energy of feeling within that 
radiant center. In other words, I am a 
creature of our poor old calvinistic,
St. Augustinian fathers, and am not 
afraid to carry out my logic to the 
rigorous end of regarding our present 
society, its ideals, and purposes, as 
dregs and fragments of some primitive, 
essential instinct now nearly lost. If 
you are curious to see the theory stated 
as official instruction, you have only 
to look over Bergson's 'Evolution 
Creatrice,"...The Tendencies of thought 
in Europe seem to me very strongly that 
way.
(Letters, VI, 357)
Of course, Adams had taught no students since 1877 in any 
conventional classroom, and his oft-proclaimed hopelessness 
about the profession of teaching and the state of 
historiography makes his remarks even more cryptic than they 
are ordinarily. There is, nevertheless, as there always is,
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a coherence in Adams's sense of his place in the history of 
thought. Adams conceived of himself as a point of mediation 
in the history of self-construction in the west. He looks 
backward to the Stoics of the ancient world, to Scotus's 
statement of the problem of meaning in language, and to 
Ockham's nominalism. At the end of his life, he is at one 
with Nietzsche in his vision of an identity based on 
something other than consciousness and interiority, and his 
theorizing can be seen as a vital link between Bergson and 
Gilles Deleuze.
In his anti-Hegelian stance, Adams runs the danger that 
Francois Chatelet identifies in failing to take "our Plato"- 
-Hegel— into account. Chatelet points out that Hegel 
"determined a horizon, a language, a code that we are still 
at the very heart of today. Hegel by this fact, is our 
Plato; the one who delimits... the theoretical possibilities 
of theory."11 Rejecting Hegel and the model of mind and 
consciousness as the locus of reality, Adams nevertheless 
revisits Hegel's hierarchy of value when he declares that 
his new model of history will look at art and religion as 
indices of culture. This was partly what Adams meant when he 
announced that he felt like Childe Roland. He had come to 
the Dark Tower only to find himself entrapped. Adams's final 
pessimism stems from his belief that the self is 
simultaneously the product and the victim of its ideologies. 
Adams cites Eduard Meyer's belief that "the whole mental
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development of mankind has for its preliminary assumption,
the existence of separate social groups."
'Above all, the weightiest instrument of 
men, Speech— which first makes the Man, 
and first makes possible the growth of 
our systematic Thought,-— has not been a 
casual creation of individuals,... but 
has grown out of the common need of 
equals, bound together by common 
interests and regulated intercourse. But 
even the invention of tools...the 
settlement in Residence... are possible 
only within a Group; or, at least have 
meaning only so far as what has first 
and immediately benefitted one, becomes 
the property of the whole community.,n
Following Meyer, Adams believes that "even the child is the 
creature of the State Organism, not of the Family." In 
Adams's view, the "social Organism...is the cause, creator, 
and end of the Man, who exists only as a passing 
Representative of it, without rights or functions except 
what it imposes" (Degradation. 2 60). For Adams, the 
dissolution of modern society, which leads it to entropy, is 
the process by which the "vital energy" of a society becomes 
focused on individual desires and capacities, rather than on 
the undifferentiated body of society. His hope for education 
is that "the departments of biology, sociology, and 
psychology" will find "some common formula" which will allow 
them to study the problem of "vital energies" and escape the 
replication of the second law of thermodynamics in social 
evolution— -that is, the moment of the modern subject, when
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the world has been divided into the spheres of infinite
universes of individual mind.
That which formed a people, a unity, a 
block ends by becoming an agglomeration 
of individuals without cohesion, still 
held together for a time by its 
traditions and institutions. This is the 
phase when men, divided by their 
interests and aspirations, but no longer 
knowing how to govern themselves, ask to 
be directed in their smallest acts; and 
when the State exercises its absorbing 
influence. With the definitive loss of 
the old ideal, the race ends by entirely 
losing its soul; it becomes nothing more 
than a dust of isolated individuals, and 
returns to what it was at the start, — a 
crowd.1,13
The world of sense may be a new possibility, but it is 
not one that he can actively embrace. Adams is too enamored 
of the idea of absence, too much a part of the Platonic 
traditions that flower in Augustine and in Petrarch in a 
sense of inwardness and solitude so full that the subject 
knows social privation and loneliness only in the company of 
others.14 Adams's stance as historian, as biographer, and 
as autobiographer is mediated by his desire for the 
knowledge he lacks, for the people whose presence he 
conjures in letters, and for the escape from the sense of a 
duality of being that had haunted him since his student days 
in Berlin. What Adams seeks— with self-acknowledged 
futility--is a reversal of this conception of desire, and 
his motion away from his characteristic idealism finds an 
accidental echo in Gilles Deleuze.
In his collaborations with Felix Guattari, Deleuze 
perforins the analogue in the realm of psychoanalysis and the 
linguistic field of semantics of Adams's reoccupation and 
transformation of the normative terms and forms of 
historiography and autobiography. In Anti-Oedipus and A 
Thousand Plateaus, the two volumes of Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia Deleuze and Guattari reverse our sense of the 
rational order of things, as well as our internalized notion 
of the nature of desire. In these works, desiring machines 
replace Adams's depiction of the perpetually ravenous 
subject of modernity which was, in turn, his altered version 
of the Cartesian cogito. Desiring machines, like Adams's 
pteraspis. are involved in all human processes, and they are 
constantly engaged in the production of other desires: 
"Desire constantly couples continuous flows and partial 
objects that are by nature fragmentary and fragmented.
Desire causes the current to flow, itself flows in turn, and 
breaks the flows."15 Desire becomes diseased in Deleuze, as 
it does in Adams, only when it becomes self-reflexive; that 
is, when the economy of the individual and the personal self 
displaces that of the group. In this configuration, the 
individuated self is not a goal to be attained, but a fate 
to escape. Thus Deleuze and Guattari call the schizophrenic 
the "universal producer" because he has managed to escape 
the disease inherent in existence as an isolated ego, and 
"the sole thing that is divine is the nature of an energy of
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disjunctions."16 Deleuze and Guattari invoke Beckett's The
Unnamable as the exemplar of the schizoid's dilemma.
The ego, however is like daddy-mommy: 
the schizo has long since ceased to 
believe in it. He is somewhere else, 
beyond or behind, or below these 
problems, rather than immersed in 
them...There are those who will maintain 
that the schizo is incapable of uttering 
the word ' I , ' and that we must restore 
his ability to utter this hallowed word.
All of which the schizo sums up by 
saying: they're fucking me over again;'I 
won't say 'I' any more, I'll never utter 
that word again, it's just too damn 
stupid. Every time I hear it, I'll use 
the third person instead, if I happen to 
remember to. If it amuses them. And it 
won't make one bit of difference.17
The problem with versions of Platonic desire for Deleuze is
that from the moment we align desire with acquisition by
defining it as "absence" or "lack" we "make desire an
idealistic (dialectical, nihilistical) conception" that
exists in pure mind as something that has only a "psychic
reality" and thus leaves us perpetually dissatisfied. The
object of desire in Platonic terms is never present, and
never really available, and thus it is always fantastical or
illusory. In the world of sense, desire produces, and its
products are real.18
Deleuze is far from believing that he is alone in 
conceiving of the world in these terms. Rather, he proposes 
an entire alternative history of philosophy which 
exemplifies "expressionism" rather than subjectivity, and 
which leads from the Stoics to the nominalists to Leibniz,
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Spinoza, Hume, Nietzsche, and Bergson.19 For Deleuze the 
fascination with each of these philosophers lies in their 
emphasis on man's capacity to order his reality through 
reference to the world outside the self. For example, 
Bergson's belief that "we become conscious of an act sui 
generis by which we detach ourselves from the present in 
order to replace ourselves, first in the past in general, 
then in a certain region of the past— a work of adjustment, 
something like the focusing of a camera" involves a belief 
that we "place ourselves at once in the past; we leap into 
the past" through a creative act of will and desire.20
Most significant for our study of Adams is Deleuze's
view of history which he explores with Felix Guattari in A
Thousand Plateaus. There, Deleuze proposes to replace what
he calls the "arborescent" model of culture with one founded
in the idea of the rhizome which connects and unites rather
than creating divisions. The problem with notions of
reality and of learning based on the image of the tree is
that they are hierarchical.
The tree and root inspire a sad image of 
thought that is forever imitating the 
multiple on the basis of a centered or 
higher segmented unity.... Arborescent 
systems are hierarchical systems with 
centers of significance and 
subjectification, central automata like 
organized memories.21
In such a model of thinking, memory is, as we have seen, 
specially privileged. Long-term memory, which traces the
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branches of family trees, and the versions of the shared 
past of civilizations is the real muse of western concepts 
of history. And history is what imprisons Quentin Compson, 
and ultimately Henry Adams, who, as we have seen, could not 
escape his identity as an Adams even in Tahiti. Deleuze 
proposes a "de-centered," transpersonal vision of history, 
in which short-term memory is privileged over long-term 
memory precisely because one of the characteristics of 
short-term memory is that it "includes forgetting as a 
process."
In the hierarchical models of thought that have 
dominated western culture's conceptions of itself, the idea 
of the personal self is as privileged as the memory that 
makes unified conceptions of self possible. The individual, 
after all, must engage in ordering the hierarchy of his 
world. He must engage in interpreting the tasks of the 
composite cultural memory we accept as history. Most 
privileged of all is the secularized priesthood of 
historians and literary artists who choose to make their 
visions of the past accessible to the community, and who 
bind the community together through the fruits of their 
long-term memory as they are preserved in writing— that 
living symbol of our alienation from one another. The 
literary artist, the historian, the philosopher are each, in 
their several ways, what Deleuze, following Rosenstiehl and 
Petitot, calls the "universal friend," mediating between the
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members of his audience through the agency of the text,
while at the same time announcing a necessary absence.
Who is the friend of humankind? Is it 
the philo-sopher as he appears in 
classical thought, even if he is an 
aborted unity that makes itself felt 
only through absence or subjectivity, 
saying all the while I know nothing, I 
am nothing. Thus the authors [Deleuze 
and Guattari] speak of dictatorship 
theorems. Such is indeed the principle 
of root-trees, or their outcome: the 
radicle solution, the structure of 
Power.22
But the universal friend does not unite; rather, he 
separates, because he can only communicate with his audience 
through absence. Adams's celebrated absences from his texts 
and from scheduled public appearances alike dramatize his 
own prescient sense that language could resonate only in the 
silences of the individual consciousness. For Adams, the 
idea that the "whole of the function of nature has been the 
ultimate production of this one-sided Consciousness,— this 
Degraded Act, this truncated Will,...that the function of 
man is, to the historian the production of thought" 
(Degradation. p. 205) was a deforming one, and, as he 
recognized, it lay at the heart of the western sense of the 
order of things.
Adams thus moves toward what Deleuze called a 
"nomadology" of thought— the opposite of a history— in which 
history comes to encompass what neither it nor the artifact 
of the book have ever accomplished— the world outside the 
perceiving consciousness.
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History has never comprehended nomadism, 
the book has never comprehended the 
outside. The State as the model for the 
book and for thought has a long history: 
logos, the philosopher-king, the 
transcendence of the Idea, the 
interiority of the concept, the republic 
of minds, the court of reason, the 
functionaries of thought, man as 
legislator and subject. The State's 
pretensions to be a world order, and to 
root man. The war machine's relation to 
an outside is not another 'model;' it is 
an assemblage that makes thought itself 
nomadic, and the book a working part in 
every mobile machine, a stem for a 
rhizome (Kleist and Kafka against 
Goethe) .23
Henry Adams's decision to erase himself through 
representing himself acquires its real significance when we 
consider his critique of history and historiography. His 
"suicide in print," was part of his embrace of vitalism; it 
was his way of naming a future that was not circumscribed 
by the personal self and its history. His "failure" was that 
he concluded that he could only point the way toward the 
alternative selves and the alternative history of the 
future.
By rights, Henry Adams should have been a high 
modernist, claiming for himself the capacities for 
engendering order that would later be claimed by a William 
Faulkner or a Gertrude Stein as artist. Instead, Adams, like 
his haunting image of the caterpillar, remains suspended 
between the textual world where he refuses to say "I," and 
the epistolary world where he perpetually constitutes a
community founded in absence, but ordered and connected by 
his own modernist imagination. Adams is hamstrung between 
an instinctive high modernism, and a prescient groping 
toward the postmodern realm of Warhol's diaries, which were 
dictated moment by moment over the electronic fields 
provided by the telphone. In his discussion of 
postmodernism, Fredric Jameson notes that postmodernism 
differs from high modernism in that the former is possessed 
of a "new kind of flatness or depthlessness." For Jameson, 
this kind of "death of the world of appearances" is no 
longer a matter of content, but rather "of some more 
fundamental mutation both in the object world itself— now 
become a set of texts or simulacra— and in the disposition 
of the subject."24 Adams's high modernist vision of a 
"crisis in the university— "a crisis of mind that was 
invented and interpreted by "men of letters"— is borne out 
in the postmodern outpourings of Deleuze and Warhol, but it 
is interpreted by the modernism of Adorno and Jameson, who 
still lend narrative coherence and a conventional linguistic 
shape to the absent selves and the absent order that both 
mourn.
From the nominalists to Petrarch, and from Petrarch to 
the Reformation, to Descartes and Pascal, and to Nietzsche 
and Bergson, Adams traces the emergence and disappearance of 
the subject of modernity and the history without which the 
individual subject has no meaning. Amid the bankruptcy of
his vision of the Cartesian and Hegelian models of mind, he 
experiments with a new world, one founded on sense and 
desire which moves us toward the neo-Scholasticism of 
Deleuze, the late twentieth century and postmodernism. That 
his quest ends in questionings is perhaps the mark of the 
true nomad.
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